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Preface
The chapters in this volume offer a timely analysis of some of the crucial challenges, contradictions and promises within current environmental discourses and practices in Latin America. This collective project 
arose from a symposium held in the spring of 2014 at the Institute of Latin 
American Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of London. Both 
the original event and the essays stemming from it have been envisaged as a 
space where scholars from different disciplines address and discuss interrelated 
aspects of the politics of the environment in the region. The issues and topics 
addressed include: conceptualisations of nature; indigeneity and environmental 
agendas; local and global agri-cultural1 knowledges and food security; the 
national, regional and international contexts of deforestation and climate 
change. Through an approach that stresses the interconnectedness between the 
epistemological, ontological and socio-political dimensions, the book reveals 
original articulations of environmental concerns that have been produced in 
many Latin American countries over the last two decades.
This book reveals the challenging scenarios and original perspectives that 
have come to the fore in Latin America in relation to the globally urgent 
issues of climate change and the environmental crisis. New political spaces 
for alternative eco-nomies are grounded upon emerging epistemic places of 
alternative eco-logies which are informing policy in Latin America through 
a hybridisation of knowledge-production processes. Firstly, this has been 
taking place through the appearance of a multiplicity of epistemic centres that 
have challenged the expert-led democratic model. Secondly, the concept of 
indigeneity, particularly in its relation to ecological memory, is complicated 
by a plurality of levels of hybridisation, from local to transnational, which 
problematises the role of indigenous politics within environmental movements. 
Several of the chapters demonstrate the deeper complexities and limitations in 
the processes through which many social actors influence policy and challenge 
the hegemony of ‘the lettered city’.2 While these challenges to existing forms 
of citizenship modelled upon the nation-state and party-politics democracy are 
1 The notion of ‘agri-culture’ encompasses ecologically-sound farming techniques and the 
reconnection of people, land and nature, as described in J. Pretty (2002).
2 See Á. Rama (1984).
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stronger than ever before, the state’s role in the management of natural resources 
remains dominant. 
The discussions are guided by two interconnected analytical frameworks: 
the relationship between nature, knowledge and identity and their role 
in understanding recent and current practices of climate change and 
environmental policy. The chapters contribute to this debate by offering 
multidisciplinary perspectives on particular aspects of these two frameworks, 
and through a multidirectional outlook that links the local, national, regional 
and transnational levels of inquiry across a diverse geographical spectrum. 
Each contribution approaches questions concerned with the politics of the 
environment in Latin America from a specific geographic, thematic and 
methodological viewpoint, while also creating interconnections that raise new 
questions, potentially relevant well beyond a regional context. By looking at the 
creation of new environmental discourses and policies through the emergence 
of new centres of epistemic production in the region, this volume ultimately 
explores the possibility of reconceptualising socio-natures beyond existing 
political and economic paradigms. As a whole it raises further questions on 
the need for new governance architectures within post-neoliberal or post-
development paradigms.
In the opening chapter, Michela Coletta and Malayna Raftopoulos set 
out to offer an overview of some of the major themes and questions that mark 
current environmental theories and practices in Latin America. They start by 
discussing how the epistemic and ontological turns have been incorporated into 
recent conceptualisations of the human/nature relationship with meaningful 
consequences for the modernist developmentalist paradigm. In introducing 
these debates, the chapter analyses them in the context of indigenous 
and land rights movements, participatory democracy and constitutional 
reform, neoextractivist policies and governance issues. By emphasising the 
relationship between environmental challenges and the new approaches that 
are emerging from a variety of epistemic communities, the authors consider 
the extent to which such a complex agency introduces different dynamics into 
national and regional environmental politics. Finally, these critical revisions 
of developmentalist socio-economic models are discussed in the face of the 
challenging divide between epistemological proposals and political realities. 
What ultimately is at stake is a reconceptualisation of nature within social, 
cultural and political structures.
In chapter 2, Lesley Wylie explores the wider significance of the cultural 
imaginations of nature in Latin America. Offering an analytical overview 
of nature’s role in Latin American literary and cultural imaginations, she 
considers the importance of plants in the literature on tropical South America 
from the Conquest to the present. Her chapter demonstrates that, from 
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the writings of the first European travellers, plants have been central to the 
construction of ‘New World’ Otherness, an Otherness embraced by writers in 
the post-independence era as a source of literary originality. It begins with an 
examination of how early modern travellers represented tropical flora before 
continuing with the celebration of plant-life established in the foundational 
Latin American narrative, Andrés Bello’s ‘Silva a la agricultura de la zona 
tórrida’, an attempt to forge a literary aesthetics able to convey the abundance 
and variety of tropical nature – one which, it will be shown, carried on well 
into the 20th century in traditions such as the novela de la selva. The chapter 
concludes with a consideration of the folktales and poetry of the Amazonian 
author Juan Carlos Galeano, which, informed by indigenous and ecological 
thinking, tends to present humans and plants – the human and the non-
human worlds – as profoundly interconnected. 
Naomi Millner explores understandings of indigenous knowledge within 
environmental politics in chapter 3. To do this, the author mobilises a 
‘multinaturalist’ perspective, which goes beyond looking at different cultural 
approaches to one given nature (multiculturalism) in order to include a 
multitude of ‘nature−cultures’. Analysing nature−cultures in transforming 
Global South contexts is complex, however, as rural life is constantly 
being reconfigured by globalising political economies and communication 
technologies. Focusing on a growing ‘permaculture’ movement in El Salvador, 
this discussion demonstrates the dangers of characterising non-dominant 
nature–cultures in terms of purity, localism or isolation. It proposes instead 
foregrounding the hybridity, always-already embedded into agricultural 
practices and ways of knowing, as a means of challenging material forms of 
enclosure which acquire legitimacy by situating indigenous knowledge in the 
past. Millner argues that this allows friction around universalising claims to 
‘nature’ to be created, and thus to propose the valorisation of diverse forms of 
expertise within the production of future-oriented environmental knowledge.
Graham Woodgate takes up the discussion on agroecology as post-
development discourse and practice in chapter 4, seeking to explore two 
distinct proposals, ‘global food security’ and ‘food sovereignty’, as possible 
strategies for confronting regional food insecurity and environmental 
degradation. Detractors criticise post-development discourse for not offering 
any viable alternatives. Since the 1980s, however, post-development processes 
have been building from the bottom-up. One of the clearest examples of post-
development in action is agroecology, a field of endeavour that brings together 
agricultural practice, transformative agroecological science and agrarian social 
movements, and is set in motion through the politics of food sovereignty. As 
such, agroecology represents a clear and potent challenge to the corporate 
food regime and its neoliberal discourse of ‘sustainable development’ and 
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‘food security’. The chapter begins by exploring the environmental impacts 
of different agricultural practices before moving on to consider the benefits 
associated with low-external input, biodiverse agriculture. Woodgate discusses 
agroecology’s origins and development and the promotion of its practices 
constructed from local and ecological knowledge. The second half considers 
the outset of 21st-century food price spikes and the proposal for food security 
and sovereignty and ends by discussing key dimensions of Latin America’s 
agroecology revolution.
In chapter 5, Marieke Riethof discusses Brazil’s participation in international 
negotiations on issues such as climate change and sustainable development. 
It argues that environmental foreign policy is not simply rooted in material 
interests and ecological vulnerability but also reflects the ambition to increase 
international recognition of an emerging country’s power and status. With 
Brazil emerging as an economic and political power that has global leadership 
ambitions, its commitment to environmental protection has come under 
increasing domestic and international scrutiny. Although the Brazilian 
government tends to stress national autonomy and sovereignty over natural 
resources, it has more recently committed itself to a unilateral and voluntary 
reduction of carbon emissions and has shifted its policies away from the 
traditional emphasis on developing countries’ differentiated responsibilities. 
The chapter examines the significant discrepancies between Brazil’s domestic 
and foreign environmental policy priorities. It outlines and explores examples 
of Brazil’s conflicting commitments to economic and green development 
strategies, as well as its foreign policy agenda such as the expansion of hydro-
electric power generation and rainforest protection. 
Anthony Hall contemplates the promises and challenges of REDD+ in 
Latin America in chapter 6. Policies of encouraging ‘Reduced Emissions 
from Deforestation and forest Degradation’ (REDD+) have been hailed 
internationally as a major opportunity to mitigate global warming by 
discouraging deforestation, enhancing carbon stocks and persuading rural 
populations to pursue more environmentally friendly, sustainable activities. A 
major proportion of Latin America’s greenhouse gas emissions are the result of 
agriculture and forestry. The chapter begins by examining REDD+ activities in 
Latin America and the region’s emergence as a REDD+ pioneer, albeit on an 
experimental basis so far. In spite of its relatively modest scale, policymakers 
have high hopes that a scaled-up REDD+ strategy could have a positive impact 
in terms of encouraging a more socially and environmentally appropriate 
rural development model and help reduce carbon emissions and avert global 
warming. The second part focuses on the challenges that REDD+ faces in 
the future as it is developed and expanded. These include the introduction of 
economic incentives within a neoliberal logic, securing additional international 
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funding, creating appropriate governance structures, and dealing with potential 
conflicts over land and natural resources. 
Katinka Weber reflects, in chapter 7, on the effects and limits of 
contemporary discourses of indigenous environmentalism in Bolivia and 
their seeming capacity to mask indigenous voices and realities and undermine 
indigenous sovereignty claims. Firstly, she addresses how this discourse 
operates in the Bolivian national indigenous project, which proposes that 
wisdom and leadership on global environmental issues could be provided by 
indigenous cultures and movements. The chapter reveals how these discourses 
are based on reductive images of indigenous-nature relations, clashing with 
the complex political and economic realities faced by the Movimiento al 
Socialismo (MAS) administration. Furthermore, it considers how this plays 
out in one particular Bolivian locality, the Monte Verde territory in the eastern 
Bolivian Santa Cruz department. In exploring the case of the Chiquitano 
people, Weber demonstrates how these national discourses intersect with 
environmental discourses, wielded by a host of non-governmental actors to 
create a situation where Chiquitano and their leaders must fulfil certain state-
recognised and defined forms of organisation and administration. Finally, 
such environmentalist discourses have the capacity to obscure the complex 
livelihoods indigenous peoples engage in, or the plans for their future.
Finally, chapter 8 by Sarah Radcliffe discusses how environmental 
policy debates in post-neoliberal Ecuador position indigeneity and analyses 
the decolonial politics indigenous peoples have devised to both resignify 
indigeneity and recast the protection of environments. It begins by exploring 
how indigeneity is informing and positioning socio-natures in relation to 
‘all-too-human’ subjects and the political, administrative and development 
contexts in which they operate. Drawing on in-depth collaborative work with 
Kichwa indigenous women, the chapter examines ongoing negotiations about 
the most appropriate agricultural development, the direction for policy and 
the meanings and salience of indigeneity. These dynamics provide a context in 
which to analyse ethnographically and theoretically the postcolonial framings 
of socio-natures in ‘post-neoliberal’ Ecuador, and to discuss how to decolonise 
the powerful association between agentive nature, environmental agendas and 
indigeneity. The chapter suggests that, notwithstanding a degree of policy 
openness to indigenous knowledges, indigeneity is figured in ways that tend to 
reproduce colonial relations. Radcliffe concludes by arguing for decolonising 
the debates around environment and indigeneity.

1. Whose natures? Whose knowledges? 
An introduction to epistemic politics and 
eco-ontologies in Latin America 
Michela Coletta and Malayna Raftopoulos
In early 2014 Ecuador’s National Electoral Council rejected a petition for a national referendum over government plans to allow oil explorations in protected areas of one of the world’s most biodiverse areas − the Yasuní 
National Park in the Ecuadorian Amazon. While activists and campaigners 
invoked the conservation of nature and the protection of indigenous 
communities, President Rafael Correa appealed to the need for more revenue 
to support social welfare plans and poverty reduction. The dilemma between 
exploiting natural resources on the grounds of socio-economic development 
and defending environmental rights represents the major challenge that many 
Latin American countries will face over the coming decades. These conflicting 
scenarios are mirrored in the equally complex discrepancies between alternative 
visions that can seriously compete with modernist political and economic 
models and the implementation of socio-political reform. This opening 
chapter introduces some recent questions that have been widely discussed in 
scholarly debates and beyond, emphasising the recent emergence of epistemic 
and political centres which are bringing the region into the forefront of original 
visions and conceptualisations.
Shifting the focus from the colonialism paradigm which has shaped most 
of the region’s environmental histories (Faber, 1992; Miller, 2007), the chapter 
sets the tone and scope for the rest of the book on new ways of conceptualising 
nature, territoriality and development in Latin America that have come to 
the fore especially in the social sciences (Carey, 2009) and to some extent 
also in eco-critical studies (Kane, 2010). The relationship between humans 
and their physical environment has been widely shown to have been crucial 
in understanding and constructing the New World (Pratt, 1992; Greenblatt, 
1992). Historians have pointed out the extent to which Columbus’s inability 
to recognise and name the American flora troubled him, and several readings 
have attempted to establish whether the admiral’s frustration had a purely 
epistemological basis or rather was driven by economic motives, since it meant 
he could not establish the value of the newly acquired territories (Rivera-Barnes 
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and Hoeg, 2009). Not only was America’s nature envisaged as a discrete set of 
resources to be possessed, categorised and exploited; the New World as such was 
imagined and objectified as nature (Gerbi, 1985; Cañizares-Esguerra, 2006).
The profound interrelations between the economic, the political and the 
cultural in consolidating a colonial system in the Americas have been widely 
discussed (Quijano and Wallerstein, 1992). In spite of this, Latin America 
hardly features in studies exploring the creation of the modern world from 
a global perspective (Bayly, 2004). This historiographical gap is all the more 
obvious when one considers the general lack of attention given to geographically 
and culturally specific articulations of economic, political and social structures 
in relation to their real and potential role in understanding and formulating 
human-nature relations. New categories such as ‘environmentality’ (Agrawal, 
2005) have recently been introduced to both signify and comprehend how 
the emergence of new local identities around environmental agendas plays out 
with the state and other traditional actors. In Latin America, a cognitive and 
epistemic shift has been advocated over the last two decades or so in order to 
move away from modernist paradigms and to adopt original epistemological 
and ontological narratives in which rearticulating the natural environment’s 
role must be paramount.
The continued reliance on the exploitation of natural resources, which has 
not been sufficient to overcome high levels of poverty and social injustice, 
combined with the high impact of climate change in post-colonial regions 
has made scholars question established historiographical paradigms. In a 
seminal article comprehensively introducing the ‘Anthropocene’ category, that 
is, a new human-engendered geological era, into history and social sciences 
debates, historian Dipesh Chakrabarty has argued that ‘what scientists have 
said about climate change challenges not only ideas about the human […] 
but also the analytic strategies that post-imperial and post-colonial historians 
have deployed in the last two decades in response to […] decolonization and 
globalization’ (2009, p. 198). Latin American authors’ concern with similar 
questions has gradually and increasingly included debates on environmental 
sustainability and environmental governance in which intellectual and social 
actors from academia, social and indigenous movements, governmental 
and non-governmental institutions, have posed a challenge to the political 
and economic ontology of the development model through new relational 
ontologies coming from local and indigenous communities and cultures.
The category of ‘decoloniality’ evolved following the emergence of the 
‘epistemic turn’ in both the methodology and practice of critical thought in 
Latin America since the late 1990s, when questions about the historical as well 
as the theoretical legacy of modernist categories started to be debated across 
disciplines (Dussel, 2000; Quijano, 2000). Latin American scholars started 
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calling for new ways of understanding and approaching the region’s post-colonial 
status by asking whether it was possible to imagine Latin America’s future within 
the modernist paradigm, while acknowledging the fact that ‘Euro-modernity’ 
would not have been possible without colonialism (Mignolo, 2002; 2007). In 
other words, ‘[c]oloniality and modernity constitute two sides of the same coin’ 
(Grosfoguel, 2007, p. 218). So, whereas the ‘post-colonialism’ category indicates 
a chronological process encompassing political, economic and cultural structures, 
‘decoloniality’ can be said to express a relational, non-linear and multidirectional 
structure which in itself does not respond to modernist patterns. 
The dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity, or the Cartesian 
distinction between a thinking subject and the object of the subject’s thought, 
was reproduced in the European mind’s objectification of the New World’s 
nature. In the words of anthropologist Philippe Descola, ‘[o]ne does not have 
to be a great seer to predict that the relationship between humans and nature 
will, in all probability, be the most important question of the present century’ 
(2013b, p. 81). Not only is this question especially compelling and urgent 
in Latin America, it is also in this region that new theoretical, political and 
economic conceptualisations of the relationship between humans and the 
natural environment are being formulated, assessed and challenged: ‘What 
is knowledge in a context where the distinction between subject and object 
becomes moot?’ (Blaser, 2014, p. 50). As new relational structures are turned 
into potential political and juridical entities, is it enough to consider difference 
as cultural, or, as some propose, is it necessary to engage with alterity in a new 
way and take into account different realities? This ‘ontological turn’ (Blaser, 
2013; 2014) attempts to overcome classical critiques of modernity through 
categories such as ‘tradition’ − which still imply that ‘modernity’ is accepted 
as all-encompassing − and to open up new possibilities of incorporating a 
performative value into different ways of ‘wording worlds’. New epistemic 
assemblages bear on the region’s environmental politics in unprecedented ways, 
as the chapters in this volume clearly show.
Natures, knowledges and identities
The production and organisation of knowledge from multiple loci form the 
foundation of the decolonial option. Since the construction of Otherness 
starts from the epistemic field, the latter cannot be detached from its political 
and practical embodiments. In a heterological sense, the deconstruction of 
Otherness through pluralising places of knowledge must challenge first and 
foremost the separation between the theory and the practice, that is, the 
speculative fragmentation that has allowed the western European subject to 
be identified as the thinking subject informing and conquering the objectified 
Other (de Certeau, 1986). Some scholars have seen in this pluralisation-of-
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knowledge process a challenge to the ‘lettered city’ (Rama, 1984), namely to 
the idea that knowledge is produced ‘elsewhere’ by ‘expert institutions’ without 
any connection to a given community and its social and physical environments: 
‘an important pattern in contemporary Latin American social mobilization [is] 
the ongoing challenge to the dominant regime of modern power/knowledge’ 
(Aparicio and Blaser, 2008, p. 60). The creation of ‘mixed spaces’ of critical 
thought and action has been identified as an essential feature of the modernity/
coloniality approach. Different agents or levels of border thinking (Mignolo, 
2000) interact in creating alternative strategies that link the decoloniality of 
knowledge and power: social movements and subaltern actors, intellectual-
activists, academic-intellectual agents and the state, thus challenging the 
normative conceptualisations of traditional spaces of knowledge/power 
(Escobar, 2007). Several chapters here bring to the fore the achievements 
and challenges of the socio-political practice of decolonial thinking in Latin 
America in relation to environmental discourses.
The decentring of euromodernist perspectives has further contributed 
to strengthening ethnic politics in the region in relation to ecology and 
environmentalism. Land rights and indigenous movements have increasingly 
mobilised around the crisis of the modernist paradigm which has failed to deliver 
sustainable societal and economic structures. The current environmental crisis has 
led to a further questioning of the epistemological frameworks based on a dialectic 
system of inclusion-exclusion upon which the developmentalist socio-economic 
model is based. The construction of the political agency of indigeneity in relation 
to environmental discourses is deeply ingrained in the idea of the possibility of 
a new political and social ecology based on alternative cosmologies other than 
the modern one. Scholars have replaced the multiculturalism category with one 
of interculturality (Walsh, 2003; 2009) based on the principle of relationality 
rather than on the dualistic principles that have produced racialised, gendered and 
ontologically discrete knowledge systems. One issue, for example, regards linguistic 
plurality and its socio-cultural value in determining both the significance of 
scientific interculturality and the effective role of new political agents (Walsh, 2002; 
Gustafson, 2009). It has become clear that, as the epistemic production loci have 
started to shift away from a centre-periphery axis, the political participation models 
are similarly moving away from the model of the nation-state and traditional party-
politics democracy. 
The contingencies of neoliberal reform opened up new political spaces for 
popular mobilisation by encouraging the rearticulation of politics from a class-
based discourse to one of indigenous identity, allowing these new movements 
to mobilise around claims for cultural recognition, territorial sovereignty 
and environmental rights (Haarstad and Andersson, 2009). For example, in 
Cochabamba, Bolivia, during the struggle to regain control of water from the 
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Bechtel transnational corporation, it became clear that the labour movement 
had been significantly weakened under neoliberalism. In place of the traditional 
labour movement emerged the Coordinadora social movement, spearheaded 
by street vendors, peasant farmers, irrigators, local water committees and urban 
neighbourhood water cooperatives as well as those associated with the fabriles 
[factory workers] (Olivera, 2004). As Burbach et al. comment, these new social 
movements with their broad range of interests and demands have ‘transcended 
the modernist meta-narratives of both capitalism and socialism’ (2013, p. 19) 
and have gained both national and international prominence. Their demands for 
new forms of representation, political autonomy and multicultural recognition 
have ‘engaged Latin America in a struggle over the kinds of democracies that 
will be built; the rights, responsibilities, and identities of citizens; and the 
ties that bind citizens to the state’ (Yashar, 1999, p. 78). Furthermore, their 
transcendence as political actors has shifted the balance between global and 
local politics as spheres of social change (Martin and Wilmer, 2008). 
Due to the racialisation and subsequent ‘indigenisation’ of Latin America’s 
autochthonous populations, some commentators have emphasised the extent 
to which, far from simply being one more form of social movement, indigenous 
agency has an unequalled and unprecedented subversive potential in political, 
ethical, epistemic and aesthetic contexts (Quijano, 2012). The relationship 
between territoriality and indigeneity is largely defined through the existence 
of communal forms of living, based on relational ontologies in which, unlike 
in modern cosmologies, nature is not externalised. Literature on the tropics, 
for example, often dealing with the challenge explorers face in classifying the 
Amazon’s overwhelming vegetation, clashes with indigenous relational thinking 
in which the sharp dichotomy between natural objects and social beings is 
absent (Descola, 2013a). Studies about indigenous ontologies have focused 
on alternative categories to exemplify the fluid relation between humans and 
non-humans in Amazonian indigenous cultures (Rival, 1998; Brightman et 
al., 2012). Wylie, in the next chapter, demonstrates how crucial tropical nature 
representations have been to discourses about cultural and political identities 
from colonial times up to the more recent significance of indigenous poetics of 
plants for new forms of ecological thinking.
The ways in which these ontologies are based on a different phenomenology 
which escapes the principle of nature’s exteriority have been largely incorporated 
within the current constructions of indigeneity, particularly in relation to the 
ecological impact of environmental indigenous knowledge (Rival, 2009). It 
has been widely shown, for instance, how activists in the Andean region often 
weave both Aymara and Quechua traditional beliefs about the sacredness of 
places into discourses about communal lands and environmental protection 
(de la Cadena, 2010; García Linera, 2012). This scenario is further complicated 
PROVINCIALISING NATURE6
by more recent processes of ‘hybridization of environmental and human rights 
discourses within a [Catholic] religious framework’ (Arellano-Yanguas, 2014, 
p. 76), which stress the spirituality of the environment’s well-being and that of 
all living beings. The multiple layers of indigenous epistemic politics are even 
more blurred according to scholars who see the relationship between modern 
and non-modern worlds as a fictional divide imposed through coloniality 
(Aparicio and Blaser, 2008). Indeed, as Millner shows in chapter 3, the edifice 
of indigenous knowledges goes far beyond the interrelations between memory 
and tradition and involves a hybridisation between the local and the global. 
This emergence of mixed spaces of epistemic politics has brought to the surface 
new aporias in the theory and practice of democratic values through the 
appearance not only of new social and political actors, but also of alternative 
ideological formulations (Escobar, 2010). 
Social movements in Latin America have undoubtedly benefited from the 
shift in governance structures and the radical constitutional reforms which 
have taken place throughout the continent in the last two decades, placing 
greater emphasis on local participatory development and democracy. The 
creation of new rights for previously excluded groups has led to their political 
incorporation and heightened mobilisation. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Ecuador, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela have all ratified the 
Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples by the International Labour 
Organization, stipulating that indigenous peoples must be consulted with 
regard to extractive projects in their territories (Haarstad, 2012). These new 
constitutions and conventions have become a crucial weapon in the struggle 
against the old elites and also against the very same governments who supported 
constitutional reform (Burbach et al., 2013). The adoption of extractivism by 
pink-tide governments in the region to fund social programmes has resulted 
in repeated clashes with indigenous communities over the use and control of 
natural resources and land. One such incident was the violent confrontation 
between indigenous protesters from the lowland town of Trinidad and Bolivian 
police in 2011 over government plans to build a highway through the middle 
of the recognised Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure. Despite 
it being formally protected by Bolivian Law, the Morales government, like its 
predecessors, declared the project top priority and authorised the completion of 
designs to construct the highway. Although the conflict is linked to additional 
pressures on land and territory, it is embedded in the expansion of agriculture 
and hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation (Bebbington and Bebbington, 
2012). Current governments’ continued use of neoliberal developmental 
agendas, coupled with globalisation, has nonetheless opened up new political 
spaces in natural resource governance for transnational networks of indigenous 
movements and actors and provided them with a larger stage to promote their 
demands (Radcliffe et al., 2005).
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Sustainability, post-development and beyond
The debate surrounding natural resources and the need for more equitable 
sustainable development is more prominent than ever before and high on the 
public policy agenda of national and international actors in Latin America. 
Although natural resources offer an opportunity for economic growth and 
development, their presence has also posed somewhat of a conundrum: curse or 
blessing? Latin America’s relationship with its natural resources has historically 
been a source of conflicting political, social and economic dynamics. As Haarstad 
fittingly comments, ‘natural resources have traditionally been considered a 
curse on Latin American societies, from the plundering of the colonial era to 
the ills of commodity dependency in later years’ (2012, p. 1). Current research 
on development and natural resource extraction moves beyond the idea of the 
resource curse focusing increasingly on the good governance concept (Collier 
and Goderis, 2008; Dunning, 2008; Mehlum et al., 2006; Van de Ploeg, 2011). 
The question of why some countries benefit from their natural resources, while 
others lose out, has been at the forefront of this research with scholars such as 
Van de Ploeg (2011) arguing that low economic growth, political instability, 
poor institutions and an underdeveloped financial system are all contributing 
factors. 
Widespread poverty and social injustice are often considered to be a direct 
consequence of the socio-economic conditions produced by extractivist-based 
economies in Latin American countries rich in natural resources. Ecuadorian 
economist Alberto Acosta has defined this seeming paradox as the ‘curse of 
abundance’, suggesting that extractivist economies have continued to create 
the preconditions for not just political but financial, commercial, social and 
energetic instability in countries such as Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela and 
Brazil (2009, pp. 30−2). He argues that this continued reliance on exploiting 
non-renewable resources not only perpetrates neocolonial power relations 
based on the export-led growth model, with incalculable environmental 
consequences, but it also further undermines democratic institutions by 
creating a ‘paternalistic state’, one ‘whose political impact is a direct result of its 
ability to manage a higher or lower participation in the mining or oil revenues’ 
(ibid., p. 136). According to many Latin American critics and analysts, Latin 
American progressive governments’ neoextractivist policies, based on claims of 
equitable development, have failed to tackle this legacy. They have instead built 
on it further through the state’s much more prominent and active role in the 
extractivist sector. For some, the crucial question revolves around the ways in 
which the concept of ‘growth’ as the basis for ‘development’ still remains at the 
core of debates about wealth redistribution (Gudynas, 2009, pp. 193−6, 
213−16).
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The region’s changing political climate has fostered optimism that finally 
natural resource extraction could offer long-term, broad-based benefits to 
its local communities and national economies (Haarstad, 2012). The rise of 
left and centre-left governments in countries such as Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador 
and Venezuela, has been accompanied by a shift towards new post-neoliberal 
and post-development agendas that seek to reinstate national sovereignty 
over the economy and the countries’ natural resources, while managing their 
development in a sustainable manner. The alternative platforms put forward 
by new left governments in Latin America have looked to transcend traditional 
growth-centric economic models by offering radical alternatives to the way in 
which socio-economic development discourses are constructed. Offering an 
innovative response to the post-development concept, the buen vivir notion 
[live well] moves beyond traditional western development theory, based on a 
narrow set of indicators,1 transforming the relationship between development 
policy and social wellbeing. The rise of the new left and indigenous social 
movements has opened up critical new political spaces allowing for the 
expression of indigenous knowledge, traditions and cultural identity which 
had previously been oppressed (Radcliffe et al., 2005; Gudynas, 2011). 
In the face of increasing human insecurity and socio-economic inequality, 
the Buen Vivir planning process has become synonymous with preserving 
human dignity and community solidarity in harmony with nature 
(Ruttenberg, 2013). Furthermore, as ecologist Eduardo Gudynas posits, 
‘Buen Vivir does not endorse the classical understanding of a unidirectional 
linear progression of history, following a precise path, as several directions 
are possible’ (2001, p. 445).
The critique of the growth-based development model therefore extends so far 
as to entail a deeper and more comprehensive critique of Euro-modernity and 
modern ontology through Buen Vivir’s relational ontology. As all the chapters 
here show, what is at stake in the challenging task underway is to produce 
clear alternative epistemological and political proposals. These decolonising 
processes must stem from understanding how Latin American nature was 
historically created as a pivotal element in how the modernist development 
category was imported. Indeed, within the developmental economic model, 
nature does not appear as such, but rather as a discrete system of ‘resources’ 
devoid of any intrinsic relational value (Gudynas, 1999). On the contrary, the 
theory and practice of Buen Vivir presupposes a new set of rights based on 
plurality and coexistence rather than on dialectical dualities and hierarchies. 
For Gudynas, Buen Vivir as a post-development model is also both post-
capitalist and post-socialist (2011). Unlike degrowth movements (Latouche, 
1 The Human Development Index (HDI) is based on three basic dimensions: a long and healthy 
life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living.
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2009), it implies a critique of modernisation while also incorporating strong 
environmental and intercultural components. Whereas, on the one hand, the 
state’s role has been strengthened, on the other pluralising social and political 
stakeholders has also meant that new complex negotiations are taking place at 
different levels. In Grosfoguel’s words, ‘[what] would the world-system look like 
if we move the locus of enunciation from the European man to an Indigenous 
woman in the Americas […]?’ (2007, p. 216). Radcliffe’s contribution (chapter 
8) vividly brings to the fore the complex relation between indigeneity, gender 
and environmental politics in Ecuador.
The Buen Vivir paradigm has become an integral part of Latin America’s 
post-neoliberal policy framework and socio-economic transition, driven and 
articulated by the region’s leftist governments and indigenous social movements 
(Ruttenberg, 2013). In Bolivia and Ecuador the concept has gained broad 
social, cultural and political support. Both countries have redefined themselves 
as plurinational states in a post-colonial context, incorporating buen vivir 
principles into their national development plans and new constitutions 
(Fatheuer, 2011).2 In Bolivia, Buen Vivir represents the state’s basic principles 
and orientation, promoting a pluralistic society’s ethical and moral principles. 
It refers to the Aymara concept of Suma Qamaña and to the Guaraní ideas of 
ñandereko [harmonious living], teko kavi [the good life], ivi maraei [the land 
without evil] and qhapaj ñan [the path to a noble life], emphasising in particular 
the protection of Pachamama [Mother Earth]. The Ecuadorian conceptual 
framework for Buen Vivir differs in that it refers to plural sets of rights based 
on the indigenous Quechua notion of sumak kawsay, which includes the 
rights to freedom, participation, health, shelter, education, food, as well as the 
rights of nature, rather than an ethical principle for the state as in the case of 
Bolivia (Gudynas, 2011, p. 443). As Gudynas has noted, by bringing together 
a ‘Buen Vivir regime’ with a ‘development regime’ the Ecuadorian constitution 
moves away from the ‘classical approach where a classical development strategy 
determines and limits economic and social life’ to rearticulating development 
through the Buen Vivir framework and objectives (ibid.). Although these 
approaches have existed for centuries, only recently have they been drawn 
into the post-development debate. Distinct from western forms of knowledge, 
which are grounded on lineal advancement notions, these buen vivir notions 
have emerged both as an expression of decolonial efforts and as an attempt to 
strengthen plural cultural identities (ibid., p. 444). 
In Bolivia, the notion of Pachamama has been interwoven into the country’s 
political rhetoric. In December 2010, President Evo Morales set a global 
precedent by adopting the Law on the Protection of the Earth, recognising the 
2 The Buen Vivir concept was incorporated into the new constitutions of Ecuador in 2008 and 
of Bolivia in 2009.
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rights of all living things and giving the natural world equal status to human 
beings. Morales has continually used the international arena to lobby for the 
protection of Mother Earth, successfully campaigning to have the United 
Nations (UN) declare 22 April as International Mother Earth Day and hosting 
the World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother 
Earth in Cochabamba in 2010. Attended by over 30,000 people, including 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and scientists, as well as union and 
government delegations, the conference called for the protection of indigenous 
rights, proposals to keep fossil fuels underground, and the rejection of carbon 
emission schemes such as the UN programme for Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Degradation (REDD). Controversially, it also demanded 
that developed countries acknowledge and repay their ‘climate debt’ by 
transferring technology and funds to developing countries to help them adapt 
and mitigate against climate change challenges. 
With climate change high on the UN political agenda, REDD has become 
a major policy instrument in the global discussion on how to reduce global 
warming (Hall, 2012). Although REDD is unique in that it has the potential 
to generate co-benefits such as poverty alleviation and biodiversity conservation 
for heavily forested countries like Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador and Peru (Scriven, 
2012), it has also proved highly controversial. Among the many challenges 
facing REDD is the rising concern regarding the potential threat it poses to 
indigenous rights and territories and the lack of safeguards in place to protect 
their interests (Lovera, 2008; Peskett et al., 2008; Wollenberg and Springate-
Baginski, 2009). Indigenous communities are being targeted for involvement 
in REDD projects, often without their consent, and coerced into signing 
away their rights to land and carbon under terms that are highly favourable 
to commercial interests. The REDD programme has highlighted the intimate 
relationship between land tenure rights and indigenous peoples’ demands for 
collective self-determination (MacKay, 2011) and the wider discussion of how 
to integrate human rights-based approaches to conservation (Campese and 
Borrini-Feyerabend, 2011). Hall further analyses the challenges and promises 
of REDD+ in Latin America in chapter 6.
In the last decade, Latin American countries have played a leading role 
in the global fight against climate change. Most countries in the region have 
adopted national mitigation and adaptation strategies at national and (sub)
regional levels such as the Paraguayan National Climate Change Policy of 
2011, the 2010 Uruguayan National Response Plan to Climate Change, the 
2008 Bolivian National Mechanism for Adaptation to Climate Change and the 
2012 Peruvian National Plan of Action on Adaptation and Mitigation Against 
Climate Change. The election of left and centre-left governments and the 
subsequent rise of the region’s social movements, has provided a platform for 
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the world’s most impoverished and vulnerable people to highlight grassroots 
socio-environmental struggles and climate change effects on Latin American 
societies. In November 2014, Venezuela hosted the Preparatory Meeting of 
the Social PreCOP on Climate Change, bringing together for the first time 
civil society and governments to discuss practical, viable and inclusive solutions 
within the framework of respect for nature’s rights and human rights, and 
highlighting the importance of local governments and citizen participation in 
implementing public policies to address climate change. The meeting resulted 
in the drafting of the Margarita Declaration outlining the key demands of 
social movements. It called for more attention to be focused on the social 
dimensions of climate change, the transformation of the current model of 
consumption and the move away from the green economy. Importantly, Latin 
American countries have raised the profile of the ecological challenges of 
climate change, highlighting agriculture’s role in natural resource management 
(deforestation, land degradation, loss of biodiversity and water scarcity), the 
impact of climate change on food systems worldwide and advocating the use of 
more sustainable forms of agricultural production. New approaches involving 
agroecological science and indigenous knowledge systems are increasingly 
being used by rural communities in Latin America. Recent studies show that 
these methods are enhancing food security while conserving natural resources 
and empowering peasant organisations (Altieri and Toledo, 2011, Rosett et al., 
2011), as Woodgate demonstrates in chapter 4.
Despite their post-neoliberal rhetoric, certain countries have followed a 
neoextractivist path and have expanded their respective extractive industries, 
driven by the growing global demand for minerals, oil and natural resources 
and sustained price increases (Bebbington and Bebbington, 2011; 2012). 
Although the policy of extractivism under the new left governments of Latin 
America may be viewed as more progressive to previous forms of extraction in 
relation to the distribution of economic benefits, they still continue to support 
capitalist production modes through hydrocarbon expansion (Gudynas, 2009). 
As has been shown, for example, in the cases of both Ecuador and Bolivia, the 
contradictions inherent in the attempts to turn constitutional principles into 
policy are apparent first and foremost in the abundance of modernist linguistic 
concepts such as ‘growth’, ‘productivity’, ‘efficiency’ and ‘market economy’. 
In other words, without a clear political project that implements it through 
effective policies, this new decolonial episteme may remain vague and often 
problematic (Escobar, 2010). 
As the pursuit of extractive industry growth policies has run into local 
opposition, social movements have increasingly become engaged in the debate 
on biodiversity conservation and appropriation, and in redefining cultural 
and ethnic identities (Escobar, 1998, p. 53). Although the emergence of social 
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movements that explicitly appeal to biodiversity discourses is a relatively new 
phenomenon, it has, in countries such as Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, Bolivia 
and Brazil, originated from the broader struggles for territorial control 
(ibid., p. 61). The unique approach to biodiversity conservation applied by 
the region’s social movements is ‘couched in terms of cultural difference, 
territorial defense, and some measure of social and political autonomy’ (ibid., 
p. 54). In linking biodiversity to cultural and territorial defence, these social 
movements have articulated an alternative political ecology framework that 
transforms the debates on biodiversity and places local communities at the 
centre of innovation and alternative worlds (ibid.). Indigenous environmental 
movements pose a challenge to policymakers by introducing new dynamics 
into processes of capitalist globalisation (Escobar, 2008). However, as shown 
by chapters 5, 7 and 8, by Riethof, Weber and Radcliffe respectively, forms 
of bottom-up decoloniality (Mignolo, 2007), based for example on the 
notions of plurinationality and interculturality (Walsh, 2009), are met with a 
challenging scenario where local communities try to assert themselves in the 
face of both national, regional and transnational actors. Although activists 
often use indigenous cosmologies and epistemologies to support environmental 
discourses, converting the decolonial turn into a political space remains a much 
more complex and challenging feat. 
Arturo Escobar has highlighted two different projects which are underway 
in the region: the first, based on anti-neoliberal principles, is anchored to 
modernising and developmentalist models from the left, while the second 
attempts to propose alternatives to Euro-modernity (2007). In this second 
hypothesis, decoloniality is therefore taking place in three interlinked areas: 
epistemological, economic and political. This problematisation of recent and 
current attempts to include relationality into political and social structures 
is clearly exemplified by the chapters in this volume. As new discourses on 
Latin American nature are being created through ecological narratives based 
on reappropriating various forms of local knowledge, the interactions between 
local, national, regional and global dynamics have made them all the more 
complex. Although this scenario opens up new opportunities for managing 
existing structures as well as creating alternative ones in the conflicts over 
natural resources, it also reveals certain rhetorical, cultural and administrative 
continuities in colonial relations.
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2. The poetics of plants in  
Latin American literature 
Lesley Wylie
Plants have played a significant role in the culture and society of Central and South America since pre-Columbian times. Agriculture began in South America some 10,000 years ago, yielding not only reliable sources of 
food, but as Kowtko argues, ‘fundamental advancements in society, economics, 
culture, and politics’ (2006, p. 50). Flora figured highly in pre-Columbian 
cosmologies and myths, as well as in Mesoamerican calendrical systems (Staller 
and Carrasco, 2010, p. 122) and pre-Columbian man’s knowledge of and 
important relationship to plants is evidenced by detailed botanical illustrations, 
such as the Mexican codices, and on Mayan embroideries, Peruvian textiles and 
Colombian ceramic spindle whorls (McMeekin, 1992, pp. 171–2). John E. 
Staller shows that maize, in particular, ‘was central to the mythological origins, 
ethnic identification and very existence of the Mesoamerican people’ (2010, 
p. 59) – an importance captured in the title of Miguel Ángel Asturias’ novel 
Hombres de maiz (1949).1
Flora continued to play a transcendent role in the colonial period, with botany 
and the prospecting of economic plants at the heart of Europe’s earliest encounters 
with the Americas, and income largely dependent on the ‘precise identification 
and effective cultivation of profitable plants’ (Schiebinger and Swan, 2007, p. 
2). Alfred W. Crosby’s classic book, The Columbian Exchange, established the 
ecological as well as the cultural consequences of the Conquest (1972).2 Non-
native crops such as sugar and coffee, grown by African slaves, became staples of 
colonial agriculture while rubber, a native plant, was at the centre of a boom in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries which dramatically altered the demography 
and topography of large areas of the Amazon. In the plantation culture of the 
American Tropics, especially in the Caribbean, there has long been, according to 
DeLoughrey, ‘an entanglement with the environment’, which precludes a simple 
division between humans and nature (2011, p. 265; see also Allewaert, 2013). 
1 See Millner, chapter 3, for her discussion on plants and the politics of nature in El Salvador.
2 Londa Schiebinger (2007, p. 83), has coined the idea of ‘biocontact zones’, after Mary Louise 
Pratt, to refer to the ‘exchange of plants and their cultural uses’ between Europeans and non-
Europeans, including in the Americas. 
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In Caribbean discourse, plants and trees have often been used to ‘metaphorize 
heredity’ (Alcocer, 2005, p. 81), providing ‘organic metaphors for civilization, 
a means of naturalizing the nation and/or ethnicity through the grammar of 
“roots” and genealogical “branches”’ (DeLoughrey, 2008). 
The plant kingdom is not only fundamental to the history of the Americas 
more broadly, but closely tied to the place’s literary identity. In the case of 
Latin America, flora has figured prominently in literature from the botanical 
considerations of early modern travelogues by colonial explorers such as 
Christopher Columbus to poems such as Gregorio Gutiérrez González’s 
Memoria sobre el cultivo del maíz en Antioquia (1866). In the 18th and 19th 
centuries, poets enlisted tropical agriculture as a means to celebrate and explore 
regional and later post-independent identity. The Guatemalan-born Jesuit, 
Rafael Landívar, extolled American flora in his Latin poem ‘Rusticatio Mexicana’ 
(1781), and Andrés Bello’s ‘Silva a la agricultura de la zona tórrida’ (1826), 
which will be discussed in more detail below, praises the fecundity of tropical 
nature and the superabundance of crops such as maize and sugarcane. In the 
20th century, literary and national identity in Latin America continued to be 
intertwined with the botanical in traditions such as the novela de la selva [jungle 
novel], and more recently plants and trees have been central to the ‘mythology-
infused ecopoetics’ of much literature from the Amazon basin (Wylie, 2014, p. 
13). Indeed, a growing focus on the eco-critical dimensions of Latin American 
literature reveals the extent to which many literary texts register complex, non-
exploitative relationships between humans and nature, especially between people 
and plants (see, for instance, Taylor Kane, 2010; DeVries, 2013; Nielson, 2014).
This chapter examines the poetics of plants in a number of texts from 
tropical South America from the 1500s to the present, all united by the writers’ 
engagement with the botanical, both as subject matter and metaphor. Examining, 
in turn, Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés’ Sumario de la natural historia de 
las Indias (1526) and Historia general y natural de las Indias (1535), and Andrés 
Bello’s ‘Silva a la agricultura de la zona tórrida’, it explores how tropical plants 
and trees both challenged and defined literary form in the early modern and 
early independence eras, becoming a source of literary as well as geographical 
identity. The chapter concludes by considering the role of flora in the work of 
Juan Carlos Galeano, a contemporary writer from the Amazon, where issues of 
deforestation and plant extinction have produced a new tradition of phytocentric 
texts concerned with the preservation of the forest and the relationship between 
humans and the ‘more-than-human world’ (Abram, 1996).3
3 Although there is insufficient space here to explore more than three authors in detail, their 
concern with the botanical is echoed, as noted above, across many other Latin American 
works, from the use of floral discourse in Jorge Issacs’ celebrated Romantic novel María to 
Pablo Neruda’s frequent references to trees in the Canto general.
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Marvellous nature
In the first years of the Conquest, many accounts of the Americas were proffered 
for consumption back in Spain, particularly aimed at the monarchs who 
funded the expeditions to the so-called ‘New World’. Some of these provide 
enraptured descriptions of urban spaces, such as Bernal Díaz del Castillo’s 
Historia verdadera de la conquista de Nueva España (1568), or ethnographically 
attentive accounts of the indigenous people, such as Fray Ramón Pané’s 
Relación acerca de las antigüedades de los Indios (1498). But several works focus 
on flora and fauna, providing, as Columbus’s ‘Diario del primer viaje’ (1492) 
did, an enthusiastic vision of nature’s superabundance, abounding in ‘birds 
so various and different from our birds that it is a marvel. And then there 
are trees of a thousand varieties, and they all fruit in their own way, and they 
are all marvellously scented [todos huelen que es maravilla]’ (Colón, 2006, p. 
110).4 In this founding narrative of the Americas, its flora had already begun 
to be characterised as ‘marvellous’ − a discourse which permeated all areas of 
writing on the New World and, as Stephen Greenblatt has argued, denoted 
‘the presence … of a world of objects that exceed[ed] [the] understanding of 
the probable and the familiar’ (1991, p. 75). This discourse of the marvellous 
persisted throughout many early modern accounts of the Americas, partly, 
certainly, in order to correspond to classical and Christian ideas of heroism 
(see ibid., p. 74) but also as a way of acknowledging the lacunae between the 
familiar flora and fauna of the Old World and the unfamiliar, emphatically 
‘Other’ nature of the Americas.5
One writer in whose work the discourse of the marvellous is prominent 
is Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés, Charles V’s official chronicler of 
the Indies and author of two major works on the Americas: the Sumario de la 
natural historia de las Indias (1526), considered by Stephanie Merrim to be the 
‘first natural history’ of the New World (1989, p. 167), and the vast Historia 
general y natural de las Indias, the first part of which was published in 1535. 
Both works provide a taxonomy of the tropics, modelled after Pliny’s Natural 
History (79 AD), including sections on a vast array of plant and animal life, 
as well as the culture and physical appearance of people from the Americas 
(see Gerbi, 1985, pp. 263–7). Although a study of flora is only one aspect of 
these works, it is notable that, as Kathleen Ann Myers has observed, of the 76 
surviving illustrations Oviedo designed to accompany his Historia general, the 
majority are of American flora (2007, p. 70). Oviedo provided drawings not 
only as a way to help his early modern readers visualise the novelties of the 
4 Unless otherwise indicated, translations from the original Spanish, here and elsewhere, are 
my own.
5 Coletta and Raftopoulos look at the political and economic implications of representing 
America as Europe’s ‘natural Other’ in chapter 1.
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Americas but, as Myers notes, to acknowledge the ‘inadequacy of language 
to set forth what he had witnessed’ (ibid., p. 69). This suggests that of all that 
was unfamiliar about the New World, it was the plants, trees and flowers that 
posed the greatest challenge to Oviedo’s comprehension and his capabilities as 
a writer.6 
For these early travellers, as today, language often failed to convey the 
diversity and richness of the natural world, leading Oviedo to resort to 
drawings, as noted above, as well as rhetorical strategies such as hyperbole, 
the superlative, exclamation and anaphora. The bewildered tone discernible 
in parts of the introduction to his Historia general would characterise much of 
his account:
What mortal mind could comprehend such ... an indescribable 
[innarrable] multitude of trees, abundant in different types of fruits? How 
many medicinal plants and herbs of benefit for man? How many other 
innumerable [innumerables] plants unknown to him, and with so many 
different kinds of roses and flowers and sweet-smelling fragrances? (ed. José 
Amador de los Rios, 1851–4, I, p. 2).
Through a succession of rhetorical questions (this paragraph, only partially 
cited above, contains nine), Oviedo conveys the disconnection between both 
the pen and the mind (of any mortal at least) and the quantity and diversity 
of American flora. The negative prefix ‘in’ (un) (innarrable; innumerables), as 
well as the frequent evocation of ‘tantas diferençias’ [difference], produces a 
sort of via negativa, where nature is defined according to what it is not. And 
yet in both the Historia general, and earlier in his Sumario, Oviedo endeavours 
not only to find the means to make the unknowable knowable, but to render 
it vividly immediate for all those who were unable to see this nature first-hand.
One of the important strategies Oviedo employed was that of domesticating 
metaphors, where the flora of the New World is assimilated through its 
comparison to European vegetation. The expression ‘como en Castilla’ [like 
in Castile] and variations thereupon recur throughout his writings on the 
Americas, just as they did some 30 years earlier in Columbus’s foundational 
journal, when he described hearing ‘the nightingale and other birds like those 
of Castile’ or seeing ‘myrtle and other trees and plants like those of Castile’ 
(Colón, 2006, p. 163). Such analogies, as Antonello Gerbi affirms, are part of 
a broader ideological exercise geared towards colonial expansion: ‘it is not just 
a matter of the Old World casting itself upon the New: it is the home world 
taking peaceful possession of the overseas discoveries’ (1985, p. 6). Oviedo 
frequently describes American flora as similar to or deviating from a European 
norm, as when he notes that papayas are ‘figs as big as small melons’ (ed. José 
6 A consideration of flora also predominates in Columbus’s ‘Diario’, an interest summed up by 
Gerbi (1985, pp. 15–17) as ‘Meager fauna, exuberant flora’.
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Miranda, 1950, p. 214) or that avocados grow on ‘trees that they call pear trees’ 
(ibid., p. 215). 
Another method used by Oviedo in an attempt to render the flora of 
the Americas more familiar to his readers is to make analogies with the 
human form: the coconut is bigger than ‘the large head of a man’ (p. 207); 
the mamey [sapote] is ‘like two clenched fists’ (p. 204); large reeds are ‘like 
the thigh of a stout man’ (p. 230). These comparisons to humans are an 
example of the need among settlers in the Americas well beyond the 16th 
century to find a way to see the land ‘in relation to man before it could take 
on a meaningful shape’ (Harrison, 1977, p. 28; italics in original). And yet 
so often these analogies between the region’s plants and fruits and European 
flora or the human body emerge as inadequate before the superabundance 
of the tropics − what Humboldt would characterise in the 19th century 
as ‘wild and gigantic nature’. On many occasions, the old world’s fruits 
and trees simply cannot live up to their New World equivalents: the grapes of 
Tierra Firme are ‘better and tastier’ (Fernández de Oviedo, ed. José Miranda, 
1950, p. 212) than those of Spain, and the pineapple, which Oviedo extols, 
is likened in taste and appearance to plants (peaches, apricots and thistles) 
familiar to a European readership (see ibid., p. 236) before the author finally 
gives up: ‘it would be necessary to paint it, so that through sight one could 
understand that which language is lacking’ (p. 237). Giganticism, which 
Candace Slater has observed to be central to discourses on the Amazon (2002, 
p. 39), is evoked through references to the enormity of trees − for instance in 
the section entitled, rather vaguely, ‘Large trees’ (Fernández de Oviedo, ed. José 
Miranda, 1950, pp. 225–30). Throughout much of his writing, nature in the 
New World is not only bigger, but more fertile, more beautiful and, at times, 
almost magical, as when he describes coconut milk in rapt terms as ‘the most 
substantial, the most excellent and the most precious thing that you could 
either conceive of or drink’ (ibid., p. 209).
Alexandre Coello de la Rosa has argued that an important strand of Oviedo’s 
deeply Christian thought was his belief in the usefulness of all natural things 
(2012, p. 24). Coconuts, for instance, were valued by Oviedo not only for their 
taste but for the curative effects of their husks which were believed to alleviate 
‘dolientes de la ijada’ (ed. José Miranda, 1950, p. 209), otherwise known as 
iliaca passio [iliac passion or crippling gut pains] (see Wear, 2000, p. 126). 
Oviedo was concerned to set out the medicinal value of many of the plants 
and trees he encountered in the Americas and although, as Merrim has pointed 
out, neither scientifically trained nor a theoriser of ‘origins or causes’ (1989, 
p. 172), he nevertheless combined indigenous botanical knowledge with his 
own first-hand experience to convey a vivid picture of many of the therapeutic 
qualities of New World plants and fruits. Although some of the physiological 
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effects are unwanted, as when Oviedo relates how, much to his consternation, 
eating prickly pears turned his urine bright pink (ed. José Miranda, 1950, 
p. 239), many of these plants are shown to have almost miraculous properties, 
including the Palo Santo tree which was believed to cure ‘el mal de las búas’ 
[syphilis] (ibid., p. 219), the balsam tree which stems bleeding and cures stab 
wounds (ed. José Amador de los Rios, 1851–4, I, pp. 366–8), or one supremely 
ugly thorny tree which nevertheless had the power to set broken bones (ed. José 
Miranda, 1950, p. 236). Even when certain plants or trees are revealed as 
poisonous to humans, as is the case with the Manzanillo [poison apple tree], 
they are still shown to serve a purpose, in this case as a source of poison for the 
arrows of indigenous peoples. 
Antonio Barrera-Osorio has argued that Oviedo’s observations sprang from 
a deeply-embedded empiricism, where nature was experienced through ‘all of 
his senses’ (2006, p. 110). Time and again the reader is introduced not only to 
the extraordinary sight of the tropical vegetation, but to its tastes, smells and 
textures. Yet this sensual evocation of American nature continues to employ 
the trope of wonder − the pineapple and coconut, for instance, seem almost 
magical and medicinal plants and trees are extolled for their ‘maravillosos efetos’ 
[marvellous effects] (ed. José Miranda, 1851–4, I, p. 361). Despite attempts to 
make the nature of the New World familiar for his readership, Oviedo seems 
in the end to revel in the non-assimilability of American flora, a domain where 
‘there is no need for fiction’ (ibid.), and where the writer and artist must at 
times acknowledge that ‘the life of man is very short to be able to see or come 
to understand [the Indies]’ (ibid., p. 2).7
American nature
Although written some two hundred years after Oviedo’s natural history of 
the New World, Andrés Bello’s 1826 ‘Silva a la agricultura de la zona tórrida’ 
continued to exalt the flora of tropical South America in terms not altogether 
dissimilar from his colonial predecessor. Bello was born in Caracas, Venezuela 
in 1781 and was one of the key figures of the Latin American independence 
movement alongside Simón Bolívar, although he did not share the latter’s 
revolutionary zeal for the complete overthrow of the imperial order.8 By the time 
Bello came to write his celebrated ‘Silva’, however, the Revolution was largely 
concluded, and in the poem Bello was concerned with establishing a model 
7 Merrim notes that Pliny’s Natural History, on which Oviedo’s Sumario and Historia general 
were closely modelled, ‘revels in the superlative and the curious’ (1989, p. 174).
8 Jaksić (2002) has written a comprehensive intellectual biography of Bello which clearly 
sets out the poet and statesman’s loyalty to the colonial regime; see chapter 2, in particular. 
Cussen cites a line from an article in the journal El Censor Americano which he argues was 
written by Bello: ‘We are convinced that the South Americans cannot be good republicans’ 
(1992, p. 88).
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for peace and prosperity in Latin America, as well as, in the words of Pedro 
Henríquez Ureña, ‘literary independence’ (1952, p. 37).9 
Bello conceived of the ‘Silva a la agricultura de la zona tórrida’ as one part 
of a longer foundational poem on the theme of America, although this project 
was never completed.10 The poem opens with a celebration of the American 
landscape − ‘Hail, fertile zone’ (trans. López-Morillas ed. Jaksić,1997, p. 29). 
This, as almost every critic writing on the work has observed, closely imitates 
book two, line 173 of Virgil’s the Georgics − (‘Salve, magna parens frugum’ 
[Hail, great mother of harvests] (trans. Day Lewis, 1951, p. 40).11 As such, it 
immediately shifts the tone, as Cussen notes, from the epic mode of the 1823 
‘Alocución a la Poesía’ to the georgic mode (1992, p. 118), which, as Mary A. 
Favret argues, celebrates the ‘practical and everyday work of cultivation’ over 
the glories of war or the pleasures of leisure (2010, p. 133). According to this 
form, farming was viewed, as Anthony Low explains is the case in Virgil, as ‘a 
cultural and a civilizing activity, of building up the state and ensuring its peaceful 
prosperity’ (1985, p. 8). Agriculture for Bello constituted ‘the complete remaking 
of the landscape’ with consequences political and beyond (Hoeg, 2009, p. 65).
Farming is certainly one of the central themes of Bello’s poem. The second 
half of the ‘Silva’ calls on the citizens of the new Latin American republics to turn 
their backs on the vices of the city and go to the countryside where they would 
enjoy the ‘solitary calm’ and ‘lovely peace’ of rural life (1997, p. 32) − a peace 
contrasted both with the city’s ‘foolish revels’ and the chaos of war (ibid., p. 30). 
Above all, it is here that they will be able to take nature in hand, and nurture the 
soil that has grown ‘harsh and wild [bravo]’ during the years of conflict (1997, 
p. 33; ed. Íñigo-Madrigal, 2001, p. 53). In a series of abrupt imperatives the poet 
calls on Latin Americans to domesticate their surroundings:
let the axe break the matted trees
and fire burn the forest; in its barren splendor
let a long gash be cut.
Give shelter in the valleys
to thirsty sugarcane ...
Make coffee trees adorn the slopes; ...
Let gardens [el vergel] flourish, orchards [la huerta] laugh with joy. 
     (1997, p. 35; 2001, p. 53)
9 Bello’s poems, as Altschul has noted, have been ‘enshrined by literary historiography as 
foundational’ (2012, p. 167). Miranda (1992, p. 153), Gomes (1998, p. 181) and Meyer-
Minnemann (2000) have also drawn attention to the importance of the ‘Silva’ for literary 
independence.
10 Apart from some draft verses, only the ‘Silva a la agricultura de la zona tórrida’ was completed. 
See Cussen (1992, pp. 117–18).
11 Throughout this section, translations will be drawn from the Oxford University Press edition 
of Bello (trans. López-Morillas, ed. I. Jaksić, 1997); in cases where the original Spanish is 
especially significant, I will also include page references for Bello (ed. Íñigo-Madrigal, 2001).
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This vision is both one of destruction (the cutting down and burning of 
forests)12 and of construction (tending orchards or vegetable gardens).13 The 
metaphorical encoding of this shift seems straightforward enough: as the jungle 
is cut down, dark gives way to light and the landscapes are shaped into ordered, 
containable and economically prosperous spaces: ‘thanks to the intervention of 
man, wild nature is transformed into cultivated land which fills the grain stores 
of the settler’, notes Meyer-Minnemann (2000, p. 77). Nevertheless, there is 
something disturbing about all of this, for the land clearing in Bello’s poem, far 
from evoking a sylvan scene of happy and productive farming corresponding to 
the georgic mode, is more akin to a military exercise, and therefore reminiscent 
of the recent wars of independence:
now comes the servile crowd
with curving sickles armed.
It bursts into the dark wood’s tangled growth.
I hear voices and distant sounds, the axe’s noise.
Far off, echo repeats its blows; the ancient tree [el ceibo anciano]
for long the challenge of the laboring crowd,
groans, and trembles from a hundred axes,
topples at last, and its tall summit falls.
    (1997, p. 34; 2001, p. 53)
Here a ‘troop’ of men ‘armed’ with farm tools ‘invade’ the forest like a 
belligerent army, and hack an ancient tree to the ground. The scene is one of 
complete devastation: the air is thick with smoke, and the animals living in 
the tree (including a bird tending its young) flee in terror. Such an encounter 
hardly accords with the rules of jus de bello: with a hundred axes the aged 
tree, personified as groaning and trembling under attack, is felled then burned, 
leaving ‘only dead trunks, only ashes’ where once there had been ‘lovely green and 
freshness’ (1997, p. 34). The tree in the poem is referred to as a ‘ceibo’; however, it 
is likely that Bello is referring not to the Ceibo erythrina or coral tree − also called 
the ‘bucare’ (mentioned a few lines earlier) which is not of large proportions − but 
the Ceiba petandra or silk-cotton tree which can reach heights of 70 metres and 
diameters of up to three.14 The Ceiba is considered a cosmic tree in many parts of 
the American tropics (García-Goyco, 2007, p. 363). David Leeming notes that 
12 Kaempfer describes this as a ‘destrucción transformadora’ [transformative destruction] which 
is necessary for the founding of a postcolonial nation (2007, p. 286).
13 ‘Huerta’ can be translated as ‘orchard, cultivated plot, vegetable patch, kitchen garden or 
parkland grounds next to a river bank’; see Samson (2012, p. 133). However, although in 
the poem’s English version, ‘vergel’ is translated as ‘orchard’, it can also denote a ‘pleasure 
garden’. Ortiz Lottman argues that the opposition between the terms huerta and vergel is 
equivalent to that between ‘labor and leisure, between the […] practical orchard and the 
luxurious pleasure garden dedicated to the senses’ (2010, p. 330).
14 The ceibo is a common name for the ceiba. See Salazar (2000, I, p. 61). Incidentally, Oviedo’s 
sketch of a ‘tripod tree’ may be the first drawing of a ceiba tree by a European. See Niell 
(2009, p. 92).
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it appeared in Mayan mythology as the ‘axle’ that held the world − the heavens 
and earth − together (2005, p. 255) and the tree is also central to Caribbean 
folk culture, especially in Cuba (see Cabrera, 1968, p. 154; Niell, 2009). The 
way in which the tree is animated in Bello’s poem not only invokes the reader’s 
sympathy for a vanquished nature but for the unacknowledged indigenous 
forest inhabitants who are implicit in the image of the wild animals and birds 
being forced into exile to make way for agricultural progress.15 In Spanish, the 
verb desterrar [to exile] derives from the Latin terra, [earth] (Roberts, 2014, I, 
p. 198). According to the Diccionario de la lengua española, as well as political 
or legal exile, the term has the senseof uprooting (as in the case of plants, 
for example; 1992, vol. 1, p. 732). The toppling of the Ceiba is suggestive, 
therefore, of a wider history of uprooting and exile precipitated by Bello’s 
dream of agrarian development. And while the forest denizens are uprooted, 
the poet prays that ‘libertad’ [freedom] – the buzzword of the new political 
order – ‘se arraigue y medre’ [will root and thrive] (1997, p. 35; 2001, p. 55), 
an image which, as Rudyard J. Alcocer observes, ‘metaphorically collapses the 
language of people and plants’ (2005, p. 88).
By using a botanical metaphor to describe the political world, and attaching 
human characteristics to nature, Bello blurs the boundaries between the 
human and the non-human in a manner more consistent with the beliefs of 
Latin America’s indigenous population than the georgic mode. Although forest 
clearing in the poem gives way, in time, to new shoots, the enduring image in 
this section is of ‘dry ruins’ (p. 34), of barrenness and ruination, reminiscent 
both of the Conquest and the recent wars of independence. This sterility 
contrasts sharply with the fecund nature of the opening lines of ‘Silva’: 
Hail, fertile zone, that circumscribes
the errant course of your enamored sun,
and, caressed by its light,
brings forth all living things
in each of your many climes!
You weave the summer’s wreath of golden grain,
and offer grapes to the bubbling pail. 
    (1997, p. 29)
Here Bello evokes a bountiful Golden Age where tropical nature requires no 
toil but gives its products freely – at least until the problematic reference to 
the ‘slave’s hand’ (ibid., p. 30).16 Much of this first section feels like a natural 
history and is reminiscent of Oviedo’s tropical taxonomy in its use of classical 
15 It is notable that the word ‘conquered’ is used in the English translation, although not in the 
original (1997, p. 34).
16 Meyer-Minnemann notes that the abundance of the tropics in Bello’s poem is evocative of 
the classical Golden Age (2000, pp. 79, 81).
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models and form to produce a very American scene.17 Here the Ancient Greek 
and Roman taste for wine and sapphires is met with agave syrup and indigo; 
the ‘ambrosia’ of the tropics is the pineapple, and the cotton plant supplies 
‘golden roses’ (1997, p. 30). Maize, personified like the Ceiba, is a ‘proud chief ’ 
(ibid.) − the tropics’ most important plant, just as it was for the Ancient Maya 
who had a Maize deity represented as a man embodying ideas of botanical and 
human fertility (Foster, 2001, p. 167). And throughout this opening stanza, 
like Oviedo, Bello appeals to the reader’s senses through reference to the 
colours, tastes and ‘thousand odors’ of the tropics − like Columbus’s ‘trees of a 
thousand varieties’ (1997, p. 29) − conveying a world of uncontainable vigour 
and fertility through repeated images of bubbling or spilling (‘the bubbling 
pail’, ‘beans / that overflow the foaming chocolate cup’, ‘Living red teems on 
your cactus plants’, ‘the pierced agave / pours’) (ibid., pp. 29–30). 
The sense of tropical nature’s uncontrollability is also augmented by the form 
of Bello’s poem. His choice of the silva − which consists of hendecasyllables or 
heptasyllables, has no predictable rhyme scheme, and allows the poet to make 
‘strophic divisions at will − usually in unequal lengths’, seems to be in opposition to 
the poem’s themes (Clarke, 2013, p. 1306; see also De Bryan, 2001). While Bello’s 
‘Silva’ advocates the control of wild nature − the felling and burning of forests to 
give way to ‘fruitful plantings, that display / their proud rows and orderly design’ 
(1997, p. 34) − the lack of structure in the poetic form works against the ordered 
vision to create a work of prosodic unpredictability: what Marsha Suzan Collins has 
called a ‘structureless structure’ (2002, p. 54). And surely it can be no coincidence 
that Bello selected a form which draws its very name from the poem’s subject 
matter − selva [the jungle] (Gomes, 1998, p. 189; see also Carreño, 1994, p. 228). 
Sections of Bello’s poem dealing with the domesticated landscape notably show no 
more rhythmic or syllabic regularity than those describing the wilderness; as John 
Beverley has noted of Góngora’s ‘Soledades’, the silva form thereby ‘becomes on 
the page of the text the graphic embodiment of a confusion’ (1980, p. 37). Bello’s 
choice of the silva seems a prior admission that the superabundance of the tropics 
cannot be contained by language − something that Oviedo acknowledged some 
three hundred years before. 
Bello’s poem has been read by a number of critics as proposing Republican 
Rome as a model for Latin America, with agriculture at the centre of future 
prosperity (see Cussen, 1989, p. 126; Hoeg, 2009, pp. 63–4). Hoeg, for one, 
argues that in the poem:
Man and Nature reverse their relative positions in terms of freedom 
and slavery. Initially, nature is free and supplies Man’s needs without 
17 Indeed, as Juan Duran Luzio (1987) has shown, Bello developed an interest in natural 
sciences from his acquaintance with Alexander von Humboldt. Hoeg points out that in 
the text’s footnotes Bello gives his readers the Linnaean name for flora and place of origin 
(2009, p. 57).
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cultivation. It is Man who is a slave to Nature. But by the post-
independence period, however, Nature has become a slave to Man who is 
now free thanks to his control over nature. (2009, p. 64)
Yet the apparent commitment to modernisation and order in the poem is 
undermined consistently, not only by the images of botanical uncontainability 
(the overflowing cups of chocolate and sagging banana plants) but the form of 
the poem itself, which is a literary reflection of the very thing that the poet wishes 
to suppress − the jungle. In the final lines Bello refers to ‘people / on the ... path 
of immortality’, achieved through the ‘simple life, / [of ] the farmer’ (1997, p. 
37). But references to ‘ambrosia’ and ‘nectar’ (nectáreos globos; 2001, p. 48 [that 
is ‘sweet globes’; 1997, p. 30]), both suggesting eternal life, appear in the first 
stanza to evoke the pre-agricultural tropics. Rather than a sense of progression 
and development, or of man’s control over nature, the poem closes with a sense 
of circularity, enhanced by the description of how ‘the scythes do not suffice to 
cut the grain’ (1997, p. 36). Far from proof of nature’s productivity, this image 
confirms the futility of man’s attempts to control tropical nature according to 
the agricultural models of classical Europe. In the ‘Silva a la agricultura de la 
zona tórrida’ what emerges is a nature uncontainable, which resists both the 
sickle and the pen.
Towards an indigenous poetics of plants
The trope of tropical nature as unassimilable and uncontrollable, recurrent in 
both Oviedo and Bello, continued in Latin American literature in the 20th 
century in the novela de la selva, a novelistic tradition spanning from the 
1920s to mid century, with the Amazon rainforest as its subject and often its 
protagonist. These rainforest fictions were published across South America, and 
include the celebrated Colombian novel, La vorágine by José Eustasio Rivera 
(1924), Canaima by the Venezuelan statesman and author Rómulo Gallegos 
(1935), and Los pasos perdidos by the Cuban intellectual Alejo Carpentier 
(1953).18 Although these novels, like Bello’s poetry, were largely concerned 
with forging literary independence, echoes can also be seen of the early colonial 
crónica or natural history in their preoccupation with cataloguing Amazonian 
flora. These texts abound in references to native plants and trees, often described 
in some detail, and frequently included in a glossary at the end of the novel, 
which acts as a kind of field guide for the non-Amazonian reader. 
There is also a move towards an indigenous poetics of nature in the novela 
de la selva, where the flora of tropical South America is regarded not only 
18 Other important texts include Green Mansions by Anglo-Argentine writer W.H. Hudson 
(1904); Toá by the Colombian César Uribe Piedrahita (1933); A selva by Ferreira de Castro 
from Portugal (1930). For further discussion of the novela de la selva see León Hazera (1971), 
Rogers (2012), Sá (2004), Wylie (2009).
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through the lenses of science or Romanticism, but through the eyes of native 
Amazonians. In particular, the view of the flora as alive − as well as references 
to supernatural forest entities like the curupitá (or curupira; see Wagley, 
1964, p. 235) in W.H. Hudson’s Green Mansions (1998, p. 31; n., p. 205), 
or the eponymous canaima in Gallegos’s work (see Whitehead, 2002) − lay 
the foundations for an indigenous poetics of tropical nature.19 In much of the 
novela de la selva the boundaries between the vegetal and the human are eroded 
through the use of anthropomorphism and supernatural belief − qualities that 
are already latent in Oviedo and Bello, respectively, and which are central to 
the work of many Amazonian writers in the early 21st century.
One prominent contemporary author from the Amazon, concerned with 
the relationship between man and plants, is Juan Carlos Galeano, who was 
born in Colombia’s Caquetá department in 1958 and has published poetry, 
essays and folktales on Amazonian themes, as well as directing a documentary 
film, The Trees have a Mother (2008). Galeano’s work, which is peopled by 
both human and non-human protagonists, is governed, as Michael Uzendoski 
has noted, by the concept of ‘Perspectivism’, which views all living things as 
sharing a common nature (2007, p. 8). The world of his tales and poems 
is one of shape-shifting and boundary crossing, corresponding to native 
Amazonian beliefs in the lack of distinction between nature and culture.20 
Although many of Galeano’s works deal with the fluidity of identity 
between people and animals, corresponding to Viveiros de Castro’s 
observation that Amerindian myths, above all, ‘inextricably mix human and 
animal attributes in a common context of intercommunicability’ (1998, p. 
471), the Amazonian flora remains an important touchstone and source of 
identity in his work. For instance, in his Amazonia poetry collection, ‘Cedar’ 
tells of a tree which weeps as it flees mankind and concludes with the line: 
‘The cedar ought to be more manly and stop crying / every night’ (2003, 
p. 75). In another poem, ‘Grass’, the poet evokes the early modern trope 
of superabundant nature in his description of grass growing ‘on houses, on 
bodies, out of our ears and pockets’ (ibid., p. 65). Here and elsewhere in 
the collection Galeano questions the ontological distinction between humans 
19 Although critics such as Suárez-Araúz (2004, p. 2) have argued that the novela de la selva 
should not be considered ‘Amazonian’, there is a strong case for doing so, as I contend here 
and elsewhere; see Wylie (2014). 
20 Viveiros de Castro has led the discussion of perspectivism in anthropology (1998). More 
recently Descola has argued that in the Amazon ‘The identities of human beings, both 
living and dead, and of plants, animals, and spirits are altogether relational and are therefore 
subject to mutations and metamorphoses.’ (2013, pp. 10–11). Also see chapter 1 for a 
discussion of debates about the nature/culture divide and relational systems of knowledge, 
and chapter 8 for Radcliffe’s analysis of the political significance of indigenous ontologies in 
Ecuador.
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and plants and speaks in a deadpan and sometimes comic way of an animated 
flora which cries, talks and has its hair brushed.
As with the novela de la selva, Galeano’s Cuentos amazónicos (2007, translated 
into English as Folktales of the Amazon, 2009), a collection of stories from across 
the Amazon basin, contains a glossary giving the vernacular and scientific name 
of 58 ‘Plants and Fruits’ (2007, pp. 149–50) and many of the tales − including 
‘Pumayuyo: A Plant with Magical Powers’, ‘Renacal: a Grove of Magical Trees’, 
‘Boa Plants: Plants turn into Animals’, ‘Seringa: Mother of the Rubber Trees’, 
‘Lupuna: a Tree becomes Vengeful’ and ‘Vitória Régia: Giant Water Lily’ − 
are motivated by the magical qualities attributed to the tropical flora. In an 
interesting postscript to the felling of the silk cotton tree in Bello’s ‘Silva’, the 
story ‘Lupuna’ (a vernacular name for the Ceiba) tells of how, after a man saws 
down a lupuna in the hope that it will bring rain, he develops a painful and 
swollen stomach, which is only cured by the timely intervention of a shaman 
who appeals to the ‘mother of Lupuna’, an old woman with ‘hair [...] made out 
of little leaves and [...] a face carved in wood’ (2009, p. 99).21 Indeed, many 
of the narratives in Cuentos amazónicos refer to the spirit protectors of plants 
and trees, including the mãe de seringa [mother of rubber] − distinguished by 
limbs covered with wounds similar to those rubber workers made on the Hevea 
brasiliensis. In ‘Seringa’, Galeano relates how a rubber worker living on the 
banks of the Yavari River is visited by a mysterious young woman, with bark 
clothing, who performs household tasks in his absence. One day he conceals 
himself to observe her and she punishes him by ensuring the non-productivity 
of his rubber trees from then on. In ‘Renacal’, a female guardian of a lake and 
the renacos (Ficus americana) and other trees which ‘vivían allí’ [lit. ‘lived there’] 
expel a group of fishermen (2007, p. 62). In all these stories, folk beliefs about 
animate flora act as a check against the overexploitation of nature. Indeed, as 
Nigel Smith argues, the belief in the mãe de seringa may well have played an 
important role in the tree’s conservation during the rubber boom since rubber 
tappers have attested to reducing the quantity and frequency of their latex 
extraction − hence allowing the trees time to heal − in order to appease this 
respected figure (1996, pp. 131–3).
Galeano’s tales and poems demonstrate that it would be an error simply 
to consign indigenous belief in plant and animal lives to the world of ‘myth’. 
Instead, in Galeano, as Joni Adamson argues, folktales are ‘employed as 
authoritative commentary/theory illuminating the consequences of global 
economic development for local humans, animals, and non-humans’ (2014, 
p. 173). In a recent anthology of Amazonian poetry, Jeremy G. Larochelle also 
stresses the way in which the region’s writers often engage ecological ideas, a 
21 A poem called ‘Lupuna’ also refers to the tree’s ‘ability to do good or evil’ and concludes with 
the description of how ‘To those who don’t respect the Lupuna and piss beside his trunk, / the 
Lupuna will balloon their bellies with water until they burst’ (Galeano, 2014, p. 33).
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consequence not only of the lack of differentiation between humans and non-
humans in Amazonian thinking, but also of the region’s vulnerable position 
at the forefront of global capitalism (2014). Oil and gas extraction, oil palm 
cultivation and cattle grazing are just a few of the grave threats facing the 
Amazon’s flora and fauna today. In the documentary The Trees have a Mother, 
Galeano blends the mythological and the ecological when local commentators 
reflect on how many spirit protectors of plants and animals such as the 
chullachaqui − characterised by having one foot larger than the other, and 
closely related to the curupira − have fled the forest just like the species they 
have been protecting (2007). If spirit protectors of the forest have traditionally 
been invoked, as Candace Slater observes, in response to man’s ‘disrespect for 
the natural world’, then their extinction may well reflect the feeling among local 
people that they are beyond help (1994, p. 139). In a recent poem, ‘History’, 
Galeano writes of the loss of ‘the entire jungle / with its birds, fish and rivers’, 
adopting an apocalyptic tone: 
In the north we hunted many buffalo
whose lard warmed us all winter.
But in the jungle they told us that to bring more light
we should throw more trees into the sun’s furnace. (2013, p. 26)
The simple diction here belies a terrifying picture of environmental destruction 
and climate change as Oviedo’s and Bello’s superabundant tropical nature gives 
way to no nature at all: five hundred years after Oviedo tried to find a language 
commensurate to the untamed nature of the tropics, Galeano searches for a 
way to express its demise.
Conclusion
Galeano’s work is not only concerned with raising environmental consciousness, 
but also, alongside Oviedo and Bello, with how man should understand and, 
crucially, speak and write about nature in the Americas. Oviedo has perhaps 
more in common with Galeano in this regard than with Bello, for both these 
writers accept the limitations of man’s knowledge of and control over nature 
− Oviedo because of his belief in God, and Galeano as part of a posthuman 
tradition where plants and animals are credited with agency and rights. Bello, 
on the other hand, advocates a model of agriculture which, as Hoeg notes, 
‘sounds to modern ears as a slash and burn policy’ (2009, p. 59). Yet Bello’s 
poem shows that, in the end, humans are never able totally to overcome nature; 
even the form of the poem, the silva, evokes and preserves that which his lines 
wish to destroy. Perhaps most compelling in these works is the metaphorical 
dimension, whereby the division between the human and the botanical 
becomes indistinct − a feature not only discernible in the indigenous poetics 
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of the novela de la selva or contemporary writing from the Amazon, but in the 
anthropomorphic descriptions of plants in founding texts such as Bello’s ‘Silva’. 
The worlds of people and plants have long been intertwined in Latin American 
literature, with botanical discourse both providing a space through which to 
explore national identity and, more recently, engage in ecological debate about 
the Amazon’s precarious future. 
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3. Hybrid traditions: permaculture, plants 
and the politics of nature in El Salvador 
Naomi Millner
Social scientists have long been aware of the need to acknowledge embodied social practices within the production of scholarly knowledge. Ethnographic research relies upon the observation of everyday cultural 
practices (Hume, 2009), while political geographies are increasingly called 
upon to attend to the claims and commitments of social movements rather 
than theorise from the sidelines of such struggles (Heynen, 2010). Feminist 
approaches emphasise the importance of ‘embodying’ concepts like the nation−
state, which can be regarded as abstract and all-powerful until they are studied 
in mundane detail (Mountz, 2004). 
Yet at times the activities and claims of social movements demand more 
fundamental ‘scene-changes’ in thought. As they grip public attention, 
emergent social configurations can reveal potent sites of knowledge production 
that do not necessarily seek academic permissions or forms of legitimacy. The 
appearance of such movements is rarely entirely isolated from the evolving 
ideas of critical scholarship, and rarely without critical opposition. On the 
other hand, when taken seriously, the analyses emergent from contexts of 
struggle can complicate scholarly assumptions in productive ways, not least 
by demonstrating people’s capacity to account for their situation without 
academic mediation (Rancière, 1999).
The particular ‘scene-change’ which frames my engagement with 
environmental discourses in Central America is staged by the appearance of 
‘food sovereignty’ as a fast-growing transnational social movement and political 
claim. Although the term was coined during the 1980s (Edelman, 1998), 
its reverberation through diverse geographical contexts is linked with the 
emergence of La Via Campesina (LVC) [The Peasant’s Way] during the early 
1990s.1 It was founded in Belgium by a transnational group of agricultural 
producers against a backdrop of global agrarian crisis, exacerbated by 
withdrawal of support for domestic agricultural sectors across the Global South 
(Edelman, 2005). Founding members were unified by dissatisfaction with 
1 Woodgate also refers to La Via Campesina in his discussion on agri-cultural practice and 
agroecological discourse in chapter 4.
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‘food security’ terminology as it had been elaborated in United Nations forums 
since 1974; in particular, they challenged assumptions that global hunger 
could be addressed through market-based solutions (McMichael, 2014). The 
movement introduced food sovereignty formally at the United Nations World 
Food Summit of 1996, presenting it as a kind of ‘agrarian citizenship’ requiring 
correlative rights for small-scale farmers (Wittman, 2009). It was maintained 
that local and national communities would be better equipped to solve issues 
of long-term ecological unsustainability if they could cultivate a full range of 
food crops within their borders, rather than relying on export crops. Traditional 
methods of soil and seed conservation were also defended, over and against 
programmes that supported the interests of large commercial seed and fertiliser 
companies. The vocabularies of human rights and sustainable development 
have since been reworked through food sovereignty manifestos, such as the 
seminal Nyéléni Declaration written collectively in 2007. Today the movement 
boasts a ‘peasant internationalism’ comprising hundreds of thousands of small-
scale producers (Martínez-Torres and Rosset, 2010). 
This chapter focuses on the development of a grassroots ‘permaculture’ 
movement in El Salvador, established in 2000. The Salvadorian permaculture 
movement intersects in important ways with articulations of food sovereignty, 
although it operates at a remove from LVC activities. The movement resists 
easy categorisation and, drawing together diverse cultural approaches to 
environments and social change, offers a rich example for exploring a changing 
politics of nature. Its principles build on the idea of establishing ‘permanent 
cultures,’ comprising auto-replenishing ecological, social and biological 
processes, and they revalorise traditional agricultural practices to this end. 
However, permaculture reached El Salvador via ‘brokers’ who had grown up, 
or spent time, in the Global North, and agricultural traditions are significantly 
redefined through its practices by means of transnational discourses and 
forums. Salvadorian permaculture is distinct, however, not least because of 
its elaboration in the context of longer-standing popular education practices 
associated with the growth of peasant resistance prior to civil war (1979−92). 
Permaculture was also seen as an extension of the activities of ‘agroecological’ 
networks, which had been multiplying throughout Central America since 
hybrid seeds and chemical fertilisers were first introduced during the 1960s 
and 1970s. Within such discourses ‘indigeneity’ plays a complicated role. El 
Salvador’s indigenous population was largely wiped out during the 1930s, when 
the national economy was being liberalised. Memories of ancestral practices 
are central to permaculture practices, but rely on fragments pieced together 
through exchanges with communities in other areas of Central America, and 
with transnational producer networks like LVC.
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The aim of this chapter is to explore what an analysis of the permaculture 
movement adds to a conceptualisation of nature in Latin America, with an 
emphasis on situating indigenous knowledge within agroecological discourses. 
While drawing attention to the diverse ontological approaches to nature that 
underpin environmental disagreements, it argues that a focus on the hybridity, 
rather than purity, of agroecological knowledge is essential to contesting the 
forms of enclosure that characterise the Salvadorian context. Permaculture 
discourses through their pedagogical practices redefine ‘tradition’ as a set of 
embodied archives and infrastructures essential to agricultural sustainability 
and innovation. This tradition, they claim, is what environmental discourses 
such as food security eclipse, discourses that situate seeds and plants as purely 
genetic infrastructures to be re-engineered independent of their social relations. 
By positioning ‘nature’ as raw stuff to be worked on by ‘culture’, this imagination 
legitimises myriad forms of appropriation, since nature is considered universal, 
and culture singular. 
The fieldwork which informs this chapter took place between December 
2012 and May 2014 at two main sites. Suchitoto, a small colonial town in 
the Cuscatlán region, was an important guerrilla hub during the civil war and 
today hosts a central permaculture demonstration site. Torola is a smaller town 
in the rural Morazán region, also an important site of guerrilla activities during 
the war. The regions surrounding these towns are the most ‘active’ in terms 
of permaculture, although both permaculture and agroecological associations 
exist elsewhere. This chapter draws primarily on data collected during a visit 
(March−April 2014) during which I carried out eight four-hour participatory 
workshops, co-designed with my partners. The workshops explored issues of 
political-economic transformations, perceptions of power, and the relationship 
of soil conservation practices with ideas of justicia alimentaria [food justice]. 
I also conducted 32 interviews with small-scale farmers; local, national and 
international representatives of non-governmental organisations (NGOs); and 
regional and municipal governors. After gaining the appropriate consents, audio 
and video capture of interviews and fieldwork enabled a second translation 
of my data upon return to the UK. Combining these methodologies helped 
illuminate the way that different concepts (such as food sovereignty) were 
perceived by different actors, as well as allowing multiple opportunities for 
participants to contribute towards, and correct, my narratives of the movement. 
The chapter continues with an outline of the theoretical approach which 
informs my analysis, situating agroecology against a backdrop of political 
ecological scholarship and concerns with the politics of in situ conservation − a 
politics I suggest can be expanded to engage questions of diverse nature ontologies. 
Specifically, I develop a ‘multinaturalist’ perspective, which goes beyond 
looking at different cultural approaches to one given nature (multiculturalism) 
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to apprehend several ‘nature−cultures’.2 The geographical context for this form 
of analysis is then elaborated, contextualising the Salvadorian permaculture 
movement in relation to a broader, long-standing politics of plants, and the 
development of rich repertoires of popular education practices. This analysis 
of the specificities of permaculture pedagogies emphasises how they already 
work to acknowledge contrasting nature ontologies, while sometimes seeming 
to collapse them. Indigenous practices are valorised in permaculture, at the 
same time as being reimagined and reconfigured in relation to cross-cultural 
ecological discourses. The final section outlines the place of tradition within 
this matrix, highlighting its role in conserving a diversity of agricultural 
cultures (in addition to genetic infrastructures). In this sense tradition offers 
an important way of understanding agroecological movements’ authority, and 
their contribution to producing environmental knowledge for the future.
Decolonising nature
Nature and the politics of knowledge
The basis for today’s agricultural practices is generally thought to have been set 
in place by the fourth century AD, when irrigation and fertilisation techniques 
were being systematised and disseminated, although a standardised ‘soil 
science’ was only consolidated in relation to agriculture during the Scientific 
Revolution. Vasilii Dokuchaev, the Russian geologist, became a prominent 
figure in the west in this regard, while the National School of Agriculture 
in Mexico was known throughout the Americas. It is perhaps symptomatic, 
however, that the latter was influenced far more by the French schools of 
agronomy than the historical folk knowledges and peasant practices which had 
long characterised the region. 
This strange buffer between two worlds of agronomic expertise was noted by 
geographer Carl Sauer in the 1940s when he was consulted by the Rockefeller 
Foundation regarding proposals for radical agricultural development in the 
region. Sauer warned of the dangers of applying agricultural science ‘to recreate 
the history of U.S. commercial agriculture in Mexico’ (1941, cited in Bebbington 
and Carney, 1990, p. 35), advocating a ‘bottom-up’ process focused on the 
rich heritage already embedded in Mexican agricultural practices. This, he 
argued, would enable the cultural and economic infrastructures of agriculture, 
essential to the genetic diversity of the region, to be preserved. Intervention 
otherwise, he suggested, would result in the deterioration of all three forms 
of infrastructure. At odds with a perspective which defined food production 
increasingly in terms of urban consumption and agricultural modernisation, 
2 Weber and Radcliffe, in chapters 7 and 8 respectively, also take up the nature and culture 
discussion.
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Sauer’s recommendations were not heeded. What is now known as the ‘Green 
Revolution’ was the alternative path chosen. 
Although dismissed by the Rockefeller Foundation, Sauer’s mode of thinking 
went on to influence new forms of scholarship. In agronomic terms, the field of 
‘agroecology’ was established when this awareness of in situ ecological expertise 
was applied to agricultural systems’ design and management during the 1970s 
(Altieri, 1995). This innovation was mirrored in the development of cultural, 
and later, political ecology, as sub-disciplines of the social sciences which set 
environmental uses and transformations into cultural and political contexts. 
Since the late 1970s and early 1980s political ecological perspectives have 
been adapted to analyse industrialising and globalising forms of agriculture, 
gaining critical purchase on the legacies of the Green Revolution and the 
transformations of labour through agricultural intensification.3 Scholars also 
provided a counter-point to Marxist, feminist and post-structuralist interest in 
urban settings during this period, revealing the importance of ‘rural peripheries’ 
to globalising economic processes. This point was made most effectively in 
the ‘food regimes’, theorised and developed by Harriet Friedmann and Philip 
McMichael in the late 1980s and continuing to be significant into the 2000s 
and beyond, which exposed how entangled rural and urban processes in food 
production have been since the 1870s (2009; 2009). Generally focusing on 
‘settler societies’, rather than the Global South (Bernstein, 2014), this work 
nevertheless evidenced and politicised agriculture’s strategic role in constructing 
global capitalist economies (Weis, 2007; Fairbairn, 2014). 
The importance of situated cultural understandings to a broader knowledge 
politics has also been noted within recent debates over the use of genetic resources: 
seeds, plants and the extracts derived from them to make pharmaceuticals. 
‘Bio-prospecting’ and ‘biopiracy’, for example, refer to the exploitation of 
potentially profitable biodiversity and biodiversity-related knowledge, often by 
mining small communities’ indigenous knowledge practices. Responding to 
bio-prospecting developments across Latin America, political ecologists have 
found it important to stress that traditional knowledge and natural resources 
cannot be separated in terms of protection laws (Hayden, 2003). Such accounts 
challenge the idea of ‘commons’ at stake, like food sovereignty emphasising the 
importance of combining access rights with protections against privatisation 
(Graddy, 2014). Similarly, there has been much debate over the ethical 
principles of ‘benefit-sharing’ in situations where profit has been commercially 
derived from such a plant or practice. Questions are raised around the kind of 
collective subjects that might take part in decision-making processes, and how 
such a subject might be produced where one does not yet exist. For Hayden 
(2003), as for Whatmore (2006) this politics of knowledge is also a politics 
3 See also chapter 4.
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of the ‘public’: a question of how to establish controversy over the ‘givens’ 
of science as it promotes particular interests. In many ways food sovereignty 
marks the articulation of diverse forms of in situ expertise into the claims of 
one such collective subject. 
Food sovereignty networks have been particularly interesting to such scholars 
for their models of intercultural translation and knowledge exchange, which 
seem to allow for collective political claims to be created, despite focusing on the 
particularity of in situ agricultural practices and forms of knowledge (Pimbert, 
2006). Rosset and Martínez-Torres emphasise that this distinctiveness derives 
from the diálogo de saberes [dialogue of learning] practices that have explicitly 
structured encounters between different kinds of knowledge and ways of 
knowing within LVC, prior to deliberation and planning (2013). From this 
perspective, food sovereignty claims are so powerful precisely because they 
emerge from a dialogue between absences: shared experiences of dispossession in 
diverse contexts, and shared discourses elaborated through early agroecological 
movements and peasant training schools in the Americas, Africa and Asia. For 
such scholars, the movement’s distinctiveness emerges through negotiating 
internal differences in relation to this shared experience − for example, 
disagreement over the basic unit of politics (as the family, community or 
collective), or the appropriate vehicle for agency (workers, families or militants) 
(ibid., p. 11). Edelman makes a similar point when he analyses food sovereignty 
in terms of a ‘globalising moral economy’ − an attempt to redefine the 
marketplace under new conditions (2005, p. 337).4 To historicise struggle in 
this way does not require an acceptance of the content of claims or ignorance of 
the complexifying transformations to labour which characterise contemporary 
small-scale agriculture (ibid.). It does, however, mean taking seriously the new 
forms of authority that are being produced in relation to the shared experiences 
of enclosure, oppression and value (McMichael, 2014). 
Multinaturalism
To acknowledge situated practice as a political claim to knowledge is thus to 
promote the decolonisation of scholarly discourse through attention to ‘parts’ 
that have conventionally been excluded from it, and claims which destabilise 
prevalent knowledge hierarchies (Heynen, 2010; Rancière, 1999). It also 
entails an elaboration of an ethics for translation which acknowledges what 
cannot be translated, and ought not to be translated. Site-specific knowledge, as 
it is mobilised by movements like food sovereignty, responds precisely to the 
problem of ‘flattened’ approaches to environments, which acquire legitimacy 
4 Edelman’s description recalls the social historian E.P. Thompson’s use of the term, though it 
was first used by the Chartists in the late 18th century in reference to laissez-faire economies 
and grain hoarding.
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to enclose by framing agriculture as a technology that can be developed 
independently of sites and cultures.
Within science and technology studies key figures such as Bruno Latour, 
Michel Callon and Donna Haraway have attempted to draw such a language 
of translation into methodologies for the social sciences, problematising exactly 
such claims to neutrality. This field maintains that science and technology are 
domains of knowledge production which are just as context-specific as any 
other form of social practice: while scientific method establishes a basis for 
‘objectivity’ − a ground for agreement between diverse semiotic networks and 
contexts − this is always reached through struggle and by persuading inflexible 
opponents. Science retrospectively produces a veneer of ‘fact’ that does not 
reflect the true process of discovery or invention. Thus coffee-room discussion 
is not included in the write up, points out Latour (1985); one element moves, 
but as it does so is not taking all of its previous associations or allies with it. 
The scientist is actually always creating new objects and points of obligatory 
passage for other actors. 
For Latour and his allies, conceptions of nature and natural sciences are 
always invested with culture. Anthropologists like Mario Blaser (2014), 
Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (2004) and Philippe Descola (2005) expand such 
claims to struggles over environmental resources, emphasising the way that 
western forms of science often extend colonial violence legacies by failing to 
apprehend or value the myriad ways that environments are inhabited. They 
insist that the very idea of a division between nature and culture is itself a 
specific discursive production tied to the history of ‘western’ thought. Within 
indigenous and non-western cosmologies there is often no equivalent concept 
to either, with humans, animals and objects alike invested with an idea of soul, 
or with human production understood in terms of the movement of stars 
and planetary bodies. Although highly specific, the western scientific mode 
of thinking tends to dominate environmental discourse, not least because its 
corollary claim is that land not cultivated according to productivist rationalities 
is ‘wild’ land that can be appropriated (Makki, 2014). However, this marks just 
one way of ‘worlding’ lived environments. Such scholars term this ‘worlding’ 
as an ‘ontology’ of nature, and use the phrase ‘political ontology’ to make this 
diversity a contested field for disciplines such as geography and anthropology 
(Blaser, 2014). 
Building on such a framework, the idea of ‘multinaturalism’ asserts that 
the many cultural interpretations of one given nature do not stand alone, as 
a ‘multiculturalist’ approach would imply, as there are many diverse nature−
cultures, each of which articulates a non-contiguous world of inhabiting and 
knowing the environment (Latour, 2011; de Castro, 2004). Disagreements 
over the uses and role of environments are based not primarily in opinion but 
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in ontological understandings of what environments are, and what kind of 
agencies populate them. For example, viewing animals and plants as holding 
a shared spiritual component with humans has vastly different consequences 
in terms of how Amerindian peoples view hunting, eating and agriculture 
(de Castro, 2004). Such thinking makes clear that a politics of indigenous 
knowledge within environmental discourses is not as simple as defending 
‘rights’ to territories or benefits. Instead, it is tied to competing visions of 
environmental inhabitation and environmental ethics. In relation to conserving 
the genetic material and cultural infrastructures of agricultural practices, more 
than one world is at stake. 
The fresh attention within anthropology and geography to plural nature 
ontologies finds new connections with political ecology as an interdisciplinary 
field. Perhaps most notably, anthropologist Anna Tsing models a ‘global 
ethnography of connection’ in her work on Indonesian rainforests, situating 
herself at the interface between globalising political economies and fresh 
attention to the role of non-human agencies in shaping human knowledge 
systems (2005). In recounting the changing management of the forests and 
their occupants, Tsing seeks to integrate understandings of social conventions, 
poetical influences and state regulation on environmental management with 
thick ethnographic accounts of non-human patternings and the way these are 
enrolled in − yet also resist − human systems. Key for Tsing, is acknowledging 
that the forest is always a social place: its flora, fauna and human inhabitants 
have their own biographies, and it is the long-term connection between them 
that forms the ‘basis for forest knowledge and management practices’ (ibid., 
p. 190). This acknowledgement foregrounds what historical ecologists term 
the ‘piecing together’ of landscapes, in reference to the labour of disentangling 
long-term developmental histories of species life, including humans, within 
specific regions (see Rackham, 1998). Thinking historical ecologies through 
the recent scholarship around political ontology presents an exciting challenge 
for academic writing. Anthropological appreciation is called not only to 
distinct knowledge cultures but to non-human sign systems, together with 
how these are apprehended − albeit partially − in human sign systems (Kohn, 
2013). From this point begins the challenge of translating complex systemic 
interactions faithfully, appropriately acknowledging the new ‘objects’ created as 
part of any translation apparatus (Latour, 2011). 
Characterising specific movements and struggles in terms of plural 
ontologies is therefore far from straightforward. Agroecology, food sovereignty, 
and in situ conservation practices acquire coherency by being translated from 
one site to another, often between diverse cultural groups. They also retain 
a consistency derived from specific interactions with biophysical and animal 
systems. Meanwhile, indigenous groups do not always live at a remove from 
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others and may inhabit the city, shared territories or cultural memories. As 
Tsing’s work underlines, rural and forest knowledge cultures are often at the 
very heart of global political-economic transformations, rather than at the 
fringes. Thinking through political ontology for emerging agricultural spaces of 
exchange and innovation therefore demands of researchers that they pay careful 
attention to avoid reproducing assumptions. As I contextualise the Salvadorian 
permaculture movement, I work to consider how the citation of indigenous 
knowledge within hybrid agroecological practices may be characterised, and 
what is at stake in terms of a politics of nature.
Hybrid cultures of nature in El Salvador
Power and plants
My research journal entry for 10 April 2014 describes my experiences during 
a workshop: 
the movement of plants became to us such a clear metaphor for power. 
The histories of coffee and cocoa and indigo we explored embodied so 
many of the struggles of people, so many emotions […] I wondered what 
would happen if we told a history of the country through plants and the 
movement of plants, rather than through states or global powers.
Plant genetic information has moved for thousands of years across long 
distances, by caravan across the myriad silk routes of the Asian continent, in the 
plunder of conquering armies, and in the wind. Plants migrated with people. 
From the 16th century, governments became increasingly involved in the 
planned dissemination of ‘economic plants’, for example taking breadfruit from 
Tahiti to the West Indies, or rubber from Brazil to southeast Asia (Headrick, 
1996). Plant specimens and seeds travelled across the seas in glass containers to 
populate paradise gardens, and later, the botanical gardens, in which they were 
studied and displayed. Foodstuffs moved in all directions, especially into places 
of low biodiversity like Europe, while tropical plants tended to move laterally 
between colonial possessions.
The plant geographies of Central America, which underpin contemporary 
environmental discourses, were largely established through the ‘botanical 
chess-game’ of the 16th to 18th centuries (Brockway, 1988). For example 
coffee, first domesticated by the Arabs, was taken from Ethiopia to India, 
where the Dutch encountered it and planted it on Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and 
Java in the 17th century. One plant reached the Amsterdam Botanic Garden 
in 1706 and from this most of the world’s coffee plantations are descended. 
Cacao, or theobrama cacao [food of the gods], on the other hand, originated 
from the rainforests of Central America and was prevalent in ancient Olmec, 
Mayan and Aztec cultures − although Europeans often claimed to have been 
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the first to introduce it there (Crozier et al., 2011). Cacao was an important 
form of wealth in early colonised Guatemala and El Salvador, popular as a 
drink among European elites, but competition from other colonies led to 
a marked drop in revenues. Stagnating trade was revived by the cultivation 
of anil [indigo] in the area, which was cultivated for dye. A sophisticated 
form of commercial agriculture developed to support indigo production in 
El Salvador in the early 19th century, comprising large estates managed by 
families who also played a leading role in agitating for Central American 
independence. However, although indigo was a mainstay of economic 
development, national problems emerged as synthetic dyes rose in 
significance and indigo exports declined.
For Hume (2009, p. 53) and Montobbio (1999, p. 40), it is coffee, 
however, which provides the key explanatory thread of Salvadorian history. 
Liberal agitations culminated in a ‘coffee revolution’, where new lands were 
opened to cultivation through government-backed appropriations of Indian 
communally-owned lands, the removal of trade barriers and the subsidisation 
of export-oriented crops. Through this means a new oligarchy, comprising 
coffee-growing families and the military, established a tighter rein over a poor 
campesino majority. During the colonial era, the Spanish rule had mostly 
supported the concept of Indian ‘communal lands’, and indigenous peoples 
had maintained their livelihood through share-cropping and subsistence 
growing. Unlike other Central American contexts, coffee production was also 
initially concentrated among indigenous populations (Roseberry, 1991, p. 20). 
However, this placed commercial and governmental elites into competition for 
land and labour. From 1882 private ownership was declared the only recognised 
form of land ownership and communal rights were marginalised within the 
law. It therefore became increasingly difficult for indigenous peoples to retain 
communal landholdings. Increasing restrictions on movement and labour led 
to rising impoverishment and displacement, and in 1912 the government 
formed a National Guard, using Spain’s Guardia Civil as a model, to watch over 
coffee-growers’ interests in the face of growing rebellions. Most notable was the 
killing of between 15,000−30,000 indigenous peoples and also thousands of 
campesinos by state forces during the 1932 Matanza [massacre]. Indigenous 
populations virtually disappeared from El Salvador during this period.
The political economy that marked the 1970s was largely in place by this 
time. The best agricultural land belonged to a small group of coffee plantation 
owners, while the high labour demand was met by a permanent, ‘unfree’ labour 
force living on estates in highly restrictive conditions. Permission had to be 
sought for movement, debt peonage was the norm, elections were tightly 
controlled, and in some places sterilisation was imposed as a form of birth-
control (Roseberry, 1991). After World War Two, traditional patron-client 
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relationships on estates were transformed by highly coercive wage-labour 
relations as cattle-raising, cotton cultivation and sugar expanded El Salvador’s 
trade repertoire. The coffee elite, backed by the military, further reinforced 
their dominance, while the majority laboured for little pay with no access to 
education or medical services (Montes and Gaibrois, 1979). Huge migrations 
across the country took place during the harvest months, while many sought 
work in distant labour markets. To deal with rising dissent, rural unions 
were made illegal and haciendas increasingly securitised. There were sporadic 
attempts to reform land tenure and labour relations, but the core alliance was 
defeated in 1944, 1960 and 1972 (Walter and Williams, 1993). 
It was during this period that Green Revolution technologies were also 
experimentally introduced in El Salvador. Following discussions with the 
US Vice-President Henry Wallace, from 1943 the Rockefeller Foundation 
made the Mexican Agricultural Program its key ‘developmental’ intervention 
in the region. With the remit of increasing sustainable food production in 
impoverished areas, the CGIAR (formerly known as the Consultative Group 
on International Agricultural Research) was also involved from the outset in 
the collection of indigenous germplasm for commercial experimentations 
(Mangelsdorf, 1951). Over the next eight years, projects based on the Mexican 
model were rolled out throughout Central America and Brazil, mostly under 
the auspices of the US Department of Agriculture. Agricultural development 
became tied to civil upheaval in the region through an anti-communist rhetoric 
which pervaded CGIAR and Rockefeller Foundation discourses. National 
governments were persuaded that failure to introduce ‘modern solutions’ would 
lead ‘underdeveloped’ countries to accept communist promises and systems 
(Carey, 2009). A number of Central American governments consequently 
adopted recommendations, primarily based on fears for national security. 
The economic benefits of such schemes would have been minimal, since the 
new agricultural supplies were mainly obtained through US-based companies. 
Meanwhile, the ‘miracle’ high-yielding varieties required increasingly high 
inputs of fertilisers as soils became impoverished.
Violence deepened further within El Salvador as labour conditions worsened 
and agrarian autonomies deteriorated. Coalitions of landlords and military 
hardliners brutally derailed a reformist government’s attempt at a limited 
agrarian reform along the coastal plains in 1976, while strikes for higher wages 
in 1979 were repressed with increasing violence (Wood, 2003). There was mass 
exodus from conflicted areas and civil war was on the horizon.
Popular education and plants
Green Revolution technologies became connected in the popular imagination 
with land inequalities through the widespread popular education networks 
which multiplied in El Salvador at the end of the 1970s in association with 
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the guerrilla uprisings. However, perhaps surprisingly, few of the networks or 
resources for revolt were in place in the decade beforehand. A 1973 survey of 
campesino culture, conducted by the Jesuit sociologist Segundo Montes, found 
that the rural poor in El Salvador were fatally resigned to poverty, with low 
social solidarity and high competition for land and jobs (Montes and Gaibrois, 
1979). Wood concludes that two factors were crucial in bringing about the 
ensuing resistance: first, the new pastoral practices of liberation theology; and, 
second, the organising practices of tiny guerrilla organisations which built 
upon such structures (2003). These would later form the basis for bottom-up 
critiques of industrial agriculture and the development of alternatives.
The liberation theology movement had been sparked by calls for revival at 
the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II, 1962−4), when many bishops, nuns, 
lay theologians and activists rejected established authoritarian readings of the 
gospels for a biblical ‘preferential option for the poor’ (Smith, 1991). Carlos 
Rafael Caburrús (1983, p. 135), a Guatemalan Jesuit, described the beginnings 
of this movement across Latin America as an ‘unblocking’ of radical campesino 
fatalism. Previously, church and state authority figures were associated with the 
divine will of God. The idea that the oppression of the poor was an obstacle to 
God’s will created a moral impetus for organised resistance, to which many 
became committed thus risking their lives (Pearce, 1986). From the late 1960s 
radical Catholic priests began to denounce the government from the pulpit and 
to record publicly the abusive harvest practices of local landlords. Meanwhile, 
a peripatetic network of priests and other active intermediaries, known as 
catechists, provided pastoral support for covert bible study cells in cantones and 
parishes across El Salvador. The study cells drew strongly on the pedagogical 
principles established by the Brazilian popular educator Paulo Freire for his 
1970s adult literacy programmes, which are premised on the capacity of 
individuals and groups to interpret their situations independently (1972). 
Wood claims that the feeling of equality created was critical to subsequent 
sustained uprisings, as it created the sense that ‘we are capable of managing 
these properties’ (2003, p. 206). 
Access to land and livelihood remained central to the guerrilla uprisings 
that led to the civil war, with the large majority of insurgents being subsistence 
farmers. Two years into the war, these campesinos began taking land for 
their basic food needs, beginning with microfundia [micro-plots], and many 
stopped paying rent. Coffee plantations were pulled down for firewood and 
many estates were destroyed, especially those of uncooperative landlords. 
However, the critiques of Green Revolution technologies which had developed 
during the 1970s were marginal until guerrilla resistance ended. Despite the 
struggles it provoked, liberation theology did not really promote solutions to 
the major agricultural programmes which continued to undermine subsistence 
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livelihoods. Instead, the movement provided a latent grammar for other 
popular education movements, especially the campesino-a-campesino [farmer-
to-farmer] (CaC) agroecological movement, which reemerged in El Salvador 
during the 1990s. 
The first documented agroecology initiative in Central America was a 
small NGO programme in Guatemala in 1972, which aimed to empower a 
group of indigenous Kaqarikel campesinos to teach ecological techniques that 
were embedded in their traditional culture (Holt-Giménez, 2006). Projects 
centred on sharing long-standing principles for agriculture that were being 
eroded, such as recycling biomass, minimising nutrient losses, and restoring 
degraded soils (Altieri, 1995). Bilingual campesinos were also trained as 
farmer ‘extensionists’, and used simple instruments − a machete, a tape 
measure and an aparato A [simple apparatus for measuring land gradients] 
− together with oral traditions and socio-drama, to communicate with 
other farmers. These were so successful that several encuentros [encounters] 
and intercambios [exchanges] were subsequently organised. Beginning in 
Guatemala and Mexico, these informal visits enabled farmers to consolidate 
and cross-fertilise their practices. The model grew in momentum during 
the 1980s when heavy flooding exposed the difference between terraced 
farms, planted using traditional techniques, and modern farms, which were 
stripped of topsoil. While El Salvador was largely isolated from this growth, 
agroecological discourses reentered the country as INGOs were supporting 
village-level projects during the early 1990s in conflict-affected areas.
Crucial to this process was learning to experiment: each farmer, or 
community of farmers, was encouraged to test proposed techniques by 
constructing parcelas gemelas [twin plots] and measuring the differences in 
production. Each farmer was encouraged to become a promotor [promoter] 
for principles they had found effective. As in liberation theology, the emphasis 
was on rejecting received models of practice and legitimising experience. Yet, 
as Sauer had indicated in 1941, long-standing traditional practices and their 
infrastructures in CaC are highly valued within agricultural development 
processes. The implication is that sustainable futures cannot be devised 
through attention to genetic properties alone − these depend upon cultural 
reservoirs of knowledge and practices, which have been shaped and established 
over many centuries. On the other hand, CaC pedagogies borrow from the 
science lexicon to establish methodologies which emphasise repeatability and 
testing. Agroecology, from this perspective, marks a conjuncture between 
scientific principles for establishing translatable authority, and notions of 
tradition which resist notions of universal translatability. 
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Permaculture and plants
The CaC movement reappeared in El Salvador via Nicaragua and Guatemala as 
leftist coalitions were breaking apart under the pressure of organising, without 
the unifying mission of guerrilla warfare. Repeated efforts to repair fragmented 
economic infrastructures were foundering, while INGOs were proliferating their 
interventions, as they would again after the 2001 earthquake. Rising concerns 
in Europe over gender issues, discrimination against indigenous peoples and 
environmental degradation were reflected in NGO project involvements, and 
later in bilateral and multilateral funding (Pearce, 1988). By 1989 there were 
around 700 NGOs in El Salvador, many of which provided opportunities for 
autonomous groups to operate outside state logics and jurisdiction (ibid., 
p. 599). However, the influx of new funding streams created new kinds of 
divisions between classes and party factions. The major INGOs became 
increasingly polarised by their entanglement within local forms of divergence. 
Meanwhile, older, male brokers who had not necessarily been involved in 
guerrilla leadership, took advantage of the fraught landscape to manipulate 
financial flows, ensuring that benefits reached those under their patronage.5 
Such dynamics are common in situations of high poverty and weak economic 
infrastructure, but served to further intensify the gendered and hierarchical 
structure of social organising in El Salvador. 
Agricultural practice formed a hotbed for such struggles. Besides a land 
redistribution programme mandated by the peace accords, a rush of charitable 
investment from abroad framed itself through new food security terminology.6 
Many of these were ‘quick-fixes’, which did not take community infrastructures 
into account, and tended to be short-lived. Against this backdrop, the CaC 
movement was distinct for its bottom-up development models. Oxfam’s 
‘South-to-South’ programme of the 1990s, for example, drew on earlier CaC 
models to organise meetings between farmers across locations in Central 
America affected by conflict. Salvadorian farmers attended several meetings 
in Guatemala and brought back ideas to regions like Cuscatlán and Morazán, 
leading to the development of first an Eastern Commission, and later a Western 
Commission, for the Salvadorian CaC movement. In Guatemala, farmers also 
encountered permaculture, which centres on the idea of creating a ‘permanent 
culture’: autoreplenishing and dynamic systems which incorporate ecological, 
biological and social processes. Juan Rojas, a Salvadorian exiled during the civil 
war, discovered permaculture in Australia, where it had been developing since 
the 1970s out of ‘environmental design’, rather than agroecological critiques of 
5 Interview with Karen Inwood, director, Instituto de Permacultura de El Salvador, 9 Oct. 
2012.
6 See also Woodgate’s discussion in chapter 4 on the interaction and cooperation between 
Latin American agrarian social movements and the researchers and activists involved in 
transformative agroecology. 
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growth economies. Sponsored by churches sympathetic to the aims of liberation 
theology, Rojas returned to El Salvador in 1999 to become a ‘permaculture 
missionary’, and established new links with nascent CaC and permaculture 
collectives in Central America. 
In El Salvador permaculture thus largely entered the scene via several 
brokers, who had encountered permaculture overseas. Another important figure 
was Karen Inwood, a former community development worker from the UK, 
who discovered permaculture at a Scottish ‘eco-village’ in 1999, which Rojas 
also attended. Inwood spent 12 years in El Salvador, using her community 
development background to implement permaculture as an extension of CaC 
activities. From 2001, the Salvadorian permaculture association was a project of 
FUNDHAMER, a para-church organisation, and thus gained funding from the 
Inter-American Foundation, which supports bottom-up development projects. 
The group was founded formally in 2002 as the Instituto de Permacultura de El 
Salvador (IPES), with early grants from Catholic charities in Germany, Holland 
and the USA. Consequently, although IPES was not fundamentally a religious 
group, it was able to attract funding from a range of organisations sympathetic to 
liberation theology and its connection with agroecological movements.
Central to permaculture as it has developed in El Salvador are a set of 12 
principles, each focused on observing how ecological and environmental 
processes take place. The idea is to mimic into social systems the principles of 
dynamic feedback and interaction which allow ecological networks, comprising 
diverse species communities, to coexist harmoniously. For example, the 11th 
principle, ‘use edges and value the marginal’, encourages designers to recognise 
how hedges and boundaries may support the proliferation of pollinators, but it 
also encourages recognition of how inbetween social spaces can form valuable 
interfaces between distinct cultures. The core values of ‘earth care’, ‘fair share’ and 
‘people care’ express that such practices mean to support vibrant ecological and 
social relationships, as well as a more vibrant soil. Agriculture is thus reframed as 
a process of co-design, which involves cooperation with existing communities, 
including ‘more-than-human’ communities of microbes, animals and plants. 
Permaculture also draws strongly on popular education’s repertoire and ethos, 
encouraging the use of simple instruments that can be mastered and taught by 
anyone. In each new location, a permaculture design course is run in partnership 
with existing local organisations to develop such teaching capacity. This leads 
to the establishment of local permaculture associations, which form a basis for 
collective organising, restimulating local economies and farmers’ markets, and 
collective learning.
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The nature-cultures of permaculture 
Embodied experience
Thinking about permaculture as pedagogies focused on interaction with 
nonhuman communities helps one to reflect on the nature−cultures in 
play. Permaculture mobilises specific discourses of the environment that 
highlight pragmatic observation and experimentation principles as a basis for 
intervention. At the intersection between the principles of popular education 
scientific method, these discourses treat the more-than-human world, as it is 
encountered through the body, as a kind of universal foundation for knowledge. 
However, although this universalisation allows a bifurcation of nature and 
culture to creep back in (for example, agricultural materials or technologies 
are selected according to criteria of ‘what is natural’), the emphasis on bringing 
these principles into dialogue with long-standing agricultural practices, cultural 
stories and symbolic understandings results in hybrid assemblages that vary 
considerably from place to place. I suggest that the permaculture principles 
have much to offer sites of environmental policy-making and knowledge 
production, since they create a basis for environmental design that can be 
reproduced without colonising the worlds of diverse nature−cultures. 
Given this focus on knowing the more-than-human world via pragmatic 
principles and traditions, a significant part of permaculture training is schooling 
the senses. Design students learn to feel the soil and notice how it heats and 
then cools through the process of making active compost. They also learn how 
to detect when there is ‘life’ or ‘no life’ in the soil through their finger-tips, 
and what healthy soil smells like. This reflects the biological principle at work 
in permaculture, which is, writes Puig de la Bellacasa, fundamentally based in 
ethos and doings (2010). That is, permaculture design does not just revolve 
around human selves and actions, but principles of collective interdependency, 
which reflect a different conception of ‘bios’ and ‘biopolitics’ than those usually 
employed in the social sciences. Bios (Greek for ‘life’) is expanded to include soil 
and plant life, communities of microbes as well as the human body. The body 
on the other hand becomes a litmus for evaluation, in terms of experimentation, 
but also of ethics and aesthetics. The latter come into play when exchange with 
other communities, including transnational ones like LVC, brings different 
models and ideas into competition. Bodies decide whether a practice coheres 
with the ethos and practices of a lived permaculture world, or an established 
site-based tradition. Permaculture practices are thus essentially carried by habit 
− by embodied repetitions which cultivate ways of seeing, knowing and doing.
Of course, given these shared habits, permaculture discourses also establish 
new contours of doing and knowing that define geographies of connection 
across borders, rather than simply consolidating localised nature−cultures. The 
55HYBRID TRADITIONS
process of learning about permaculture creates new collectives who identify 
with other permaculturists around the world, and cultivates agreement over 
what techniques are appropriate. This was evident, I noted when observing 
the Suchitoto permaculture design course, in the way that students, engaged 
in ‘dramatising the Green Revolution’, reproduced a similar script even as they 
drew on personal memories or accounts. The accounts agreed with one another 
and mobilised specific figures and narratives (such as the evil transnational 
company ‘Monsanto’ sending in representatives to dupe innocent farmers 
into abandoning traditional practices) in a way that confirmed exposure to 
discourses in other forums such as LVC and the World Social Forum. On the 
other hand, it was striking that although these existing scripts duplicated each 
other markedly, individuals felt they had the licence to improvise difference 
out of their own experience (for example, in the socio-dramas participants 
created theatrical costumes and sets from leaves, plants and seeds, drawing 
on their memories of indigenous medicinal uses within improvised scenarios 
in which they treated one another’s ailments). Within such improvisations, 
discourses of alternative health or of ‘natural’ materials resonated from other 
sites around the world, yet the developments of the sites and training courses 
took on a singularity that differentiated them strongly from these other places. 
The permaculture movement I encountered was characterised by confidence 
in personal and group capacities, and by an aesthetic of bricolage in the 
construction of community sites from found materials, used glass bottles, 
recycled crates. This confidence was highly gendered, and the movement 
faces ongoing challenges from pervasive machismo cultures, but also 
demonstrated the capacity of permaculture pedagogies to generate site-
specific forms of authority that function to challenge land enclosure as also 
being knowledge enclosure.
The challenges enacted by these experiential forms of authority include the 
reappropriation of abandoned land but also, increasingly, an impact on the 
strategic priorities of other influential domains. Thus, rising awareness of the 
connectedness between health, plant life and agricultural issues has opened 
shared platforms for collaboration between the permaculture movement, 
NGOs, municipal councils and regional government in El Salvador. Eberto 
Domínguez, director of the Catholic charity Caritas’s Salvadorian office, 
has observed a general shift in public awareness, across the past six years, 
towards one that recognises the impact of monocultural production forms on 
health. This has been reflected in the mandates set at municipal, regional and 
national levels, which increasingly connect agriculture, health and poverty in 
their diagnostics and targets. For Karla Vásquez, from Ayuda en Acción in 
Suchitoto, involving permaculturists in establishing gardens in schools has 
provided a means of communicating with pupils and families about healthy 
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eating, leading to food production being targeted in rural areas as a means to 
tackle nutritional deficiency. Health has started to provide an intersectional 
forum where claims based on a revival of traditional practices can be staged in 
conjunction with experimental ways of combining and extending them.
This authority production also influences how people design their 
environments, including huertos [agricultural plots], but also their domestic 
and communal spaces, and life patterns. By changing how its practitioners 
view their own intelligence and capacities, permaculture allows designs to be 
innovated which reframe space and efficiency in terms of connectivity and long-
term health rather than short-term profit. However, tradition plays an ambiguous 
role within this authorisation process. Traditional and indigenous practices are 
highly valued because they have been developed in perpetual dialogue with 
specific environmental conditions and evolving seed varieties. However, in El 
Salvador, traditional practices were increasingly marginalised during the Green 
Revolution and indigenous ones have often been reconstructed from memory 
and imagination.7 Tradition forms the medium into which new techniques are 
translated, while also forming the friction preventing place-based knowledge 
from being upscaled and translated into other sites. It is important to make clear 
the place of tradition within the nature−cultures of permaculture and to evaluate 
the degree to which a romantic attachment to the past may play its own role in 
depoliticising or parochialising environmental disputes.
Terra Madre
A key aspect of tradition that needs to be considered is its place in investing 
particular practices with authority: do traditions carry weight because they 
have always been practised, or because they are cultural practices that work? Are 
indigenous practices valued because they articulate ontological frameworks that 
open up more lively and more sustainable relationships with the more-than-
human world, or because they carry the promise of reconnecting agriculture with 
the ‘nature’ that is feared lost? This also raises the question of the degree to which 
new knowledge in permaculture is being reframed in relation to traditional 
authority structures, including patriarchal ones. 
In El Salvador tradition is entangled within ideas of indigeneity, and it 
is difficult to discuss the two separately. Tradition means the weightiness that 
practice accrues through its association either with founding figures and texts, 
or with the cultural embeddedness of reiterated custom (Arendt, 1958). Within 
permaculture, tradition refers to long-standing agricultural practices, together 
with the cultural and symbolic ways that these are validated. This cultural content 
marks the connection with indigenous forms of knowledge. In El Salvador to 
speak of nuestros indígenas is to refer to the indigenous peoples who collectively 
7 See Wylie’s discussion in chapter 2 on the significant role plants have played in the culture 
and society of Central and South America since pre-Columbian times.
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preceded the Spanish invasion, and who perpetuated their own distinct cultural 
practices in communities until the 1930s. A small indigenous minority of the 
Nahua-Pipil population still lives in the southwestern region of El Salvador, and 
smaller populations of Lenca and Cacaopera survive in the eastern regions. Besides 
ongoing deliberation on what qualifies as indigenous, many permaculturists 
value the practices of indigenous peoples as ancestral ones, and the stories, uses 
of plants and terminology remembered and learned from them are treated as 
sacred knowledge. As when traditional craft practices are revived, this process 
involves a mixture of research and reimagining. Tradition, on the other hand, 
means ‘what we do now’. Permaculture practitioners emphasise tradition as an 
archive of the memory of past generations, specifically of its singular elements, 
but tradition is also the praxis into which tested techniques of other places are 
learned and incorporated. 
The key concept forming the link between, and assessing the consistency 
of, these different forms of knowledge is the notion of Terra Madre, or Mother 
Nature − an idea derived from Mayan cosmology. To speak of Terra Madre is not 
to elicit a coherent indigenous ontology but to make a statement regarding the 
politics of ecological knowledge. Among permaculturists one can honour Terra 
Madre while also upholding a liberation theology praxis, or evangelical, Muslim 
and atheist beliefs. Most often the term is used to refer to the living vibrancy 
of the material world of plants, people and soil. It denotes life’s connectivity, 
and usually, its refusal to obey or even heed human laws. Terra Madre is a term 
for acknowledging the excess of matter to human forms of knowing and saying 
the world. Within such terms, neither Terra Madre nor permaculture can be 
characterised in terms of nature−cultures. Rather than carrying their own 
ontological content, they comprise ethical and pragmatic principles that allow 
collectives to (re)design environments in dialogue with the more-than-human 
world, via the ontological forms of knowing and traditions that are practised 
there. This ontological empty space is what makes these principles so valuable 
for learning within other spheres, as it provides an opportunity for knowledge 
production that exerts friction in relation to imposed universals. 
The hybridity of this process is vital. In practice, my interviewees told me, it 
is normally only well-meaning NGOs which insist that indigenous practice is 
something that is or ever was something pure and separate from all other forms of 
knowledge − a claim which some suggest in fact relegates indigenous peoples to 
the status of past cultures (Braun, 2002), along with the ‘pristine’ forest (Denevan, 
1992). Moreover, while it is important to recognise that, historically, western 
ontologies of nature and culture have colonised other ways of relating to the more-
than-human world, in the Salvadorian context to insist upon a pure underlying 
substrate of knowledge would misrepresent the constellation of cultural ecologies 
which informs contemporary campesino cultures. It would also eclipse the way 
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that Terra Madre is increasingly mobilised within food sovereignty framings as a 
connective concept allowing for cultural exchange between diversely positioned 
land-workers, agroecological practitioners. Like food sovereignty, Terra Madre 
therefore carries something of a ‘strategic essentialism’ without itself being an 
essentialist concept. It forms a vehicle to translate diverse experiences and cultural 
commitments, without requiring that they compromise their ‘autochthonous’ 
singularities (Rosset and Martínez-Torres, 2013). 
Tradition, thus being transformed and politicised as it is taken up within the 
permaculture pedagogies, becomes the means through which diverse ontological 
accounts of nature are to be defended. As a lay form of science, like agroecological 
approaches more generally, permaculture borrows from ideas of scientific method 
to establish principles of generalisability and translatability. On the other hand, 
agroecological approaches have been set up to resist the ideas of terra nullius which 
industrial agriculture tends to presume: the presumption that all wild land is idle, 
and all lands are equal when it comes to generating productivity (Makki, 2014). 
Tradition, within agroecology, denotes the embodied practices of knowing and 
doing upon which the conservation of genetic wealth depends. Yet this tradition 
is not static, and does not equal a direct translation of past practices into present 
coordinates. Technologies of communication, experience and ‘life’ − such as the 
biological sciences − mediate everyday life in ways that have transfigured the 
way small-scale farming communities in El Salvador know themselves and each 
other. In rendering it translatable, permaculturists and agroecologists recreate 
tradition as a site of authority, whose ‘weightiness’ to govern derives not from 
the testimony of forefathers, as in traditional forms of authority (Arendt, 1958) 
but from notions of objectivity and experience associated with biopolitical 
technologies of government (Blencowe, 2013). Tradition claims an intimacy 
with more-than-human agencies and a consequent authority to speak that also 
reframes campesino farmers as experts and protagonists of food futures. What 
unifies such movements is not one ontology, as in cases where human rights are 
expounded as a fit-all solution, but a commitment to diversity: to biodiversity 
but, before this, to ontological diversity, without which biodiversity cannot be 
achieved.
Conclusion 
Ontological diversity is necessary for biodiversity, because more than one world 
is at stake in the conservation of plant genetic material. Besides the long-standing 
practices that have functioned to preserve genetic archives across millennia, this 
is a question of what constitutes biodiversity, and how it is that we can know 
it. Scientific definitions and practices of biodiversity are helpful for establishing 
principles of objectivity through which more-than-human agencies, via their 
diverse collaborators, can influence practice (Callon, 2009). However, forms 
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of collaboration with more-than-human agencies far exceed that which can be 
captured by science. For future conservation practices, it is imperative that the 
plurality of nature−cultures within the world is taken seriously, and the way that 
the longer histories of agriculture manifest both ontological and land enclosure 
dispossession. Indeed, the latter is often performed through the former. 
This chapter has argued that permaculture pedagogies of plant relationality 
constitute a form of authority that speaks to declining biodiversity issues, without 
flattening ontological diversity. This emphasis on knowledge cultures challenges 
a fetishisation of genetic technologies within agricultural development, as if 
manipulating these to achieve food security could sustain and be sustained by 
ecologies with which they bear no relation. This suggests a possible continuation 
of Carl Sauer’s invocation into a different sort of Green Revolution, which takes 
the long histories seriously, geographies of connection, and innovative practices 
that form the seed’s unseen husk. Through an understanding of nature−cultures 
it becomes clear that citing indigenous knowledge as something ‘pure’ can 
relegate such living archives to the past. Grasping the hybridity of agroecological 
practices within contemporary contexts of globalising political economy and 
communication technologies allows environmental design principles to be 
perceived that can move beyond this impasse. Permaculture practices, for 
example, cultivate a specific disposition or relationship with more-than-human 
agencies, but they also create a basis for aesthetic and ethical evaluations in terms 
of a sense of tradition. This tradition – like Terra Madre – is a reinvention for the 
present, whose emphasis on embodied practice and lived worlds as the locus of 
technological innovation acts to exert friction on forms of both agricultural and 
ontological enclosure.
Permaculture is also significant in the Salvadorian context because it has made the 
production of experiential and in situ claims to authority audible to other regulative 
institutions. Such organisations are beginning to recognise the negative impact 
of claiming too much agency or responsibility over a domain comprising myriad 
fragile cultural and ecological networks. A further move might entail collaboration 
in the production of forums which can articulate this authority in relation to other 
problems shared by other institutions in scientific terms, such as the effects of climate 
change, water conservation and biodiversity protection. Soil science, for example, 
and the belated global interest in its broader histories and geographies, offers one 
opportunity to rethink terra nullius into terra plena: a soil already populated by 
microbial and human communities, cultural narratives, lay scientific practices, 
political demands and solutions to environmental crisis.
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4. Agri-cultural practice and agroecological 
discourse in the Anthropocene: confronting 
environmental change and food insecurity 
in Latin America and the Caribbean
Graham Woodgate
In the realms of agriculture, food and the environment the 21st century is often described as one of impending limits, extremes and crises. Expansion of the agricultural frontier into forest land and farming’s mechanisation 
and industrialisation are contributing to previously unwitnessed biodiversity 
depletion rates, while overall the food system accounts for approximately 50 
per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions (UNCTAD, 2013). Indeed, the 
scale of human impacts on the biosphere is such that it is now detectable in the 
lithosphere’s stratigraphy, prompting Crutzen and Stoermer to propose a new 
geological epoch – the Anthropocene (2000). This proposition emphasises 
the seriousness of the environmental challenges facing humanity in the 
21st century. 
Peak oil, peak nutrients, soil erosion, declining biodiversity, global warming, 
climate change and extreme weather events threaten agricultural productivity. 
At the same time market distortions, triggered by growing demand for biofuels 
and livestock feeds, together with commodity speculation have resulted in 
two exaggerated food price spikes since 2005. These rapidly rising prices have 
provoked acute nutritional crises for the world’s ‘bottom billion’ (Collier, 
2007), almost 200 million of whom are resident in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC). So, what does the situation look like in the region and what 
are the options for confronting and mitigating negative environmental change 
and food insecurity?
Some 600 million humans inhabit LAC (approximately 9 per cent of the 
world total) and, while the population growth rate is declining, at ca. 1.3 per 
cent per year, it remains above the global average and is not forecast to fall 
below it until after 2030 (FAO, 2014). In terms of productive resources, about 
37 per cent of LAC’s two billion hectares of land is dedicated to farming and 
almost 47 per cent is covered by forests. The region also has abundant water 
resources: while it accounts for just 15 per cent of the total global land area, it 
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receives some 30 per cent of precipitation. With respect to industrial inputs, 
on average some 110 kilograms (kg) of fertiliser are applied to every hectare of 
the region’s crop lands, while in Latin America, excluding the Caribbean, each 
hectare is also dosed with 5.21 kg of pesticides each year (ibid.).
This combination of land, water, labour and capital indicates that LAC is 
more than capable of producing enough food to feed its current inhabitants, 
with plenty of capacity to meet projected population growth. If the region’s 
biological capacity is compared with its ecological footprint,1 it becomes 
apparent that it has an ecological reserve or surplus of available resources over 
consumption of 2.9 hectares per person. This compares extremely favourably 
with the global scenario, which exhibits a deficit of 0.9 hectares per capita 
(GFN, 2010). Despite this apparent ecological cornucopia, some 30 per cent of 
the total population continues to subsist on less than $2/day, a figure that rises 
to over 50 per cent of rural inhabitants, some 35 million of whom fail to meet 
their daily food requirements (Berdegué and Fuentealba, 2011). Furthermore, 
despite the fact that by 2010, more than 20 per cent of the regional land surface 
had been assigned some form of protected area status, agriculture continues to 
have significant negative environmental impacts. Inappropriate cultivation and 
cropping practices lead to soil erosion, while the application of fertilisers and 
pesticides contaminates water, air and food itself. Expansion of the agricultural 
frontier and the replacement of biodiverse, peasant agroecosystems with 
monocultural, industrial production systems result in a continuing loss of 
biodiversity, while deforestation, soil cultivation, residue burning and animal 
agriculture all contribute to greenhouse gas emissions.2
This chapter seeks to unpick the situation and explore two distinct proposals 
for confronting regional food insecurity and environmental degradation. The 
first, which will be only briefly outlined, is the ‘global food security’ model 
promoted by institutions such as the World Bank and the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). This relies on technological developments, 
increasing trade liberalisation, what is termed ‘sustainable intensification’, and 
the extension of social welfare programmes. The second, which will be set out 
in greater detail, is the altogether more radical proposal for ‘food sovereignty’, 
proposed by the peasant and family farmer international, La Via Campesina 
1 Biological capacity or ‘biocapacity’ is the ‘capacity of ecosystems to produce useful biological 
materials and to absorb waste materials generated by humans’, while ecological footprint 
is ‘a measure of how much area of biologically productive land and water an individual, 
population or activity requires to produce all the resources it consumes and to absorb the 
waste it generates’. (Global Footprint Network, www.footprintnetwork.org/en/index.php/
GFN/page/glossary/ (accessed 3 Dec. 2015). 
2 Agriculture in LAC produces approximately 870 million tons of CO2e annually (c. 18% of 
the global total), 65% of which comes from enteric fermentation in the guts of the region’s 
livestock. See FAO (2014).
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(LVC),3 and promoted by a growing body of activist researchers and academics 
in the field of transformative agroecology (compare Méndez et al., 2015).
First, the environmental impacts of different agricultural practices will be 
explored, followed by a consideration of the benefits associated with low-
external input − biodiverse agriculture. Having described the productive 
and environmental characteristics of the region’s agricultures, the chapter 
will examine how the 21st-century food price spikes originated and compare 
proposals for global food security and sovereignty. It will close by setting out the 
key dimensions of what Altieri and Toledo have described as Latin America’s 
‘agroecological revolution’ (2011).
Agri-cultures and their environmental 
and health impacts
Since the emergence of agriculture humans have modified natural eco-systems 
so as to obtain a large, nett, primary product to harvest. In order to maximise 
the output of useful products farmers seek to optimise the availability of 
nutrients, light and water to crop plants by controlling competition from non-
crop species. Eco-system modification usually involves removing most or all 
tree cover, especially in temperate regions, and as the agricultural frontier has 
expanded so the area of the Earth’s surface covered by trees has contracted from 
a pre-agriculture estimate of ca. 75 per cent to a current figure of just over 30 
per cent (FAO, 2010). As already noted, this process is less advanced in LAC, 
which still has almost 50 per cent of forest cover. Be this as it may, in the 20 
years from 1990 to 2010 the region lost almost 100 million hectares of forest 
(ca. 10 per cent of the 1990 total): most of it to the expanding agricultural 
frontier. Trees store significant quantities of carbon, and thus forest clearance 
contributes significantly to greenhouse gas emissions and, hence, to global 
warming. It is not just the forests’ trees that store carbon, the UN’s 2010 
Global Forest Resources Assessment estimated that, on average, forest biomass 
accounts for just 44 per cent of total forest carbon, with a further 45 per cent 
stored in soil organic matter and 11 per cent in deadwood and leaf litter (ibid.).
According to Ruddiman (2003), the advent and expansion of agriculture 
and agrarian civilisations were responsible for a global mean temperature rise 
of almost 1˚C prior to industrialisation, implying that what Crutzen and 
Stoermer (2000) dubbed the Anthropocene began not with the Industrial 
Revolution, but some 5−8,000 years ago with widespread forest clearance 
for agriculture. While Ruddiman’s hypothesis has gained significant support 
and generated much debate, it is clear that the industrialisation of agriculture 
and globalisation of the food system based on fossil hydrocarbons has many 
3 For information on LVC, see www.viacampesina.org (accessed 3 Dec. 2015).
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additional negative environmental impacts as well as being a much more 
significant and problematic contributor to global warming than forest 
clearance alone.
As well as modifying eco-systems, agriculture has altered plant and animal 
genetics. Wild species have been domesticated and over successive generations 
those individuals with the most promising and useful characteristics have been 
selected and used to produce seed and offspring for subsequent plant and animal 
crops. The Americas are the centre of origin for a raft of familiar agricultural 
crops: maize, climbing beans, squash, cotton, chilli, tomatoes, avocados, cocoa 
and vanilla were first domesticated from wild species in Mesoamerica, while 
the vast area covered by South America, from the Andes down through the 
Amazon Basin, offers evidence of the early cultivation of potatoes, tomatoes, 
cotton, sweet potatoes and numerous other roots and tubers, as well as peanuts 
and pineapples (Toledo and Barrera-Bassols, 2008).
Over time, the ongoing domestication of wild plants and animals and the 
selective breeding of crop varieties and livestock have produced a significant 
expansion of agrobiodiversity. In Peru, there are as many as 4,000 to 5,000 
different varieties of potato, each with its own flavour, shape, colour and 
texture, and each adapted to a particular ecological niche in terms of soil 
and climate. In just one municipality in Central Mexico, researchers from 
the Institute of Agricultural and Rural Sciences, working together with 
local farmers, have identified no fewer than 60 distinct maize varieties. The 
production and processing of crops, and the distribution and consumption 
of agricultural products have gone hand-in-hand with place-based, cultural 
learning and the establishment of a broad range of social institutions. In almost 
every seat of human habitation, distinct agri-cultures and agroecosystems have 
been developed and ‘maintained through a mosaic of management practices 
that ... co-evolved in relation to local environmental fluctuations, and ... [have 
been] carried forward by both biophysical and social features ... including: 
genotypes, artefacts, written accounts, ... embodied rituals, art, oral traditions 
and self-organized systems of rules’ (Barthel et al., 2013, p. 1142).4
Toledo and Barrera-Bassols refer to these traditional agri-cultures as 
‘biocultural memory’ (2008) and concur with Barthel et al. (2013) regarding 
their importance in terms of biodiversity conservation and future food security 
(see also IAASTD, 2009 and UNCTAD, 2013). Globally, of some ‘1.5 billion 
smallholders, family farmers and indigenous people’ that occupy around 350 
million small farms, roughly 50 per cent employ agroecological practices and 
represent ‘a testament to the remarkable resiliency of traditional agroecosystems 
in the face of continuous environmental and economic change – while 
4 See also Wylie, chapter 2.
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contributing substantially to food security at local, regional and national levels’ 
(Altieri and Toledo, 2011, p. 591). Indeed, according to a United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) report of 2011, small-scale farmers produce 
50 per cent of the total global food production, with a further 25 per cent 
coming from wild harvest, hunting and fishing. Altieri claims that in Latin 
America ‘17 million peasant production units occupying close to 60.5 million 
hectares, or 34.5 per cent of the total cultivated land with average farm sizes of 
about 1.8 hectares, produce 51 per cent of the maize, 77 per cent of the beans, 
and 61 per cent of the potatoes for domestic consumption’ (2008, p. 5).
The industrialisation of agriculture and the establishment of what McMichael 
has called the ‘corporate’ or ‘food from nowhere’ food regime has involved 
the simplification of agroecosystems and the transformation of diverse agri-
cultures into homogenous agri-businesses (2009).5 In the process, crop, wild 
plant, animal and human cultural diversity have all been greatly diminished:
the rate of biodiversity loss due to ... chemically intensive monocultures 
is extraordinary. ... Entire habitats and [the] wild species associated with 
them ... have been lost or are on extinction trajectories ... and it is now 
well established that the current loss of biodiversity in agro-ecosystems 
also erodes fundamental ecosystem services that underlie the resilience 
of production, such as soil fertility, pollination and natural pest control. 
(Barthel et al., 2013, p. 1145)
The first stages of agricultural industrialisation began with mechanisation 
followed by ‘the development of hybrid maize in the 1930s, [and] the expanding 
use of complete fertilizers and [chemical] weed and pest control technology 
following World War II’ (Hildebrand and Poey, 1985, p. ix). The success of 
these petroleum-based technologies in Europe and the USA led to international 
efforts to increase global food production by promoting agricultural 
industrialisation in the south. Of particular relevance to this endeavour were the 
constituent institutions of the CGIAR (Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research), which include: the Centre for the Improvement of 
Maize and Wheat in Mexico established in 1966, the International Centre for 
Tropical Agriculture in Colombia (1967), and the International Potato Centre 
in Peru (1971). In concert with national agricultural development programmes 
and significant funding from philanthropic organisations and aid programmes 
such as the USA’s Alliance for Progress, these international institutions drove 
what subsequently became known as the Green Revolution, which extended 
technological packages of hybrid seeds, synthetic fertilisers and chemical 
herbicides and pesticides throughout Latin America and more widely in the 
developing world.
5 Compare the ‘agri-culture’ and ‘agri-business’ notions with Millner’s discussion of ‘nature-
cultures’ in chapter 3.
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Under optimum conditions industrial technologies returned remarkable 
increases in production. At the same time, however, increased productivity came 
at the cost of environmental integrity, social justice and long-term ecological 
and economic viability (see, for example, Carson, 1962; Eckholm, 1976; 
Repetto, 1985; Woodgate, 1992; Vandermeer and Perfecto, 2013). These and 
other studies show how industrial agriculture and the corporate food regime 
have concentrated land ownership, marginalised and impoverished small-scale 
farmers, depleted wild and agricultural biodiversity, polluted soils, water and the 
atmosphere, and transformed food from the most basic of human needs into 
globally traded commodities. Furthermore, toxic agrochemicals pose significant 
risks to the health not only of agricultural labourers but also of urban populations 
living in proximity to large-scale agribusiness enterprises.
Wright’s benchmark study reveals the impacts of chemical-intensive, Green 
Revolution agriculture on the health and welfare of the untrained, poorly paid 
and ill-protected campesinos, without whom the agribusiness model would lose 
its comparative advantage (2005).6 His analysis of export agriculture in Sonora, 
Mexico reveals how the exposure of campesino labourers to a wide range of toxic 
chemicals is so ubiquitous that pesticide poisonings among them are almost a 
daily occurrence: an example of the ‘super pollution’ that O’Connor considered a 
consequence of combining First World production technology with Third World 
working conditions (1989).
Neurotoxicological studies of modern, supposedly-less-noxious, agricultural 
chemicals clearly suggest earlier assumptions that sub-acute exposure to non-
persistent organophosphate and carbamate-based pesticides had little compound 
effect on human health were quite false, indicating instead permanent nervous 
system damage with loss of reasoning and other mental-processing skills (Wright, 
2005, pp. 336−40). In addition, developments in the use of recombinant DNA 
techniques have allowed companies such as Monsanto and Syngenta to develop 
genetically modified (GM) strains of cereal and other crops that are capable of 
withstanding frequent spraying with herbicides such as glyphosate, or contain 
their own bioengineered pesticides. The former allow farmers to increase herbicide 
applications without risking damage to their crops, while the latter run the risk of 
creating pesticide immune pests. Furthermore, as with the Green Revolution’s so-
called ‘miracle’ seeds, the new GM varieties are covered by intellectual property 
right law, which holds the prospect of any farmer suspected of saving seed derived 
from patent protected crops, being dragged through the courts for breach of 
intellectual property rights.
Treating plants and animals like so many assemblages of interchangeable 
parts is the ultimate stage of the application of … ‘the industrial mind’ 
to agriculture and nature. Using this logic to more tightly chain farmers 
6 Originally published in 1990.
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to the legal practices of industrial patent law and universalizing trade 
agreements extends the logic of the factory to the complex cultures of rural 
people and the winds and migrations of wild nature (Wright, 2005, p. 351)
The potential for catastrophic impacts on human health that emerges when 
agricultural policy is captured by corporate agri-business is amply demonstrated 
by soya production in the Southern Cone. In 2003, Syngenta – one of six global 
seed corporations – took out an advertisement in the Argentine national dailies 
Clarín and La Nación, proclaiming ‘The United Republic of Soya’ (GRAIN, 
2013): a vast, imaginary, agri-industrial territory, unifying arable land in 
Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia and Brazil. Argentina is the world’s 
largest producer of GM crops accounting for more than 20 per cent of global 
GM production. Since the 1990s, the Argentine state has rigorously promoted 
GM agriculture, revenue from which was vital to economic recovery following 
the country’s crippling debt crisis and eventual default in 2001 (O’Toole, 
2014, pp. 102−3). Genetically modified soya production follows a simple 
recipe: Syngenta’s patented, Glyphosate-resistant soya beans are combined 
with a regime of fertiliser and herbicide applications. While the package is 
being promoted as ‘environmentally friendly’ due to the claimed but contested 
low toxicity of Glyphosate and minimum tillage requirements, the size of the 
areas being farmed means that routine herbicide applications have to be carried 
out using light aircraft. In the suburbs of cities such as Ituzaingó in Córdoba 
province, to the west of Buenos Aires, less fair winds blow. Surrounded by 
immense oceans of GM crops, residents have been subjected to long-term 
repeat exposure to pesticide and herbicide spray drift.
Many are familiar with Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo and the struggles 
of these mothers to recover, at least, their memories of the child victims of 
enforced disappearance during the brutal 1976−83 dictatorship. In the 21st 
century, regulatory capture has produced an Argentine agribusiness model that 
resembles a corporate dictatorship, one that is spawning more bad memories 
for the future as it conducts what Broccoli characterises as the world’s most 
grisly ‘toxicological experiment’ (2015). Today, another group of mothers is 
seeking justice, this time fighting for the rights of their ‘contaminated children’. 
They are the Mothers of Ituzaingó, who first reported the impacts on their 
children of excessive agrochemical use in 2001. Their struggle for justice is 
supported by popular gatherings, pesticide-poisoned peoples’ organisations 
and peasants driven from their lands by the ‘violence’ of the industrial model 
of monoculture GM crop production (compare Shiva, 1991). By 2012 this 
pernicious production regime had spread over some 22 million hectares of 
Argentina’s grain belt, with a resident population, not including the major 
cities, of approximately 12 million (Broccoli, forthcoming 2016). It was also 
in 2012 that the Mothers of Ituzaingó were finally able to set before the courts 
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compelling evidence of more than 200 children diagnosed with cancers that 
it was claimed had been triggered by agrichemical poisoning. In a landmark 
ruling, ‘the court in Cordoba found farmer Francisco Rafael Parra and pilot 
Edgardo Jorge Pancello guilty of violating regulations that banned the use of 
farm chemicals near homes’ (BBC, 2012). Encouraged by their success the 
mothers are now leading a national campaign against GM giant Monsanto’s 
plans to build a seed-processing plant at Malvinas Argentinas in the peri-urban 
area of Córdoba City (Broccoli, forthcoming 2016).
This section began with a description of how, for most of the past 10,000 
years, agri-cultural practices produced a growing diversity of crop plants 
and domesticated animals. It concludes by noting that the globalisation of 
industrial agriculture and the corporate food regime has resulted in the loss 
of some 75 per cent of crop plant genetic diversity, more than 30 per cent of 
livestock breeds at risk of extinction, and fully three-quarters of the world’s 
food being derived from just five animal and 12 plant species (FAO, 2004). 
Most, if not all, of these 12 species of crop plants have been subject to genetic 
engineering and depend not on the local knowledge and eco-system services 
that motivate peasant agriculture but on standardised regimes of mechanical 
cultivation, agrichemical application and harvesting, all of which are dependent 
on dwindling fossil fuel reserves. The profits from industrial food and fibre 
production are reaped by transnational seed and agrichemical corporations 
and large-scale agri-business enterprises, while national accounts are boosted 
by export revenues. The social costs of the corporate food regime’s recipe for 
global food security are evidenced in ecological degradation, social deprivation, 
dietary deterioration and increasing risks to human health.
From industrial agriculture to transformative agroecology
In contrast to industrial agriculture, agroecology begins not with the 
formulation of ‘magic bullet’ technological packages in corporate laboratories 
and agricultural research stations but with the agri-cultural practices of farmers 
in the field, seeking to learn from and build upon the ecological principles 
and place-based, biocultural knowledge that support long-term sustainable 
food and fibre production.7 Agroecology has emerged as a transformative, 
transdisciplinary and pluralist discourse and practice from deep-seated 
foundations. Woodgate and Sevilla Guzmán have sketched out some of these 
intellectual roots noting a number of recent LAC experiences (2016).
After several years working in commercial enterprises in Costa Rica and 
Mexico in the mid-1970s Stephen Gliessman took up a post as agricultural 
7 The interaction of farmer-scientists and researcher-activists involved in transformative 
agroecology reflects the ‘valorisation of diverse forms of expertise within the production of 
future-oriented environmental knowledge’, as Millner posits in chapter 3.
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ecologist at the Colegio Superior de Agricultura Tropical in Tabasco, Mexico, 
which had been established ‘to train the agronomists and test [Green 
Revolution] technologies on its experimental fields’ (Gliessman, 2013, p. 26). 
During his time in Central America, Gliessman had been intrigued by the agri-
cultural practices of his peasant neighbours and, as an ecologist, it became clear 
to him that rather than trying to override natural processes the local peasants 
worked with them. He took these insights to Tabasco, where he delivered what 
was probably the first university course in agroecology: ‘International summer 
courses in agroecology were offered in 1978–80, a master’s degree program in 
agroecology was begun in 1978, and research projects with the agroecosystem 
as the organizing concept and agroecology as the research process began as early 
as 1977’ (ibid.).
During the 1980s a multitude of development NGOs sprang up throughout 
Latin America as IMF-imposed structural adjustment forced states to cut 
back on public spending and close down rural development programmes. 
Towards the end of the 1980s, NGOs from Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Peru, joined forces to form the Latin 
American Consortium on Agroecology and Development (CLADES). One 
of its technical advisers was Miguel Altieri, a Chilean agroecologist from the 
University of California, Berkeley. Together with the likes of Peter Rossett and 
Clara Nichols, Altieri developed the Consortium’s relationships with rural social 
movements and development NGOs, providing them with agroecological 
advice and training. Since 1991 CLADES has published Agroecología y 
Desarrollo, a journal dedicated to making agroecological knowledge and 
experience available to institutions. It works to encourage ecologically and 
culturally relevant development practice and provides a forum for debating the 
institutional challenges of sustainability.8 
Following the 1975 International Working Party for Peasant Studies at the 
University of Manchester, UK, where he had met and been encouraged by 
Teodor Shanin, Angel Palerm, Joan Martinez-Alier and Eric Wolf, Eduardo 
Sevilla-Guzman returned to Spain where, in 1978, he founded the Institute 
of Sociology and Peasant Studies (ISEC) at the University of Cordoba. The 
ISEC became involved with the Rural Workers’ Union (SOC), Andalucía’s 
landless workers’ movement, supporting its members as they occupied and 
began to cultivate abandoned haciendas, using agroecological techniques they 
had learned from the peasants that lived and worked around these old estates. 
The relationship between ISEC and SOC led to further important linkages 
with Latin American agrarian social movements, whose experience of struggle 
against the depredations of Green Revolution technologies and institutions 
made a significant contribution towards developing the militant perspective 
8 See www.clades.cl.
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that characterises agroecological research and teaching at ISEC to this day 
(Sevilla Guzmán and Martinez Alier, 2006).
Cooperation between the University of California, Santa Cruz, CLADES 
and ISEC resulted in the first doctoral programme in agroecology being 
established at ISEC in 1991, followed shortly after by a taught postgraduate 
programme at the International University of Andalucía. Many of today’s 
key contributors to agroecological discourse have lectured or studied on 
these programmes, and the personal and institutional relationships that 
have developed through this long period of interaction and cooperation 
have facilitated the training and diffusion of agroecology practitioners, 
social movement activists, academics and state functionaries throughout the 
Americas and beyond. These agroecological actors have contributed to the 
establishment and work of numerous institutions including the Associação 
Brasileira de Agroecologia; the Brazilian agroecology umbrella network, the 
Articulação Nacional de Agroecologia; and the Movimiento Agroecológico 
de América Latina y el Caribe, many of which come together in La Sociedad 
Científica Latinoamericana de Agroecología.
Agroecology has developed through the coming together of farmer 
researchers and activist scientists within a significant and growing social 
movement for food sovereignty.9 Unlike certified organic agriculture, 
agroecology does not simply substitute chemical inputs with commoditised 
ecological amendments; it seeks to break farmer dependency on industrial 
inputs and the corporate food regime’s institutions, and to join with 
producers and consumers in their struggles to defend themselves against the 
commoditisation of land, labour, knowledge, genetic resources and food. 
For Altieri and Toledo, agroecology comprises a technical, epistemological 
and social revolution that represents an overt challenge to ‘neoliberal 
modernization policies based on agribusiness and agroexports’ (2011, p. 
587). It also seeks to create positive environmental change and remedy 
past degradation through appropriate agroecological practice rather than 
technocratic environmental management.
The agroecology of agri-cultural practice
Traditional agri-cultural practices are built upon local, ecological knowledge 
and institutional resources, the maintenance of soil health, and crop and 
non-crop biodiversity. They display a number of key properties that are 
vitally important to future food security and environmental sustainability.
9  C.f. Millner, chapter 3.
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1) Energy efficiency
Low external-input polycultures tend to be more energy efficient than high-
input industrial monocultures. This fact came to light in the dark years of the 
1970s energy crisis, when researchers were keen to figure out how vulnerable the 
USA might be, having passed its own point of peak oil production and being 
subject to an oil embargo imposed by the Arab states within the Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), in response to US backing of 
Israel during the Yom Kippur War. Pimental et al. published a key paper at this 
conjuncture in Science, which demonstrated that the energy efficiency of corn 
production in the US grain belt was significantly lower than traditional milpa 
production in rural Mexico (1973).
Martínez-Alier points out that for most of its history agriculture was ‘the 
energy sector’, because it produced greater quantities of energy in the form 
of agricultural crops than the amount of energy invested in their production 
(2011). In his seminal text on traditional agriculture in Mexico and Central 
America, Gene Wilken calculated that manual agriculture, without the use 
of draught animals, was capable of returning as many as 30 calories of crop 
output for every calorie invested in production (1987). Of course, once part of 
the production has to be diverted to feed draught animals, the Energy Return 
on Energy Invested (EROEI) declines. Nevertheless, even when a proportion 
of the work is undertaken using animal traction it is still possible to achieve an 
EROEI of as much as ten to one. High external input, industrial agriculture, 
on the other hand, often requires ten calories of fossil fuel energy to produce 
just one calorie of food, transforming agriculture from a net energy producer 
to a net energy consumer. Clearly, such practice has no long-term future as 
it is entirely dependent on fossil fuel availability at a price (often subsidised) 
that makes it profitable. Furthermore, as the starting point for the neoliberal 
model of global food security or what McMichael calls the ‘food from nowhere 
regime’ (2009), it is responsible for significant greenhouse gas additions to an 
already overheating planet.
2) Productivity
Ploeg points out that, in discussing productivity and agroecological 
production’s potential to produce sufficient food, it is vital to specify what 
type of productivity is being referred to (2013). Proponents of industrial 
agriculture often claim that small-scale farmers and peasant producers are 
incapable of producing enough food to feed the world’s growing population, 
and demonstrate this through reference to labour productivity, which is greatly 
enhanced by the use of industrial inputs. For example, a mechanical reaper 
might be capable of harvesting eight hectares of maize in a single day, whereas 
it would take an individual around 20 days to harvest just one hectare by 
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hand. In contrast, it is generally the case that low external-input polycultures 
outperform monocultures in terms of land productivity. Mesoamerican corn, 
beans and squash polycultures can produce almost twice as much food per 
hectare as industrial maize monoculture, and twice as much organic residue 
for composting and turning back into the soil, thus obviating the need for 
synthetic amendments (Altieri and Toledo, 2011). Polycultural agroecosystems 
in general can achieve 20 to 60 per cent more useful outputs per hectare than 
monocultures because, when the entire land surface of a field is covered by a 
mixture of useful plants with varying growth habits, the productive potential 
of available nutrients, water and light is maximised.
Furthermore, species and genetic diversity within the plot provide inbuilt 
protection against losses due to pests and diseases, avoiding the need to use 
polluting synthetic pesticides and fungicides. Vandermeer and Perfecto 
illustrate this point particularly clearly in recounting the story of Guatemalan 
entomologist, Helda Morales and her research into traditional pest control 
techniques among the indigenous farmers of the Guatemalan Highlands 
(2013, p. 82). When Morales asked farmers about their problems with crop 
pests, she was astounded to hear most folk reply that there were none. Knowing 
that numerous pests cause losses in maize monocrops, she instead enquired 
about the insects that inhabited the milpas. In response, the farmers reeled off 
comprehensive lists of every invertebrate pest that could potentially harm both 
maize and beans. Asked why they did not regard these commercially significant 
species to be pests, the Mayan farmers related aspects of milpa management 
that kept insect populations below levels at which they might be experienced 
as such.
3) Carbon balance
Carbon is the key building block of life and a component of all organic matter. 
Plants extract it from the atmosphere in the form of carbon dioxide (CO2), 
combining it with water to create simple carbohydrates in the process of 
photosynthesis. It is returned to the atmosphere as a product of respiration, 
decomposition or combustion, or stored for longer periods in the woody tissues 
of perennial plants, and more permanently in the organic and mineral fractions 
of soils. Carbon is therefore found in the crop and non-crop plants and animals 
that comprise agroecosystems and, perhaps more importantly, locked away in 
perennial plants and soils.
Agroecological production is based on maintaining a healthy, living soil, 
rich in organic matter and soil meso and micro flora and fauna. Biodiverse, 
polycultural systems, especially those that integrate annual and perennial crops, 
are continually sequestering carbon and storing it in both above and below 
ground biomass and subsequently in soil organic minerals and matter. Soil 
organic matter benefits farmers through the slow release of plant nutrients, 
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reducing the need for increasingly expensive synthetic inputs. It also improves 
soil structure and water storage capacity, buffers soil pH, and moderates 
fluctuations in soil temperature. All these functions contribute to soil health 
and productivity. In addition to benefiting the farmer, this means that 
agroecological farming has significant potential for climate change mitigation 
(IAASTD, 2009; UNCTAD, 2013).10
Industrial agriculture, on the other hand, treats the soil as an inert substrate 
to which synthetic fertilisers are applied to supply plant nutrition. As a result, 
soil organic matter is depleted and in the process significant quantities of carbon 
are released to the atmosphere. Furthermore, in order to make its contribution 
to global food security, industrial agriculture depends on a whole raft of 
downstream and upstream institutions and activities. From the manufacture 
and employment of agricultural machinery and equipment and the synthesis 
of agrichemicals from oil, through the processing, packaging and storage of 
agricultural products, to their distribution to wholesalers and supermarkets 
and final preparation for consumption, at every node in its global web the 
industrial food system releases greenhouse gases to the atmosphere.
To add insult to this already significant planetary injury, it has recently been 
estimated that approximately a third of all food produced is wasted (FAO, 
2013).11 This figure takes a few moments to digest. One third of all food 
production uses water equivalent to the annual flow of the Volga, Europe’s 
longest river, and 1.4 billion hectares or 28 per cent of the world’s agricultural 
area. It is also responsible for contributing 3.3 billion tonnes of greenhouse 
gases to the planet’s atmosphere every year (ibid.)
4) Resilience
In addition to climate change mitigation, diversified agroecosystems are more 
resilient to the increasingly severe and frequent extreme weather events that 
are associated with global warming. In the Central Highlands of Mexico, 
traditional Mazahua milpa production provides year-round ground cover. The 
interlocking root mass of the maize, beans and squash plants, together with 
numerous wild species that are used as quelites [summer greens] for both human 
consumption and animal fodder, protect the soil from torrential summer rains. 
When synthetic herbicides are used, maize has to be grown as a monocrop, 
exposing the soil on steeply sloping hillsides to erosion and depriving people of 
important sources of dietary diversity and nutrition (Woodgate, 1992).
Further evidence of agroecological resilience can be garnered from a survey 
of more than a thousand farms in Central America reported by Holt-Giménez 
(2001). It demonstrated that, following the ravages of Hurricane Mitch 
10 Contrast this with the REDD+ mitigation mechanism Anthony Hall describes in chapter 6.
11 The Institute of Mechanical Engineers suggests this figure may be as much as 50% (IMechE 
2013).
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in 1998, farms with biodiverse agroecosystems suffered significantly lower 
economic costs and recovered more rapidly than those where monocropping 
was prevalent, reflecting the inherent risk-mitigating character of agroecological 
production. A more recent study of the impacts and aftermath of Hurricane 
Ike in Cuba demonstrated a similar situation, with agroecological production 
systems suffering approximately 50 per cent fewer losses and recovering their 
productive capacity substantially faster than adjacent monocultural systems 
(Machin-Sosa et al., 2010).
5) Adaptive capacity
As diversity confers resilience, in combination with traditional, place-based 
farmers’ profound understanding of local ecological and cultural resources and 
relationships, it also imparts adaptability (c.f. Vandermeer and Perfecto, 2013). 
Indeed, the hundreds of millions of traditional farms that continue to exist at 
the margins of the corporate food regime represent vital reservoirs of adaptive 
capacity that will be indispensable in the struggle to maintain food security 
in the context of declining biodiversity, dwindling oil reserves and accelerated 
global warming (c.f. Altieri and Toledo, 2011; Barthel et al., 2013; IAASTD, 
2009; Martínez-Alier, 2011; UNCTAD, 2013).
‘Transformative agroecology’: beyond 
global food security
Méndez et al. distinguish two major agroecological perspectives or 
‘agroecologies’. In the 21st century, as the negative environmental impacts 
of industrial agriculture and the global food system have become more 
obvious, an interdisciplinary but top-down and apolitical ‘agroecology-as-
natural science’ (2013, p. 12) has taken shape (c.f. Tomich et al. 2011; Wezel 
et al., 2009 among others). Its mission is to develop recommendations and 
eco-technological packages directed at the greening of industrial agricultural 
production through ecological input substitution and what Pretty has called 
‘sustainable intensification’ (1995). Agroecology-as-natural science ignores the 
much deeper social and political foundations of ‘transformative agroecology’ 
(Woodgate and Sevilla Guzmán, 2016), which is transdisciplinary, participatory, 
politically engaged, and oriented towards social action focused on transforming 
agrifood systems from the bottom up (Méndez et al., 2013).
Transformative agroecology operates within a participatory action research 
framework to generate understanding of agri-food system issues in order to 
inform transformative social action (c.f. Fals Borda, 1985). The co-production 
of knowledge and shared understanding by activist researchers and scientist 
farmers does not lead to the promotion of technological solutions, but 
rather the ‘co-motion’ (Esteva, 1987, p. 149) of systemic strategies directed 
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at establishing and reinforcing beneficial socio-environmental relationships. 
Such strategies seek to reduce dependency on external inputs of commoditised 
knowledge and petrochemical technologies, increase functional diversity and 
optimise productivity across provisioning, regulating, supporting and cultural 
eco-system services. They also aim to enhance the quantity of energy output 
from each unit of energy input, to empower farmers and rural communities and 
to make a positive contribution to their food sovereignty goal. Transformative 
agroecology thus clearly strikes at the heart of the global food security model 
promoted by the corporate food regime.
Rapidly increasing food prices between 2005 and 2007 led to an additional 
six million people going hungry in LAC, while 2008 alone added a further 
40 million people to the total global undernourished population. According 
to Torero, the price spike and associated food insecurity were the result of a 
combination of demand and supply factors (2009).12 Among the demand 
factors he points to are population and income growth, and growing demand 
for both meat products and biofuel feedstocks, such as sugar cane, maize, soya 
and palm oil. In terms of supply, the high price of oil, poor infrastructure, 
low research and development investment and climate change were implicated. 
The International Food Policy Research Institute’s (IFPRI) policy priorities 
for combating the crisis and promoting global food security were, at the 
global level, reducing barriers to trade and combating market volatility while, 
at the national level, expanding social protection, taking action to improve 
child nutrition and achieving greater efficiency in linking small farmers to 
markets (ibid.).
Although the global food security discourse does to some extent recognise 
the productive potential and importance of small-scale producers (IAASTD, 
2009; UCTAD, 2013), IFPRI’s plan of action for ‘Reaching sustainable food 
security for all by 2020’, published in 2002, frames them more as hapless 
culprits of environmental degradation than victims of the violence of the new 
Green Revolution: ‘poverty, low agricultural productivity, and environmental 
degradation interact in a vicious downward spiral, as desperately poor farmers 
[exhaust] soil fertility and climb the hillsides in an effort to survive’ (p. 4). The 
solution is pro-poor economic growth, involving ‘small-scale, nonagricultural 
rural enterprises ... [and] ... [m]ore productive agriculture’ (p. 3). From IFPRI’s 
position as a CGIAR consortium member which defines and seeks to facilitate 
global food security through research and development, in order to become 
more productive farmers, ‘poor rural people need access to credit and savings 
institutions, yield-increasing crop varieties, improved livestock, appropriate 
tools, fertilizer, and pest management technology’ (ibid.). To contribute to food 
12 Director of the IFPRI’s Markets, Trade and Institutions Division.
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security they must be articulated with markets dominated by agribusinesses 
and regulated by corporate food regime institutions.
Torero’s paper at the 2009 ‘World Food Crisis Conference’, held in London, 
contrasted sharply with the one presented by LVC technical adviser, Peter 
Rosset. In Rosset’s view, the principle causes of the 2007/8 food price spike 
could be divided into long- and short-term factors (2009). Over the long run 
neoliberal economic policy had been dismantling the capacity of the peasant/
family farm sector to produce food, while promoting agroexport capacity to 
generate state income. Furthermore, structural adjustment had forced most 
debt-ridden developing nations to sell off national food reserves such as those 
once held by Mexico’s National Basic Products Company, CONASUPO. 
In the years immediately prior to the spike, Rosset emphasised the impact 
of speculative capital in commodity futures markets, growing demand for 
agrofuel feedstock, rising input costs, hoarding by transnational corporations 
and domestic private sector, speculation and forced exports.
Rather than seeking to achieve food security at a global level, LVC 
champions an alternative model for moving towards a more sustainable 
system, central to which is the right of every country or people to define their 
own agriculture and food policies. Food sovereignty demands the right to 
produce food for anyone that wishes and thus requires genuine agrarian reform 
and the protection of national markets against dumping by the advanced 
capitalist countries. It also proclaims people’s right to adequate, affordable, 
healthy and culturally appropriate sustenance. Furthermore, food sovereignty 
envisages rebuilding the productive capacity of peasant and family farm 
sectors, through developing local agri-cultural practices and agroecological 
knowledge (Rosset, 2009).
The voices of the global corporate food regime and of global food security 
supporters criticise the food sovereignty model and, despite clear evidence to 
the contrary (from, among others, Altieri and Toledo, 2011; Holt-Giménez and 
Altieri, 2013; Ploeg, 2013; Wilken, 1987), doubt local agri-cultures’ capacity 
to produce sufficient quantities to feed the world’s growing population. This 
censure rings somewhat hollow, however, as more and more eco-technological 
fixes from ‘agroecology-as-natural science’ are incorporated into industrial 
production systems in pursuit of ‘sustainable intensification’. Detractors also 
criticise agroecology for not scaling up. In response, Holt-Giménez and Altieri 
point to the massive mobilisation of state and private capital that was required to 
globalise the Green Revolution and the significant efforts and resources that are 
currently being poured into promoting commercial bio- and eco-technologies 
(2013). They further suggest that ‘[a]sking “Why can’t agroecology scale up?” 
begs the question, “What is holding agroecology back?”’ (ibid., p. 93). Besides 
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the vastly unequal funding received by transformative agroecology, revisionist 
agroecology-as-natural science (compare Wezel et al., 2009; Tomich et al., 
2011) obscures agroecology’s social context and neglects its political content.
Transformative agroecology from the bottom up
The development of capitalist agriculture and food production through 
commoditising land, labour, water, and most recently biodiversity and 
knowledge, while promoted as the solution to global food insecurity has, at the 
same time, resulted in the dispossession of small-scale farmers from biocultural 
resources that have been coproduced over generations of agri-cultural practice. 
The collapse of state-sponsored development and the return of economic 
liberalism in Latin America since the 1980s, have created the space and 
stimulus for a resurgence in peasant politics and direct action social movements 
(Altieri and Toldeo, 2011; Martínez-Torres and Rosset, 2010; Peréz Vitoria, 
2005; Ploeg, 2009). 
These new agrarian movements demand access to and invade unoccupied 
land, and denounce the 21st-century phenomenon of international land 
grabbing: foreign capital’s rapid, large-scale acquisition of rights to vast areas 
in the south and the associated removal of peasant farmers (Magdoff, 2013). 
They also condemn what they characterise as the biopiracy of transnational 
seed companies, denounce the environmental degradation caused by industrial 
production, and protest against the health impacts of toxic agrochemicals on 
those that work on, and reside in close proximity to, agribusiness estates. Their 
own responses to enduring poverty and food insecurity involve practising 
agroecological alternatives and political mobilisation in pursuit of land, water, 
seed, food, technological and energy sovereignty.
Altieri and Toledo identify five areas within Latin America where what 
they call the ‘agroecological revolution’ has become firmly established 
(2011). In the Andean region supportive institutions and government policy 
have given new life and meaning to the highly significant biocultural heritage 
embodied in indigenous cultures and agroecosystems. In Central America, the 
campesino-a-campesino (farmer-to-farmer) movement has seen smallholders 
sharing their knowledge of agroecological methods, allowing thousands of 
farming families to reduce their dependence on costly industrial inputs at the 
same time as increasing yields, improving nutrition, and building resilience 
to the increasingly intense and frequent extreme weather events that plague 
the region (Holt-Giménez, 2006).13 In Mexico, the extensive inheritance of 
communal land holding that resulted from the revolutionary Constitution 
of 1917 has facilitated the growth of sustainable rural communities and, 
13 Also see Machin-Sosa et al. (2010) on the campesino-a-campesino movement in Cuba.
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of particular note, a significant experience of successful community forest 
management (Woodgate, 2013).
In Cuba, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the country’s access 
to cheap oil, agricultural machinery and chemical inputs was drastically 
reduced, forcing national agricultural research institutions to explore low-input 
alternatives to the highly specialised industrial agriculture they had previously 
developed and promoted. In an extensive restructuring process involving 
reforms to land tenure arrangements, the development of urban agriculture 
and the adoption of agroecological production methods, Cuba has been able 
to respond to changed circumstances and make substantial progress towards 
national food sovereignty (Funes Monzote, 2009; Machin-Sosa et al., 2010). In 
the process much of the environmental damage inflicted by intensive industrial 
production has been ameliorated and, as already noted, resilience to climate 
change impacts has been enhanced.
In Brazil, agroecology has given rise to and become embedded in farmers’ 
associations, social movements, universities, scientific associations and 
government agencies. The landless workers’ movement, the Movimento dos 
Trabalhadores Sem-Terra (MST), was established to contest the concentration 
of land in the hands of the few and, since 1984, it has led more than 2,500 
land occupations, settling at least 350,000 families on somewhere in the region 
of 10 million hectares of land.14 The movement champions agroecological 
production methods and, in 2006, established the Latin American School 
of Agroecology on MST land in the state of Paraná. It also organises an 
agroecological seed network to reduce dependence on transnational seed 
companies and to facilitate food sovereignty (Altieri and Toledo, 2011).
Like the MST, many national and regional agrarian organisations, 
confederations and social movements are members of the peasant and small-
farmer International, LVC. Martínez Torres and Rosset trace LVC’s historical 
development from the early coalescence of numerous peasant and small farmer 
organisations and confederations in Latin America (2010). Established as a 
global social movement in 1993, during the rest of that decade LVC’s leaders 
gained access to international policy fora, rejecting NGO representation and 
making a space for authentic peasant voices to be heard. In the 21st century 
the movement has taken on a global leadership role for agrarian struggles 
and, through the politics of food sovereignty, presents a clear, potent and 
unified challenge to the corporate food regime and its neoliberal sustainable 
intensification and global food security discourse. In short, ‘peasants and family 
farmers have been able to build a structured, representative, and legitimate 
movement, with a common identity, that links social struggles on five 
continents’ (2010, p. 150). In 20 years LVC has grown to encompass around 
14 For more information on MST, see www.mst.org.br.
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150 local and national organisations in 70 countries, representing, according to 
its website (see note 4), about 200 million small-scale farmers in their struggle 
to ‘defend community-based agroecological farming as a cornerstone in the 
construction of food sovereignty’.
At the local level LVC works with member organisations to facilitate 
agroecological knowledge exchange through farmer-to-farmer processes 
and has established continental-scale networks of trainers, who organise 
regular encounters to share and develop the agroecological approach to 
food sovereignty. In the face of global capital’s relentless pursuit of profit 
through land-grabbing, displacing small-scale producers, and patenting seeds, 
knowledge and technologies, developed over generations of farming practice, 
the second Americas Continental Encounter of Agroecology Trainers in LVC 
issued a declaration:
Agroecology is Ours and is Not For Sale. Peasant agriculture is part of the 
solution to the current crisis of the system. In this context we reaffirm that 
indigenous, peasant and family farm agroecology [can] feed the world and 
cool the planet (LVC, 2011).15
Today, agroecologists, whether farmers, scientists or social movement activists 
(and many individuals operate in all three of these overlapping spheres), are 
working in concert to defend rural communities and agroecological cultures 
against the negative social and environmental impacts of neoliberalism and 
the capitalist industrialisation of the food system. However, while the struggle 
for food sovereignty has become globalised, human experience of such impacts 
remains place-based and the local values, knowledges, practices and institutions 
of ecologically and culturally embedded people are indispensable to the (re)
construction of ecological integrity and social justice. Throughout the length 
and breadth of the LAC region richly diverse agroecological experiences 
are coalescing and making their distinctive contribution to the politics and 
practice of food sovereignty, part of a growing countermovement to the global 
corporate food regime.
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5. Brazil and the international politics of 
climate change: leading by example?
Marieke Riethof
At the end of March 2012, Brazilian workers on strike against low wages and poor living conditions began burning down structures associated with the Jirau Dam’s construction on the Madeira river in the Amazonian 
state of Rondônia (New York Times, 2012). The dam forms part of the Brazilian 
government’s flagship project to expand hydro-electric power generation, 
particularly in Amazonia. When the army was called in to suppress the strike, 
it was another indication of the region’s political and economic importance 
(Salina, 2012). 
The strike was also part of a wider anti-dam movement that encompasses 
environmentalists and human and indigenous rights activists, both Brazilian 
and foreign. In June 2012, and thousands of kilometres away in the megapolis 
of São Paulo, I witnessed hundreds of people filing into the Oscar Niemeyer-
designed Auditório Ibirapuera, to attend the premiere of the documentary Belo 
Monte, Anúncio de uma Guerra [Belo Monte, Announcement of War] directed 
by André D’Elia.1 The screening’s timing was calculated to coincide with 
the Rio+20 UN Conference on Sustainable Development, which was about 
to start. Many audience members wore feathered head-dresses and had their 
faces painted to resemble Amazonian indigenous peoples. After a standing 
ovation, the predominantly young and middle-class Sampa audience streamed 
out of the Auditório against a backdrop of brightly lit skyscrapers, switched 
on their phones, and returned home in taxis and cars to blog about the Belo 
Monte Dam’s effects on indigenous peoples. They were oblivious to their own 
overuse of resources, which is one of the dilemmas underpinning Brazil’s recent 
economic boom.
A week later I watched as cavalcades of the international political elite and 
their advisers were ferried back and forth through a rain-swept Rio during 
the +20 conference. Given the physical absence of most of the world’s most 
important leaders, who were attending the G20 heads of government summit 
in Mexico, and the political failure to achieve any far-reaching consensus, the 
1 See https://vimeo.com/44877149 (accessed 7 Dec. 2015).
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Brazilian authorities were happy to use the occasion to highlight their newly 
forged economic preeminence as a basis for a concomitant international 
role and status.
Because of Brazil’s ecological vulnerability and traditional insistence 
on national sovereignty, the right to development and the ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities’ (CBRD) principle, one would expect a Brazilian 
approach to climate change talks rejecting binding agreements and any 
interference with domestic policy. However, Brazil has shifted its position 
in recent years, particularly since 2009, from such a rejection of binding 
commitments to reluctantly accepting a higher level of responsibility for major 
developing countries. This was especially evident when Brazil took an active role 
in the Copenhagen climate talks in 2009, and during the 2011 Durban Climate 
Change Convention when it helped to negotiate a legally binding agreement to 
follow the Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period in 2020. This chapter 
argues that rather than constituting a minor concern or component of Brazil’s 
foreign policy agenda, environmental issues are increasingly significant and 
have allowed the country to showcase its claims about the effectiveness of 
Brazil’s own climate change policies and its ability to broker international deals 
on thorny topics, while bridging developed and developing countries’ interests. 
Brazilian global leadership ambitions involve projecting its domestic climate 
change policy on a global stage through active participation in climate change 
negotiations and promoting climate change monitoring and renewable energy. 
Environmental foreign policy can help legitimise Brazil’s ambitions to become 
a global and regional leader but discrepancies with domestic environmental 
policies and development goals have the potential to undermine this agenda.2 
Using a constructivist explanatory approach to the role of ideas, norms and 
identities in foreign policy, this chapter’s first section argues that environmental 
leadership has become a significant concern for Brazil. Legitimacy is a major 
incentive for emerging powers to engage in international climate change 
governance, which in Brazil’s case is based on claims about the effectiveness 
of the domestic climate change agenda. The second section demonstrates that 
these leadership ambitions are also in line with renewable energy expansion to 
support national economic development and wider foreign policy ambitions. 
The third section argues that Brazil’s projected carbon emissions reductions 
by 2020 rely heavily on efforts to reduce deforestation, which is a source of 
considerable international legitimacy. An explanation of how these tensions 
and dilemmas have been translated into Brazil’s position in recent climate talks 
is given in the final part. It argues that the shift towards nationally differentiated 
but binding commitments is rooted in Brazil’s domestic climate change agenda 
2 Compare this chapter with Hall’s discussion on REDD+ in chapter 6, which looks 
additionally at the articulation between nation-state policies and international frameworks.
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and foreign policy ambitions. The country’s position also reflects that its 
environmental foreign policy continues to be framed by ideas about economic 
development which are not necessarily sustainable. Although renewable energy 
and deforestation policies are a key part of Brazil’s efforts to mitigate the effects 
of climate change, they have also provoked vocal international and domestic 
opposition due to their high environmental and social costs.
Explaining environmental foreign policy 
in emerging powers
When evaluating the Copenhagen and Cancún climate talks and their 
implications for Brazil, José Domingos Gonzalez Miguez, general coordinator 
of Global Climate Change at the Brazilian Ministry of Science and Technology, 
reflected that
the pressure on developing countries, especially the major emerging 
economies, to assume targets in the second commitment period of Kyoto 
is seen as an attempt to halt or slow the progress of these countries … This 
arrangement would entail a new form of colonialism. (2011, p. 313)
In the run-up to the Rio+20 conference, former Foreign Minister Luiz 
Alberto Figueiredo defended Brazil’s environmental leadership credentials 
as ‘impeccable’, citing Brazil as ‘one of the few countries that has achieved 
economic growth with social inclusion and a reduction in deforestation 
never before seen in the history of this country’ (quoted in Frayssinet/Inter 
Press Service, 2012). The two quotations illustrate a dilemma at the core of 
Brazil’s international climate change policy. The country has made significant 
environmental progress based on climate change mitigation through renewable 
energy and deforestation policies, which legitimises the Brazilian position in 
international climate talks. Although the differentiation between the obligations 
of developed and developing countries is still a core part of Brazil’s foreign 
policy agenda, there has been a shift towards recognising the need for emerging 
powers to contribute more actively towards combatting climate change. This is 
exemplified in Brazil’s proposals at recent international climate change talks to 
develop nationally appropriate targets for carbon emission reductions and to 
enhance the technical and financial support offered to developing countries for 
climate change mitigation and adaptation. 
Recent debates about the causes and effects of climate change, as well as the 
role and responsibilities of developing countries, indicate a highly politicised 
and controversial debate. Brazil’s position on environmental negotiations 
has tended to be that developed countries should take on a leadership role 
in carbon emission depletion and that reduction targets should be based on 
actual contributions to climate change (Johnson, 2001). As the economies of 
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major developing countries such as Brazil, India and China continue to grow, 
the question is whether they should be subjected to binding targets similar 
to developed countries. At the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference in 
December 2009, there was a split between developing countries that proposed 
a more radical approach to climate change, including Bolivia, Venezuela and 
the small island states, and major developing countries such as Brazil which 
continue to question binding targets for emerging powers (Bodansky, 2010). 
Bolivian representatives were particularly vocal at the 2011 Durban climate 
talks, with its former ambassador to the UN, Pablo Solon, warning negotiators 
that their lack of action entailed committing ‘eco-cide’.3 At these talks, the 
Russian Federation proposed to add a mechanism to the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to periodically review the status 
of developing countries. Although this proposal was rejected after the the G77 
coalition of developing nations with China opposing it, the continuing problem 
is highlighted of major developing countries’ commitment to climate change 
policies. However, the resulting Durban Platform for Enhanced Action 
(ADP), in which Brazil played a significant role as negotiator, did include 
the intention to agree legally binding commitments for both developed and 
developing countries. 
Many observers of climate change talks have criticised the lack of action 
among major developing countries, leading to the failure of effective global 
climate change governance. Although Campbell does not necessarily criticise the 
emerging powers’ insistence on equity, he does attribute the failure of the 2012 
Doha climate change talks to the lack of caps on major economies’ emissions 
(2013, p. 128). According to Hurrell and Sengupta, many commentators 
treated the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) as ‘the 
villains of Copenhagen’ or the ‘great irresponsibles’, generating a pessimistic 
view of the environmental implications of the power shift towards major 
emerging countries (2012, pp. 464−7). However, these negative observations 
ignore that it is not so much a refusal to engage with climate change by 
blocking binding agreements but an adoption of the principled position that 
future international agreements should continue to reflect climate justice and 
north-south differences. Furthermore, various studies emphasise that the major 
developing countries have made significant progress through domestic climate 
change policies adopted on a voluntary basis, reflecting their recognition that 
major developing countries’ have additional responsibilities (Gupta, 2007, pp. 
124−5; Hochstetler and Viola, 2012; Hurrell and Sengupta, 2012, p. 466; 
Vieira, 2013, p. 377).
3 See Pablo Solon’s interview while on the Durban Climate March, 3 Dec. 2011, OneWorldTV 
video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0azwUxIzg3s (accessed 7 Dec. 2015).
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Despite the increasingly prominent role of emerging powers in climate 
talks, environmental politics’ role in a country’s foreign policy, particularly 
outside the developed world, is a relatively neglected field of inquiry, involving 
a ‘myriad of actors, institutions and forces’ (Barkdull and Harris, 2002, p. 63). 
Research on environmental policy’s international dimensions usually focuses 
on the interaction between states (and non-state actors) in climate change 
negotiations, the regulation of environmental problems in trade negotiations 
and international cooperation in nature conservation and protection (Johnson, 
2001; Rong, 2010). Explanations of a country’s environmental foreign 
policy and behaviour in international negotiations on the issue have often 
concentrated on explanatory factors such as vulnerability to climate change and 
the significance of a country’s natural environment (Barkdull and Harris, 2002, 
p. 71). In the Brazilian case, the global environmental and political importance 
of the Amazon region obviously shapes Brazil’s interests but a more complete 
picture only emerges when considering a wider range of issues, including the 
international context as well as national issues such as economic development 
priorities and the changing foreign policy agenda.
Traditional foreign policy explanations focusing on the national interest, 
security and sovereignty do not provide an accurate explanation for how it 
works in developing countries (Gardini and Lambert, 2011; Hurrell, 2006; 
Papa, 2009, p. 207). The nature of foreign policy in developing countries 
challenges a series of assumptions that are traditionally used to explain state 
behaviour. For example, the national interest defined in terms of the right 
to economic development rather than national security is a driving force of 
foreign policy in major developing countries such as Brazil. The protection of 
the right to pursue development motivates Brazil’s behaviour in international 
trade and environmental negotiations (Montero, 2005; Narlikar, 2010). What 
is particularly significant is that the national interest tends to be defined in 
terms of economic development rather than national security (Guilhon 
Albuquerque, 2003). In many developing countries, the national interest is 
framed as the ability and right to promote economic development alongside 
the principle of national sovereignty over natural resources, often resulting in 
the argument that developing countries should have the right to exploit their 
natural resources as developed countries did in the past.
An ongoing example of this argument is the question of Brazilian stewardship 
over the Amazon region. The Amazonian territory within Brazil’s borders and 
the social, environmental and economic problems in that region, tend to be 
viewed internally as an exclusively domestic matter, although this view is not 
necessarily shared by those domestic social movements and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) engaged in international networking and campaigning 
(Alonso and Maciel, 2010; Hochstetler and Keck, 2007). Brazil has long 
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resisted any form of international Amazonian deforestation monitoring and 
rejects what it calls the ‘internationalisation’ of the Amazon. Echoing this 
sentiment, in the context of the protests against the Belo Monte Dam in March 
2012, former President Lula observed that ‘I saw in the newspapers today that 
a lot of NGOs are coming here from various parts of the world, hiring boats to 
go to Belém to try to prevent us from constructing a dam … No one is more 
preoccupied with the protection of Amazonia and our Indians than we are. 
Those who have already destroyed theirs do not need to stick their nose in our 
business’ (cited in Bocchini, 2012, author’s translation).
Brazil’s position in global environmental governance was therefore 
traditionally characterised by a strong reluctance to allow international 
deforestation monitoring and management by other states, international 
organisations or NGOs, and the region continues to be treated as an area of 
exclusive national sovereignty. The view of the Brazilian eco-system as a matter 
of national political responsibility stems from a combination of commitments 
to national security, economic development and environmental protection. 
Concerns about national security in the region have traditionally referred to 
the difficulties of controlling borders as well as those natural resources deemed 
essential for national development. More recently international concerns about 
drug trafficking have led to increased transborder monitoring of the Amazon 
region, including military cooperation (Hochstetler and Keck, 2007; Montero, 
2005, p. 142), while international NGOs continue to challenge the direction 
of international climate negotiations as well as the environmental effects of 
domestic policies. Business interests also play a significant role in shaping the 
policies, both through a growing interest in green development, while in the 
context of Brazil’s booming agricultural exports, agribusiness interests have 
often lobbied for limitations on legislation to protect forests. 
Due to these controversies, Viola and Barros-Platiau argue that Brazil has 
not taken up a leadership role in international climate politics similar to its 
ambitious agenda in other areas of global politics, speaking of a ‘dissonance’ 
between foreign and environmental policy (Viola, 2009; Barros-Platiau, 2010, 
p. 75). Vieira Lisboa claims that for the Brazilian government, ecological 
principles cannot contradict the prerogatives of economic policy, which in her 
view undermines the country’s ambitions to become a global leader in this field 
(2002, pp. 49−50). In the run-up to the 2010 Cancun climate talks, Kozloff 
commented that
[p]laying down its environmental role on the world stage may appear 
logical given Brazil’s strong and independent stance on its right to develop, 
yet such a position may not win it many friends in the long term … a 
more constructive stance on climate change may prove more beneficial to 
Brazilian foreign policy goals. (2010)
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The Brazilian commitment to international environmental leadership 
appears weak, ambiguous and often contradictory in their view, which highlights 
the problematic relationship between economic development priorities and the 
environmental agenda. If this is the case, what is the incentive for Brazil to 
engage in combatting climate change if there are no internationally binding 
restrictions on developing countries’ carbon emissions? What explains Brazil’s 
motivation to play an active role in climate change talks to the extent that 
it attempts to position itself as an actor capable of bridging developed and 
developing countries’ interests?
Constructivism’s emphasis on the fluid nature of interests and actor’s 
positions in international politics is particularly useful when considering 
Brazil’s motivations to engage more actively with international environmental 
politics. There is increasing attention to the role of ideas, norms and identities 
in explaining emerging countries’ foreign policy behaviour, which resonates 
with Brazil’s own perspective on foreign policy, which tends to focus on 
multilateralism and an adherence to international law, while championing 
developing countries’ interests and rights (Almeida, 2009; Guilhon 
Albuquerque, 2003). Barkdull and Harris also point to the role of ideas in 
environmental foreign policy explanations, which can be studied at the 
level of society, the state and the international system. In their view, ‘[i]deas 
both shape preferences, and constitute the identities of states as empowered 
international actors’ (2009, p. 25). These ideas do not emerge or develop in a 
political vacuum so they ‘are formulated to serve a specific goal’ and result from 
‘a dialectical process involving both internal and external influences’ (Burges, 
2009, pp. 67−8). The Brazilian perspective should therefore not necessarily 
be understood as an ideologically-informed attempt to radically challenge 
certain norms and principles ‘but rather [as an attempt] to gain status … in 
order to advance the Brazilian agenda’ (Gardini, 2011, p. 18). This approach 
can also be detected among other emerging powers’ foreign policy agendas 
which ‘seek not just material power and economic development but also status 
and recognition’ (Hurrell and Sengupta, 2012, p. 464). Another significant 
principle is that even if the stalemate in climate change talks appears to be 
due to irresolvable and rigid differences between developed and developing 
countries, the environmental foreign policy agenda is in fact ‘continuously 
redefined as foreign policies evolve and adapt to new situations’ (Papa, 2009, 
p. 209). It is therefore unsurprising that the Brazilian position has changed 
in response to the domestic and international recognition that environmental 
issues can provide the country ‘with a new if problematic source of potential 
leverage’ (Hurrell, 1992, pp. 398−9).
From this perspective, Cass contends that actively pursuing an international 
environmental agenda can serve to legitimise government policy: ‘governments 
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frequently utilize environmental foreign policy as a symbolic tool to manage 
international identities in the eyes of both domestic and international 
constituencies’ (2009, p. 41). From a constructivist perspective, ‘governments 
therefore have an incentive to affirm liberal international norms to cultivate an 
identity as a legitimate international actor’ (p. 42). Hochstetler and Milkoreit 
also emphasise the significance of norms in shaping environmental foreign 
policy behaviour. Referring to the role of the BASIC countries in recent 
climate talks, they conclude that their policies are informed by the desire ‘to 
be perceived as responsible global stakeholders in a context where they knew 
they were receiving extra scrutiny’ while ‘defending against pressure to take on 
a larger share of the mitigation burden [and] protecting domestic development 
interests’ (2014, pp. 226, 231). 
However, the climate change debate is characterised by disagreement about 
international norms and differing perspectives among developed and developing 
countries.4 Whereas the approach of the former focuses on ‘economic efficiency 
in mitigation’ without differentiating levels of development or responsibility, 
for developing countries international climate policy is ‘about financial and 
technical assistance from developed countries to adapt to climate change 
and promote sustainable development’ (Mayer and Arndt, 2009, pp. 77, 
82). Parks and Timmons Roberts attribute this difference to worldviews and 
principled beliefs among developing countries about global inequality, based 
on the view that developed countries are responsible for climate change and 
that imposing environmental policy on developing countries can be a form of 
‘environmental imperialism’ (2010, pp. 145−6). Vieira argues that ‘the moral 
high ground belongs to developing nations’ in climate politics due to their 
claims about fairness and the need to protect the poorest (2013, p. 372). As 
a result, ‘[e]merging powers have thus come to see themselves as defenders 
of … established norms rather than as revisionist states seeking to challenge 
the system’s dominant norms.’ (Hurrell and Sengupta, 2012, p. 469). In 
this respect, Hochstetler and Milkoreit view the emerging powers’ voluntary 
commitment as a ‘new constitutive norm’, which combines recognising their 
responsibilities with differentiation based on national circumstances (2014, 
p. 229).
Apart from ecological vulnerability, coupled with the right to development, 
a major incentive for emerging powers to actively engage in international 
climate change policy is therefore to seek legitimacy in order to gain power 
and recognition on a global stage. For Brazil, that legitimacy to speak out is 
based on claims about the effectiveness of its domestic climate change policies, 
illustrated by the increased importance of extensive and transparent reporting 
on domestic environmental policies. This rationale also supports the argument 
4 See Radcliffe, chapter 8. 
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that a major developing country like Brazil can combat climate change without 
necessarily being subject to the same internationally binding emission targets 
as developed countries, legitimising the climate regime’s transformation with 
nationally defined, rather than universal, targets for developing countries. For 
Brazilian negotiators, this rationale also underlines the nation’s role in bridging 
the gaps between developed and developing countries in climate change talks, 
as illustrated by Brazil’s active role in recent agreements. These policies are 
therefore also informed by Brazil’s global and regional leadership ambitions, 
which include environmental concerns and the desire to present the country’s 
position internationally as at the forefront of climate change governance and 
renewable energy. 
Climate change mitigation through renewable energy
The Brazilian government has long used the argument in international 
negotiations that its contribution to climate change is mitigated by its heavy 
reliance on renewable resources for energy generation. As an example, the use of 
renewable energy sources constituted 44.5 per cent of total energy use in Brazil 
in 2006, in contrast with 6.1 per cent in OECD countries (Brazil/MRE et al., 
2007). Brazil’s voluntary reduction projections rely primarily on combining 
the reduction of deforestation rates and the expansion of hydro-electric power 
generation and other renewable energy sources, including biofuels (ibid.). In 
December 2009, the Brazilian government decided to unilaterally legislate its 
commitment to greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction, resulting in the 
adoption of a national climate change policy based on the Plano Nacional 
sobre Mudança do Clima (National Climate Change Policy – PNMC) (Brazil/
CIMC, 2008). This legal commitment to voluntary reductions in carbon 
emissions is similar to initiatives in other major developing countries like India 
and China since the early 2000s (Bodansky, 2010; Dimitrov, 2010; Rong, 
2010). It was introduced in the context of the 2009 presidential elections’ 
second round, when the Workers’ Party candidate Dilma Rousseff was running 
against Marina da Silva, a former environmental activist, Minister of the 
Environment, and Green Party representative. While indicating a clear electoral 
motivation for this policy, it is also part of a wider trend to introduce voluntary 
commitments among emerging powers (Hochstetler and Viola, 2012). 
Arguing that its emissions are not primarily due to fossil fuel use, as is 
the case in developed countries, has allowed Brazil to hold the position that 
its emission reduction efforts should be voluntary and in proportion to its 
stage of development. From their perspective, the same principle applies to 
all other developing countries without differentiating varying development 
levels. However, Brazil continues to expand the exploitation of fossil fuels 
to promote economic development. President Lula announced in 2006 that 
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Brazil was self-sufficient in crude oil, making the country the second-largest 
oil producer in South America after Venezuela. Although it has been argued 
that this announcement was politically motivated, the discovery of significant 
pre-salt oil reserves in the Tupi field in late 2007 further confirmed this 
optimism (Economist, 2008). Although gas production has increased from the 
early 2000s onwards in an effort to reduce dependency, Brazil still imports 
considerable amounts of gas from Bolivia (EIA, 2012). Investments in gas 
exploitation and infrastructure in Bolivia are a key part of a strategy to integrate 
regional energy supplies through the Initiative for the Integration of South 
American Infrastructure (Burges, 2009, pp. 117−19; Zhouri, 2010, p. 264), 
but they have also been highly controversial. When Evo Morales announced 
the nationalisation of hydrocarbons in Bolivia in May 2006, this directly 
affected Brazilian investments in the sector. Meanwhile there is an ongoing 
dispute with Paraguay over electricity generated by the Itaipu Dam, located on 
the Paraguayan-Brazilian border (Ubiraci Sennes and Narciso, 2009, pp. 58−9; 
Vigevani and Ramanzini, 2011, pp. 58−9). The issue flared up again in the 
context of the Paraguayan presidential elections in 2008, when the government 
attempted to negotiate a fairer price for power sold to Brazil.
The 2010 PNMC forms Brazil’s contribution towards international efforts 
to reduce carbon emissions (Brazil/CIMC, 2008). The policy includes a 
carbon emissions reduction target of between 36.1−38.9 per cent of projected 
emissions by 2020. Its core focus is on mitigating climate change through the 
increased use of renewable energy, that is, hydro-electric power generation 
and the expansion of biofuels production through the Programa Nacional do 
Álcool (National Alcohol Programme – PROALCOOL). Brazil is well-known 
as a pioneer in the development and exploitation of alternative energy sources, 
such as ethanol and hydro-electricity. In order to reduce dependency on oil 
imports in the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis, the Brazilian government 
decided in 1975 to provide fiscal incentives to produce bioethanol based 
on sugar-cane production, leading to land being converted to sugar- cane 
plantations. The government’s energy strategy also focused on diversifying 
energy sources, including nuclear power and hydro-electricity. When the 
price of sugar increased and that of oil decreased during the 1980s, the use 
of ethanol for cars began to decline, resulting in the stagnation of ethanol 
production (Brazil/MRE, 2007, pp. 14−15). From 2000 onwards, renewed 
domestic and international interest in alternative energy sources revitalised the 
sector. The production of ‘flex-fuel’ cars with engines that run on a mix of 
ethanol and petrol has increased substantially since 2003 (ANFAVEA, 2012, 
p. 60). However, a combination of the rising price of sugar, a poor harvest and 
a decline in global demand led to ethanol production decreasing between 2009 
and 2011, although it recovered in 2012 along with exports (Brazil/MME, 
2011; Brazil/ANP, 2014, pp. 62−4).
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In environmental terms, biofuels are a renewable energy source and therefore 
have a reputation for being environmentally friendly. However, concerns exist 
that the production of biofuel competes with that of food, contributing to the 
global inflation of food prices. In Brazil, sugar-cane production is associated 
with high social and environmental costs, as well as the conversion of arable 
land for the purpose. Furthermore, questions have been raised regarding the 
ability of biofuels to contribute to carbon emission reduction, as the energy 
used for its production reduces the overall impact. In 2011, ethanol represented 
5.7 per cent of domestic fuel consumption. Expansion of biofuels in the road 
transport sector, in particular, one of the largest carbon emitters in the country, 
is expected to contribute to a reduction of oil consumption by 2020. Brazil’s 
biofuels policy includes expanding production abroad through investments 
in Africa, in particular, and attempts to create a more competitive market 
for biofuels internationally by diversifying producers (Freitas Barbosa, et al., 
2009). Despite the country’s ambitions, international demand for biofuels has 
decreased considerably since the 2008 global financial crisis (Brazil/MME, 
2011, p. 244; Brazil/ANP, 2014, p. 64). 
In 2007, the Brazilian government introduced the first Plano de Aceleração 
de Crescimento (Growth Acceleration Plan – PAC), followed by a second 
phase (PAC 2) launched in 2010. Apart from improvements in social policies 
(urban improvement, basic public services and housing), the plans focus on 
expanding the energy matrix as well as infrastructure development. These 
two areas comprise the bulk of the investment programme, totalling R$503.9 
billion during the first phase (2007−10) and R$1.59 trillion between 2011 and 
2014. Controversially, the plans include expanding infrastructure and energy 
generation in the Amazon region. The projects combine road, railway and 
port development along with electricity transmission networks, mining and 
agriculture. The drive to invest in the Amazon region domestically is matched 
by the growth of oil and gas exploration as well as infrastructural investment 
in neighbouring countries, such as Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia (Burges, 
2009, pp. 113−19).
By the close of 2009, hydro-electric generation provided 71.7 per cent of 
the country’s power consumption and 93.9 per cent of electricity was produced 
domestically, which included that generated by the binational Itaipu Dam on 
the border between Brazil and Paraguay (Brazil/MME, 2011, p. 33). Brazil’s 
most recent energy expansion plans focus on the development of northern 
Brazil, which has now become a new ‘energy frontier’. Amazonia has long 
been viewed as a region with high potential for the growth and integration of 
hydro-electric energy generation, and the Belo Monte Dam project is part of 
the Brazilian government’s drive to expand hydro-electric energy generation 
nationally, and in Amazonia in particular. The project is located on the Xingu 
PROVINCIALISING NATURE100
River in Pará State and was first proposed by the military government in 
1975. The expansion of hydro-electricity was a key element of the military 
government’s drive to reduce oil dependency, also forming part of ambitions to 
develop Amazonia. National security and control over natural resources were 
another motivating factor, which continues to be the case after the democratic 
transition (Hochstetler and Keck, 2007, pp. 142−7; Montero, 2005, p. 132). 
Reports and planning were finalised in the late 1980s, provoking protests 
by indigenous groups in the hope that a democratic government would 
be more likely to listen to their demands. After prolonged groundwork 
and legal delays during the 1990s, the plans were revived in the early 
2000s aiming not only to expand hydro-electricity, but also to develop the 
Amazon region, including integrating electricity transmission networks and 
infrastructure within the region and across the country (Brazil/Ministério do 
Planejamento, 1999). Renewed attention fell on the project in the context 
of electricity blackouts in large urban centres in 2002 and the hydro-electric 
dams’ vulnerability to droughts, lending a new urgency to the plans. Amid 
protests and legal challenges, the government simplified the requirements for 
environmental licensing of electricity projects that were expected to have a low 
environmental impact in 2001, with a view to increasing the potential for 
natural resource exploitation. 
Deforestation policies
Although combatting deforestation is at the core of Brazil’s climate change 
policy, there is considerable domestic and international controversy relating to 
deforestation’s role in Brazil’s contribution to carbon emissions. Deforestation 
monitoring has improved dramatically over the last decade as a result of almost 
real-time satellite surveillance by the Instituto Nacional de Estudos Espaciais 
(National Institute for Spatial Studies – INPE). Rates have dropped steadily 
since 2004 and INPE data show that deforestation has more than halved 
between 2006 and 2012 (see Figure 5.1; INPE/PRODES, 2015). Research 
demonstrates that carbon emissions dropped when deforestation rates began 
to reduce in 2004−5, which is expected to contribute to Brazil’s voluntary 
emissions targets by 2020 (INPE, 2009, pp. 2−3). A report by the Institute 
of Applied Economic Research (Instituto de Pesquisa Económica Aplicada – 
IPEA), a Brazilian think-tank, points out that ‘[n]ational targets concentrated 
on controlling deforestation can offer the country a significant comparative 
advantage, since deforestation reduction is undoubtedly less restrictive to 
economic growth than limits to energy consumption’ (Seroa da Motta, 2011, 
p. 37). However, the causes of deforestation are still highly controversial as 
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they underline contradictions between simultaneous commitments to economic 
development and environmental protection.5
Figure 5.1: Annual deforestation rates (km2) in the Brazilian Amazon 
(source: INPE/PRODES, 2015)
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Despite the substantial progress made in reducing deforestation rates, 
forest protection has come under fire as being in favour of agribusiness and 
other economic interests in recent years. In legal terms deforestation has been 
managed in Brazil through the Código Florestal (Forest Code) since 1965. The 
Forest Code legislation is highly protective of forested areas, stipulating that 
between 50 and 80 per cent of forests should remain uncut in Amazonia and 
other vulnerable areas like the cerrado and the Atlantic rainforest. Although the 
cerrado, a semi-humid tropical savanna, covers significant parts of the national 
territory and is a rich natural habitat, it is under threat from the expansion 
of large-scale intensive agriculture and desertification (Brazil/Ministério de 
Meio Ambiente, 2005). Partly because of its economic importance and also 
because environmental problems in this region receive less attention than in 
Amazonia, regulation and monitoring of this issue is particularly lacking, while 
enforcement of the Forest Code is weaker (Wolford, 2008, pp. 222−3). The 
Atlantic rainforest located in the southeast, a UNESCO World Heritage site, is 
under threat from increased road transport, oil refining and shipping activities. 
Even in regions that feature prominently in international environmental 
debates, deforestation policy has been blighted by contradictions between 
efforts to monitor and regulate deforestation, environmental conservation 
and economic exploitation (Hochstetler and Keck, 2007, p. 2), as well as 
weak enforcement capacity. Although authorised logging has become better 
regulated, illegal logging continues and enforcement is difficult despite the 
improved monitoring. As deforestation is often directly connected to changes 
5 See Hall on REDD+, chapter 6.
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in land use and the conversion of forest to – often unsustainable – agricultural 
activities (including cattle ranching and soybean production), this question is 
at the heart of Brazilian debates on the expansion of export agriculture versus 
environmental protection. 
The domestic debate on forest protection and the conversion of land to 
agricultural use continues to be heated, particularly in the context of the 
Rio+20 Conference, which placed Dilma Rousseff under pressure to showcase 
Brazil’s environmental credentials. Since 2009−10, the Forest Code has come 
up for renewed discussion, as exemplified by a legislative proposal in May 
2011 to alter the percentage and types of land that are legally protected (the 
Novo Código Florestal). Agribusiness representatives and deputies in favour 
of ruralistas [agricultural interests] lobbied strongly in favour of the changes 
proposed by Deputy Aldo Rebelo, a member of the Partido Comunista 
do Brasil, which supported the government. Environmental movements 
protesting against the proposal to water down the Forest Code bore huge signs 
calling for Dilma to veto the entire Code − ‘Veta Dilma!’. In May 2012 the 
government announced that Dilma would veto 12 out of 84 of its legal articles, 
followed by further amendments and vetoes in October 2012 (Globo, 2012; 
Richard, 2012). Although progress has been made in the area of deforestation, 
the problems associated with its regional and domestic regulation demonstrate 
there is no clear consensus about the need for forest protection in relation to 
promoting export agriculture. The increase in deforestation rates in 2013 (see 
Figure 5.1) have given a clear warning that deforestation policy might not be 
sufficient to meet Brazil’s climate targets, particularly in light of the new forest 
legislation’s unpredictable impact.
Brazil’s position in recent international 
climate change negotiations
Despite these significant indications of progress in deforestation policy and 
renewable energy, significant fault lines can be found in the relationship 
between environmental and development policy, as export-led growth and 
the legacy of state-led industrialisation clash with attempts to protect the 
environment. Indeed they often actively exacerbate related problems. In light 
of these dilemmas, this section discusses these tensions’ impact on Brazil’s 
evolving approach to international climate change negotiations. Neoliberalism 
and state-led export promotion have contributed to the growing importance 
of market-oriented approaches to nature conservation, which includes carbon 
trading through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and REDD+ 
(UN Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation in Developing Countries) (Zhouri 2010). The rise of agribusiness 
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and export agriculture poses significant challenges to Brazil’s environmental 
policies, and points to tensions between Brazil’s international commitments 
and domestic policies. Most notably, these economic changes have led to 
large-scale export expansion (for example, soybeans, fruit and sugarcane), 
often to the detriment of small-scale producers (Barros, 2009). The growth 
of cattle ranching in ecologically vulnerable areas is also a key deforestation 
factor (IPCC, 2014, chapter 27, p. 11) but this issue is hard to tackle through 
government policy. Actors associated with export-led growth in agriculture 
and natural resources tend to lobby for policies that weaken environmental 
protection (as seen in recent debates about forest protection regulation) and in 
favour of large-scale infrastructural and energy projects that sustain economic 
expansion. At the same time, Brazil’s development strategy throughout this 
period has also been based on state-led growth in other sectors, particularly 
energy, infrastructure and manufacturing. 
Due to the variety of Brazil’s natural habitats and the country’s reliance 
on exploiting natural resources and agricultural production, the country 
undoubtedly has a significant stake in climate change. For example, a 2011 
report on climate change impact on Latin America provides evidence for rising 
sea levels along the Brazilian coast, particularly in the north-eastern states. The 
report also cites evidence of increasing wind speeds and other extreme weather 
events (ECLAC, 2011, pp. 71−4, 121−39). Several regions in Brazil, including 
the south, the northeast and Amazonia, have experienced a combination of 
droughts and extreme rainfall, leading to high levels of social disruption and 
economic costs (IPCC, 2014, chapter 27; Malhi et al., 2008, p. 169; Marengo, 
2010, pp. 7−9). Northeastern Brazil’s semi-arid regions have experienced 
desertification for years, compounded in recent decades by increasingly extreme 
fluctuations in rainfall and droughts (Brazil/Ministério de Meio Ambiente, 
2005; 2006). More recently, landslides in Rio de Janeiro state caused hundreds 
of deaths and left thousands homeless (BBC, 2012; New York Times, 2011). 
These extreme weather events have high social costs, but there are also concerns 
about the impact on agricultural production, the availability of drinking water, 
and hydro-electric power generation which depends on a steady water supply 
(Marengo, 2010).
Although Brazil tends to stress national autonomy and sovereignty over 
natural resources in its environmental foreign policy, it has also made several 
notable contributions to international climate change negotiations. Whereas 
in the 1980s Brazil tended to oppose binding targets for carbon emissions and 
resisted initiatives for international deforestation monitoring, during the 1990s 
it became a CDM proponent as part of the Kyoto Protocol and other policies 
to assist developing countries with mitigating climate change effects (Johnson, 
2001; Gupta, 2010). Brazil is the third-largest participant in the CDM after 
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China and India, as measured in terms of the number of projects and carbon 
emission reduction, with projects focusing primarily on hydro-electric power 
generation (Brazil/MCT, 2007; Brazil/MRE et al., 2007; IPEA, 2011). 
Recent climate change talks have been a highly frustrating process but even 
so Brazil has played a significant role in implementing some changes. During 
the negotiations, the Brazilian agenda has been threefold. The first important 
element is support for a multilateral climate change regime, including a second 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol post-2012 and the negotiation of 
a new agreement with binding targets for all countries to enter into force in 
2020. Secondly, although the country’s position continues to be based on the 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ principle, since 2009 it has shifted 
towards proposing a new model for developing countries’ targets, based on 
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action (NAMA). Brazil claims that this 
proposal’s legitimacy is based on effective domestic monitoring, focusing 
primarily on deforestation. Thirdly, reflecting the principle that developing 
countries should be assisted in their climate efforts, the agenda concentrates 
on ensuring appropriate finance for mitigation and adaptation programmes 
in various economic sectors through the Green Climate Fund. Such initiatives 
have been reflected in Brazil’s national climate change policies, such as the 
national Climate Fund and the Amazon Fund (Brazil/MMA, 2013; Teixeira, 
2012a, pp. 5−6). These, together with REDD+, will help combat deforestation.
The Brazilian position is strongly influenced by its role as an emerging 
power among an increasingly heterogeneous group of developing countries, 
particularly the G77 alliance. It has also become increasingly apparent that 
the emerging powers are now coordinating their environmental negotiation 
strategies to some extent, particularly through the BASIC group since 
Copenhagen in 2009 (Papa and Gleason, 2012, p. 919). The BASIC group’s 
starting point continues to be that major developing countries should not be 
subject to the same binding targets as developed countries and that climate 
change agreements should ‘not hinder their central priority of promoting 
economic development’ (Vieira, 2013, p. 373). Regular ministerial meetings 
have been held in advance of the annual climate change talks to agree a joint 
statement and negotiating position. Their unity and collective strength should 
however not be exaggerated as Brazil and South Africa appear more willing to 
move towards targets for developing countries than China, and particularly 
India (Hochstetler and Milkoreit, 2014; Hurrell and Sengupta, 2012, p. 473; 
Papa and Gleason, 2012). Major powers’ increasing engagement can also have 
positive implications for climate change governance. Hurrell and Sengupta argue 
that the climate change regime has in practice shifted away from differentiation 
to a bottom-up system ‘based on “pledge and review” that requires developing 
countries, especially the emerging powers, to be treated in much the same way 
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as the developed world with regard to their climate mitigation and reporting 
obligations’ (2012, p. 471). Hochstetler and Milkoreit also conclude that 
the coordination effect through BASIC ‘can be productive … when it pulls 
reluctant parties [such as India] forward’ (2014, p. 233).
The 2011 climate talks resulted in the Durban Platform for Enhanced 
Action (ADP agreement) which led to the negotiation of a new climate 
change agreement in Paris at the end of 2015 to succeed the Kyoto Protocol 
after the second commitment period ends in 2020. The ADP agreement was 
further recognition that major developing countries have more responsibility 
for climate action due to their higher emissions levels. In Durban, the then 
Brazilian Minister of the Environment, Izabella Teixeira, emphasised the 
country’s focus on reaching a legally binding agreement which would include 
both developing and developed countries (2011). She reiterated this position 
in Doha in December 2012, expressing frustration with developed countries 
‘shifting the burden’ to developing countries (2012b).
However, the details of how individual contributions would be calculated 
and translated into cuts in emissions remained highly contested, which was 
also the case in Warsaw at the UN Climate Change Conference (COP19) in 
December 2013. Brazil proposed that potential contributions to emissions cuts 
should be calculated domestically, taking into account historical contributions 
while maintaining the distinction between Annex I and non-Annex 1 countries 
(Folha de São Paulo, 18 November 2013). The debates also illustrate how 
Brazil’s negotiating position may be affected by the effectiveness of its domestic 
climate change policies. An additional complication and embarrassment for 
the Brazilian government was that the latest INPE/PRODES data, published 
in December 2013, showed that deforestation rates had increased in 2013 
compared to 2012 (see Figure 5.1), which led to questions about the legitimacy 
and effectiveness of Brazil’s climate change policies, which are primarily based 
on deforestation reduction (Folha de São Paulo, 14 and 19 November 2013). 
The importance of agricultural production and land use change in 
Brazil’s carbon emissions illustrates the problematic relationship between the 
country’s development and climate change agendas (Fernandez Silva, 2012, 
pp. 379−80). A study published by the civil society organisation Observatório 
do Clima argued that although Brazilian carbon emissions have dropped 
significantly since 2005, reductions associated with combatting deforestation 
may have peaked between 2010 and 2012, with other economic sectors 
contributing to possible future increases (2014, p. 19). Brazilian exports have 
increased significantly since 2000, although there has been a drop since 2011, 
reflecting the economic downturn. Commercial relations with two of Brazil’s 
main trading partners, China and the European Union, are dominated by 
agricultural and other primary products, particularly soy which represented 
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51.7 per cent of exports to China and 8.18 per cent to the EU in the first half 
of 2015 (European Commission/Directorate General for Trade, 2015; Jenkins, 
2012, pp. 27−9; Ministério do Desenvolvimento/SECEX, 2015). There is 
a relationship between trade expansion in Brazil’s major agricultural export 
products, soybeans and beef, to the Russia Federation, China and the EU, and 
carbon emissions resulting from deforestation and land use change (Karstensen 
et al., 2013, p. 15). Although deforestation rates have reduced since 2004, the 
drive to increase exports of primary products, which is at the heart of Brazil’s 
development agenda, could challenge the nationally set reduction targets. 
Brazilian civil society organisations used COP19 in Warsaw as an opportunity 
to press the negotiators not only to address the increase in deforestation but 
also to enhance democratic accountability and indigenous rights, while also 
underlining the contradictions between domestic policies and the legitimacy 
of Brazil’s position in climate talks (Carta aberta ao governo brasileiro, 2013). 
Furthermore, research demonstrated that Petrobras is a major contributor to 
carbon emissions, particularly due to pre-salt oil exploration (Heede, 2014, p. 
238; Guardian, 20 November, 2013). Despite the criticisms, Izabella Teixeira 
announced new deforestation monitoring measures at the conference and, 
linking environmental policy to Brazil’s global ambitions, commented that ‘it 
is impossible to deny that Brazil has a strategic position in the international 
geopolitical scenario, which unites production and forest protection’ (quoted 
in Clark/Greenpeace, 2013, my translation). The increasingly transparent 
reporting that forms the foundation of Brazil’s argument for nationally-
calculated targets can therefore prove to be a double-edged sword.
Conclusion
In the aftermath of the Rio+20 Sustainable Development Summit held 
in Rio de Janeiro in June 2012, it appears that there is a significant role for 
major developing countries in global environmental politics. While Dilma 
Rousseff stated in her opening speech that the global economic crisis could 
be a catalyst for a transition to a more sustainable economic model, this 
was not the most important driving force for the negotiations. To a large 
extent Rio+20 functioned as an attempt to consolidate Brazilian leadership, 
particularly because the country’s priority seemed to be to play a key role in 
international negotiations rather than to set a radical agenda for sustainable 
development. Together with Brazil’s leadership ambitions in other arenas, these 
are all indications that environmental issues could provide the country with the 
power and recognition to which it aspires. While Brazil continues to oppose 
the argument that major developing countries should be subject to the same 
emissions targets as Annex 1 countries, its climate change agenda has moved 
towards accepting a degree of emerging power responsibility for climate change. 
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This strategy can provide Brazil with recognition and power internationally 
as the country’s growing economic and political power also allows it to bridge 
developed and developing countries’ interests in climate change talks.
Foreign and environmental policies in Brazil have several strategic goals 
in common, namely, as Hurrell states, ‘the twin imperatives of economic 
development and political autonomy’, as well as the need to balance 
environmental protection with the exploitation of natural resources for 
development purposes (1992, p. 378). Economic development strategies over 
the past decade, in particular, have contributed to the expansion of export 
agriculture with associated environmental and social costs. Industrial growth 
and the exploitation of natural resources have also required the spread of 
electricity generation in often vulnerable regions. Continued development 
in the use and production of biofuels is a key strategy in mitigating carbon 
emissions and climate change contributions. However, emissions related 
to deforestation and particularly changes in land use (the growth of export 
agriculture) still play a key role in Brazil’s total emissions. The controversy 
surrounding the construction of hydro-electric dams in the Amazon shows that 
the drive to expand renewable energy can have high social and environmental costs.
Whereas there is considerable debate about the domestic sources of 
environmental foreign policy among emerging economies, less scholarly 
attention has been paid to the interaction between the domestic context, the 
dynamics of international climate talks and Brazil’s foreign policy agenda. 
Based on a constructivist approach to environmental foreign policy in emerging 
powers, this chapter has therefore argued that such policy is not simply rooted 
in material interests and ecological vulnerability but also reflects the ambition 
to increase international recognition of an emerging country’s power and status. 
Brazilian climate change discourse, based on claims about the effectiveness of 
national policies, serves to legitimise Brazil’s position as a major actor in global 
environmental politics. The government’s own perception of its comparative 
advantage in renewable energy and environmental monitoring has contributed 
to a shift in Brazil’s position from an insistence on differentiated responsibilities 
to binding commitments at a national level. However, national-level climate 
change measures are less ambitious than those required to avoid environmental 
disaster and the international position is marred by the contradictions created 
by domestic policies. This in turn challenges Brazil’s claims to legitimacy and 
environmental leadership.
PROVINCIALISING NATURE108
References
Almeida, P.R. de (2009) ‘Lula’s foreign policy: regional and global strategies’, 
in J.L. Love and W. Baer (eds.), Brazil under Lula: Economy, Politics and 
Society under the Worker-President (New York: Palgrave), pp. 167−83.
Alonso, A. and D. Maciel (2010) ‘From protest to professionalization: 
Brazilian environmental activism after Rio-92’, The Journal of 
Environment & Development, 19 (3): 300−17.
Associação Nacional dos Fabricantes de Veículos Automotores (ANFAVEA 
(2012) Anuário da Indústria Automobilística Brasileira (São Paulo: 
ANFAVEA).
Barkdull, J. and P.G. Harris (2002) ‘Environmental change and foreign 
policy: a survey of theory’, Global Environmental Politics, 2 (2): 63−91.
— (2009) ‘Theories of environmental foreign policy: power, interests, and 
ideas’, in P.G. Harris (ed.), Environmental Change and Foreign Policy: 
Theory and Practice (Abingdon and New York: Routledge), pp. 19−40.
Barros-Platiau, A.F. (2010) ‘When emergent countries reform global 
governance of climate change: Brazil under Lula’, Revista Brasileira de 
Política Internacional, 53, special edn.: 5373−90.
Barros, G. (2009), ‘Brazil: the challenges in becoming an agricultural 
superpower’, in L. Brainard and L. Martinez-Diaz (eds.), Brazil as an 
Economic Superpower? Understanding Brazil’s Changing Role in the Global 
Economy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution), pp. 81−109.
BBC (2012) ‘Landslide kills eight in Brazil’s Rio de Janeiro state’, 10 Jan., 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-16480213 (accessed 3 Dec. 
2015).
Bocchini, B. (2012) ‘Lula critica ONGs estrangeiras que “dão palpite” 
contra Belo Monte’, Portal do Meio Ambiente, 14 Mar., http://
portaldomeioambiente.org.br/editorias-editorias/energia/belo-
monte/3839-lula-critica-ongs-estrangeiras-que-qdao-palpiteq-contra-belo-
monte (accessed 7 Dec. 2015).
Bodansky, D. (2010) ‘The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: a 
postmortem’, The American Journal of International Law, 104 (2): 230−40.
Brazil/Agência Nacional de Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis (ANP) 
(2014) Oil, Natural Gas and Biofuels Statistical Yearbook 2014 (Rio de 
Janeiro: ANP).
Brazil/Governo Federal, Comitê Interministerial sobre Mudança do Clima 
(CIMC) (2008) Plano nacional sobre mudança do clima (Brasília: Governo 
Federal/CIMC).
109INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
Brazil/Ministério de Ciência e Tecnologia (MCT) (2007) Status atual das 
atividades de projeto no âmbito do Mecanismo de Desenvolvimento Limpo 
(MDL) no Brasil e no mundo (Brasília: MCT).
Brazil/Ministério de Desenvolvimento/Secretaria de Comércio Exterior 
(SECEX) (2015), ‘Balanço comercial brasileira: Países e blocos’, www.
desenvolvimento.gov.br/sitio/interna/interna.php?area=5&menu=576 
(accessed 8 Dec. 2015).
Brazil/Ministério de Meio Ambiente (2005) Programa de ação nacional de 
combate à desertificação e mitigação dos efeitos da seca, PAN-Brasil  
(Brasília: MMA).
— (2006) National Report on Implementation of the United Nations 
Convention to Combat Desertification, 2002−2006 (Brasília: MMA).
— (2013) Fundo Nacional sobre Mudança de Clima, Plano anual de 
aplicação de recursos – PAAR 2013 (Brasília: MMA).
Brazil/Ministério de Minas e Energia (MME), Secretaria de Planejamento e 
Desenvolvimento Energético (2011) Plano decenal de expansão de energia 
2020 (Brasília: MME/PPE).
Brazil/Ministério do Planejamento (1999) Avança Brasil, plano plurianual 
2000−2003: Orçamento da união 2000 (Brasília: Ministério do 
Planejamento).
Brazil/Ministério de Relações Exteriores et al. (2007) Contribuição do Brasil 
para evitar a mudança do clima (Brasília: MRE).
Burges, S.W. (2009) Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War (Gainesville, 
FL: University Press of Florida).
Campbell, D. (2013) ‘After Doha: what has climate change policy 
accomplished?’, Journal of Environmental Law, 25 (1): 125−36.
Carta aberta ao governo brasileiro – COP19 (2013), published by 
Engajamundo, www.engajamundo.org/carta-aberta/ (accessed 8 Dec. 
2015). 
Cass, L.R. (2009) ‘The symbolism of environmental policy: foreign policy 
commitments as signaling tools’, in P.G. Harris (ed.), Environmental 
Change and Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Abingdon and New York: 
Routledge), pp. 41−56.
Clark, N. (2013) ‘Governo exalta Código Florestal na COP-19’, Greenpeace, 
www.greenpeace.org/brasil/pt/Blog/governo-cria-sistema-para-monitorar-
emisses/blog/47457/ (accessed 8 Dec. 2015).
Dimitrov, R.S. (2010) ‘Inside Copenhagen: the state of climate governance’, 
Global Environmental Politics, 10 (2): 18−24.
PROVINCIALISING NATURE110
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 
(2011) Efectos del cambio climático en la costa de América Latina y el 
Caribe: Dinámicas, tendencias y variabilidad climática (Santiago de Chile: 
ECLAC).
Economist, The (2008) ‘A big oil discovery’, 12 Feb., www.economist.com/
node/10677726 (accessed 7 Dec. 2015).
Energy Information Administration (EIA) (2012) ‘Brazil energy data, 
statistics and analysis − oil, gas, electricity, coal’, www.eia.gov/cabs/brazil/
Full.html (accessed 10 Aug. 2012).
European Commission/Directorate General for Trade (2015) European 
Union, Trade in Goods with Brazil, European Union, 10 April, http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113359.pdf (accessed 8 
Dec. 2015).
Fernandez Silva, E. (2012) ‘Rio+20 and Brazil’s policy on climate change’, 
Nature Climate Change, 2 (6): 379−80.
Folha de São Paulo (2013) ‘Desmatamento não prejudicará negociações 
do Brasil na conferencia do clima, diz ministra’ (G. Miranda), 14 
Nov., http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ambiente/2013/11/1371725-
desmatamento-nao-prejudicara-negociacoes-do-brasil-na-conferencia-do-
clima-diz-ministra.shtml (accessed 8 Dec. 2015).
— (2013) ‘Países ricos barram proposta brasileira na cúpula do clima’ 
(G. Miranda), 18 Nov., http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/paywall/login.
shtml?http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/cienciasaude/139436-paises-
ricos-barram-proposta-brasileira-na-cupula-do-clima.shtml (accessed 8 
Dec. 2015).
— (2013) ‘Editorial: Nuvens sobre Varsóvia’, 19 Nov., www.pesca.sp.gov.br/
noticia.php?id_not=13423 (accessed 15 Dec. 2015).
Frayssinet, F./Inter Press Service (2012) ‘Brazil defends credentials as Rio+20 
host’, www.ipsnews.net/2012/04/brazil-defends-credentials-as-rio-20-
host/ (accessed 7 Dec. 2015).
Freitas Barbosa, A. de, T. Narciso and M. Biancalana (2009) ‘Brazil in Africa: 
another emerging power in the continent?’, Politikon: South African 
Journal of Political Studies, 36 (1): 59−86.
Gardini, G.L. (2011) ‘Latin American foreign policies between ideology and 
pragmatism: a framework for analysis’, in G.L. Gardini and P. Lambert 
(eds.), Latin American Foreign Policies: Between Ideology and Pragmatism 
(New York: Palgrave), pp. 13−33.
111INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
Gardini, G.L. and P. Lambert (2011) Introduction, ‘Ideology and pragmatism 
in Latin American foreign policy’, in G.L. Gardini and P. Lambert (eds.), 
Latin American Foreign Policies: Between Ideology and Pragmatism (New 
York: Palgrave), pp. 1−11.
Globo (2012) ‘Diário oficial publica justificativas de Dilma aos vetos do 
Código Florestal’, 28 May, http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2012/05/
confira-justificativas-de-dilma-aos-vetos-do-codigo-florestal.html (accessed 
15 Dec. 2015)
Gonzalez Miguez, J.D. (2011) ‘The Kyoto Protocol and the current 
negotiations of the international regime on climate change’, in R. Seroa 
da Motta, J. Hargrave, G. Luedemann and M.B. Sarmiento (eds.), 
Climate Change in Brazil: Economic, Social and Regulatory Aspects (Brasília: 
IPEA), pp. 305−18.
Guardian, The (2013) ‘Which fossil fuel companies are most responsible 
for climate change?’, 20 Nov., www.theguardian.com/environment/
interactive/2013/nov/20/which-fossil-fuel-companies-responsible-climate-
change-interactive (accessed 8 Dec. 2015).
Guilhon Albuquerque, J.A. (2003) ‘Brazil: from dependency to globalization’, 
in F.O. Mora and J.K. Hey (eds.), Latin American and Caribbean Foreign 
Policy (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield), pp. 267−87.
Gupta, J. (2007) ‘Beyond graduation and deepening: toward cosmopolitan 
scholarship, in J.E. Aldy and R.N. Stavins (eds.), Architectures for 
Agreement: Addressing Global Climate Change in the Post-Kyoto World 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 116−30.
— (2010) ‘A history of international climate change policy’, Wiley 
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 1 (5): 636−53.
Heede, R. (2014) ‘Tracing anthropogenic carbon dioxide and methane 
emissions to fossil fuel and cement producers, 1854−2010’, Journal of 
Climatic Change, 122 (1−2): 229−41.
Hochstetler, K. and M.E. Keck (2007) Greening Brazil: Environmental 
Activism in State and Society (Durham, NC: Duke University Press).
Hochstetler, K. and E. Viola (2012) ‘Brazil and the politics of climate change: 
beyond the global commons’, Environmental Politics, 21 (5): 753−71.
Hochstetler, K. and M. Milkoreit (2014) ‘Emerging powers in the climate 
change negotiations: shifting identity conceptions’, Political Research 
Quarterly, 67 (1): 224−35.
Hurrell, A. (1992) ‘Brazil and the international politics of Amazonian 
deforestation’, in A. Hurrell and B. Kingsbury (eds.), The International 
PROVINCIALISING NATURE112
Politics of the Environment: Actors, Interests, and Institutions (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press), pp. 398−429.
— (2006) ‘Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space for would-be 
great powers?’, International Affairs, 82 (1): 1−19.
Hurrell, A. and S. Sengupta (2012) ‘Emerging powers, north−south relations 
and global climate politics’, International Affairs, 88 (3): 463−84.
Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA) (2011) Uma visão geral da 
utilização do Mecanismo de Desenvolvimento Limpo setorial: Perspectivas 
para o desenvolvimento sustentável brasileiro (Rio de Janeiro: IPEA). 
Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (INPE) (2009) Relatório técnico 
sintético: estimativa de emissões de CO2 por desmatamento na Amazônia 
Brasileira (São José dos Campos: INPE).
Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (INPE) and PRODES (2015) 
‘Projeto PRODES: Monitoramento da floresta Amazônica brasileira por 
satélite’, www.obt.inpe.br/prodes/index.php (accessed 8 Dec. 2015).
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2014) Climate Change 
2014: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Part B: Regional Aspects, 
contributions of working group II to the IPCC’s fifth assessment report 
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press).
Jenkins, R. (2012) ‘China and Brazil: economic impacts of a growing 
relationship’, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 41 (1): 21−47.
Johnson, K. (2001) ‘Brazil and the politics of the climate change 
negotiations’, The Journal of Environment & Development, 10 (2): 
178−206.
Karstensen, J., G.P. Peters and R.M. Andrew (2013) ‘Attribution of CO2 
emissions from Brazilian deforestation to consumers between 1990 and 
2010’, Environmental Research Letters, 8 (2): 1−7. 
Kozloff, N. (2010) ‘Cancun climate summit: will Brazil step up to the plate?’, 
26 Nov., www.huffingtonpost.com/nikolas-kozloff/cancun-climate-
summit-wil_b_788286.html (accessed 7 Dec. 2015).
Malhi, Y., J. Timmons Roberts, R.A. Betts, T.J. Killeen, W. Li and C.A. 
Nobre (2008) ‘Climate change, deforestation, and the fate of the 
Amazon’, Science, 319 (5860): 169−72.
Marengo, J.E. (2010) Mudanças climáticas, condições meteorológicas extremas 
e eventos climáticos no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Fundo Brasileiro de 
Desenvolvimento Sustentável).
Mayer, M. and F.J. Arndt (2009) ‘The politics of socionatures: images 
of environmental foreign policy’, in P.G. Harris (ed.), Environmental 
113INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
Change and Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Abingdon and New York: 
Routledge), pp. 74−89.
Montero, A.P. (2005) Brazilian Politics (Cambridge: Polity).
Narlikar, A. (2010) ‘New powers in the club: the challenges of global trade 
governance’, International Affairs, 86 (3): 717−28.
New York Times (2011) ‘Landslides and flooding kill scores in Brazil’, 12 
Jan., www.nytimes.com/2011/01/13/world/americas/13brazil.html?_r=0 
(accessed 8 Dec. 2015).
— (2012) ‘Amid Brazil’s rush to develop, workers resist’, 5 May, www.
nytimes.com/2012/05/06/world/americas/brazils-rush-to-develop-
hydroelectric-power-brings-unrest.html?_r=0 (accessed 7 Dec. 2015).
Observatório do Clima (2014) Análise da evolução das emissões de GEE no 
Brasil (1990−2012): Documento Síntese (São Paulo: Observatório do 
Clima).
Papa, M. (2009) ‘Environmental foreign policy: towards a conceptual 
framework’, in P.G. Harris (ed.), Environmental Change and Foreign Policy: 
Theory and Practice (Abingdon and New York: Routledge), pp. 202−20.
Papa, M. and N.W. Gleason (2012) ‘Major emerging powers in sustainable 
development diplomacy: assessing their leadership potential’, Global 
Environmental Change, 22 (4): 915−24. 
Parks, B.C. and J. Timmons Roberts (2010) ‘Climate change, social theory 
and justice’, Theory, Culture and Society, 27 (2−3): 134−66. 
Richard, I. (2012) ‘Mensagem presidencial explica os vetos ao Código 
Florestal’, Exame, http://exame.abril.com.br/mundo/noticias/mensagem-
presidencial-explica-os-vetos-ao-codigo-florestal (accessed 8 Dec. 2015).
Rong, F. (2010) ‘Understanding developing country stances on post-2012 
climate change negotiations: comparative analysis of Brazil, China, India, 
Mexico, and South Africa’, Energy Policy, 38 (8): 4582−91.
Salina, N. (2012) ‘Termina greve nas usinas de Santo Antônio e Jirau’, Exame, 
2 Apr., http://exame.abril.com.br/mundo/noticias/termina-greve-nas-
usinas-de-santo-antonio-e-jirau-2 (accessed 7 Dec. 2015).
Seroa da Motta, R. (2011) ‘The national policy of climate change: regulatory 
and governance aspects’, in R. Serroa da Motta, J. Hargrave, G. 
Luedemann and M.B. Sarmiento Gutierrez (eds.), Climate Change in 
Brazil: Economic, Social and Regulatory Aspects (Brasília: IPEA), pp. 33−44.
Teixeira, I. (2011) Statement of the Minister of the Environment of Brazil, 
Durban, COP17, 8 Dec.
PROVINCIALISING NATURE114
— (2012a) Discurso da Senhora Ministra Izabella Teixeira durante a Convenção 
do Clima (Doha, COP18), 5 Dec. 
— (2012b) Delegation of Brazil Official Statement to COP18 Closing Plenary 
(Doha, COP18), 8 Dec.
Ubiraci Sennes, R. and T. Narciso (2009) ‘Brazil as an international energy 
player’, in L. Martinez-Diaz and L. Brainard (eds.) Brazil as an Economic 
Superpower? Understanding Brazil’s Changing Role in the Global Economy 
(Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press), pp. 28−65.
Vieira, M.A. (2013) ‘Brazilian foreign policy in the context of global climate 
norms’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 9 (4): 369−86.
Vieira Lisboa, M. (2002) ‘Em busca de uma política externa Brasileira de 
meio ambiente: três exemplos e uma exceção à regra’, São Paulo em 
Perspectiva, 16 (2): 44−52.
Vigevani, T. and H. Ramanzini (2011) ‘The impact of domestic politics and 
international changes on the Brazilian perception of regional integration’, 
Latin American Politics and Society, 53 (1): 125−55.
Viola, E. (2009) ‘Brazil in South American integration and global and 
regional politics of climate’, LANIC Etext Collections (Austin, TX: Latin 
American Network Information Center, University of Texas), http://lanic.
utexas.edu/project/etext/llilas/vrp/viola.pdf (accessed 7 Dec. 2015).
Wolford, W. (2008) ‘Environmental justice and agricultural development 
in the Brazilian cerrado’, in D. Carruthers (ed.), Environmental Justice in 
Latin America: Problems, Promise, and Practices (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press), pp. 213−38.
Zhouri, A. (2010) ‘“Adverse forces” in the Brazilian Amazon: 
developmentalism versus environmentalism and indigenous rights’, The 
Journal of Environment & Development, 19 (3): 252−73.
6. REDD+ in Latin America:  
promises and challenges 
Anthony Hall
Rising greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions produced by human activity are generally acknowledged to be a major cause of global warming and climate volatility. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), the increase in GHG (largely carbon-dioxide − CO2) 
from its preindustrial level of around 280 parts per million to its current 
estimated level of 430ppm is contributing to a projected world temperature 
rise of 2−3 degrees over the next century (IPCC, 2007, 2014; Stern, 2007). 
Agriculture, forestry and other land uses are responsible for almost a quarter 
of all anthropogenic GHG emissions, producing between 10−12 gigatonnes of 
CO2 equivalent (GtCO2e) each year.
1 
Historically, deforestation alone has accounted for approximately 18 per cent 
of global emissions, although this estimate has now been revised downwards 
to ten per cent (partly due to Brazil’s recent success in curbing deforestation, 
discussed below). In Latin America, due to high levels of forest removal, this 
figure has historically stood at 70−80 per cent in the cases of Brazil, Bolivia, 
Ecuador and Peru (Hall, 2012). Curtailing forest loss can therefore mitigate 
climate change in two ways; by limiting anthropogenic emissions of GHGs 
caused by forest destruction and by strengthening the capacity of standing 
forests to act as carbon sinks.
The landmark United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (or Earth Summit – UNCED) was held in Rio de Janeiro in 
1992 and launched international climate negotiations to address the issue of 
global warming. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), signed by 150 nations, came into force in 1994. The 
basis was thus laid for negotiations to be held at annual UNFCCC Conferences 
of the Parties (COP), of which there had been 20 by 2014. The 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol finally came into effect in 2005, establishing binding commitments 
for 39 industrialised countries and the European Union (together known as 
Annex I countries in UN parlance) to limit or ‘cap’ their combined emissions 
to five per cent below 1990 levels by 2008−12, the first commitment period. 
1 Including methane (18%) and nitrous oxide (9%).
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Under the Kyoto Protocol, industrialised countries are expected to meet their 
emissions reductions targets through pollution controls and the introduction 
of green technologies at home. 
In addition to these domestic measures, new ‘cap-and-trade’ mechanisms 
would allow Annex I countries to offset emissions over and above their 
designated quotas, known as ‘assigned amount units’ (AAUs). Surplus AAUs 
accumulated by countries within their quotas can be sold on carbon markets 
to countries that have exceeded their targets. Carbon has thus become a new 
international commodity. Through the Clean Development Mechanism, for 
example, emissions reduction projects can be set up in developing countries to 
earn ‘certified emissions reduction’ credits that can be traded on carbon markets 
and count towards industrialised countries meeting their Kyoto targets. 
Under Kyoto, only afforestation and reforestation projects could be funded 
for carbon offset purposes, but not avoided deforestation schemes. However, the 
Coalition for Rainforest Nations emerged during this period to seek financial 
support to maintain standing forests as a potentially major contribution 
towards mitigating global warming. Yet the international forest lobby proved 
strong and under the 2007 Bali Action Plan, the principle of providing 
financial support for addressing Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and 
forest Degradation (REDD) as a mitigation policy was introduced onto the 
international agenda. The REDD concept has since been expanded to include 
not just avoided deforestation but also enhancing forest carbon stocks and 
regenerating secondary forests (REDD+) and sustainable forest production 
(REDD++). Its fundamental principle is that forest users would be given cash 
and in-kind incentives for maintaining standing forests, and preserve vital eco-
system services such as carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation and 
climate regulation at the same time as sustaining people’s livelihoods.2 
A REDD+ Partnership was set up to develop collaborative arrangements, 
embracing national governments, multilateral bodies and major non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) involved in forestry issues and the 
private sector. Working outside of the UNFCCC, a plethora of official 
organisations has committed to funding and/or providing technical assistance 
to developing REDD+. These include, for example, the World Bank’s Forest 
Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), the UN-REDD programme, the Global 
Environmental Facility (GEF) and major bilateral donors such as Norway and 
Germany (Hall, 2012, chapter 2). 
Funding for REDD+ can in theory originate from one or a combination 
of three sources: i) a market-based mechanism; ii) a results-based approach; or 
iii) non-results-based forest protection. Under the first option a high carbon 
2 Contrast REDD+ as a mitigation strategy with the agroecological practices discussed by 
Woodgate in chapter 4 and Millner in chapter 3.
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price would be necessary to have a significant impact and sufficient credits 
would need to be available in the market. Rules would have to be changed 
under the UNCCC to allow REDD+ offsets in compliance markets. Forest 
carbon transactions have been worth US$900 million over time, amounting to 
US$216 million in 2012, with multinational companies purchasing 67 per cent. 
The low prices of carbon and weakness of the emissions compliance markets is 
likely to maintain low levels of private investment, involving those commercial 
enterprises wishing to demonstrate corporate social responsibility and climate 
leadership (Norman and Nakhooda, 2014). Under the second option payments 
can be made based on results from projects and verified emissions reductions, 
without any formal status under the UNFCCC. The most prominent funding 
scheme for such result-based projects is the Norwegian Forest and Climate 
Initiative, which supports Brazil’s Amazon Fund, as well as the World Bank’s 
FCFP and the UN-REDD programme. The third option grants support for 
forest protection without requiring proof of additional emissions reductions or 
carbon sequestration, which are assumed to have occurred rather than being 
verified. In practice, many small REDD+ projects fall into this category, being 
more a statement of good faith than anything else (Wunder, 2005).
It is estimated that public and private finance for REDD+ amounted to 
US$8.7 billion between 2006 and 2014, most of which was pledged by 2010, 
since when the pace of such commitments has slowed down (Norman and 
Nakhooda, 2014). Some 90 per cent comprises public funding that originates 
from about 20 donors. Three-quarters of bilateral support comes from Norway, 
the US, Germany, Japan and the UK, while ten countries received the bulk, 
particularly Brazil and Indonesia, with 40 per cent of the total. Latin America 
and the Caribbean has been the largest regional recipient, favoured in particular 
by the multilateral agencies. New funding sources, such as the proposed Green 
Climate Fund, could offer additional sources of support for REDD+ once it 
becomes operational.
A large gap has opened up between the significant sums of money originally 
pledged by donors for REDD+ and amounts subsequently dispersed. Stern 
(2007) estimated that REDD+ would require US$5−10 billion annually, a 
figure that has increased to US$12.5 billion, the equivalent of roughly ten 
per cent of the annual international aid budget (Sunderlin et al., 2014). It has 
been estimated that a REDD+ funding gap will open up of US$15−48 billion 
by 2020 (Bastos Lima et al., 2014). This deficit has generally been blamed on 
the failure to reach a binding global agreement on climate change mitigation 
through the UNFCCC that would create a regulatory framework capable 
of underpinning a strong market for forest carbon. Fiscal restraint in donor 
countries and fears that REDD+ credit oversupply would depress carbon prices 
are also highlighted (Sunderlin et al., 2014). 
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As already mentioned, at present official compliance markets under the 
Kyoto Protocol do not allow forest carbon offsets for avoided deforestation; 
neither does the European Union (EU) emissions trading system. Such forestry 
projects have had to rely on public funding as well as private sources such as 
international NGOs and voluntary carbon markets. However, the latter have 
accounted for just one per cent of traded carbon’s total volume, a situation 
that worsened in 2010 when the Chicago Climate Exchange closed its 
voluntary carbon-trading programme (Waage and Hamilton, 2011). Regional 
compliance markets offer another potential source of REDD+ funding as the 
result of agreements between subnational administrations. 
Negotiations resulting from the Governors’ Climate and Forests Task 
Force (GCF) have given rise to California’s cap-and-trade system, which is 
being piloted through an agreement with Acre state in Brazil and Chiapas in 
Mexico to support jurisdictional (area-based) rather than individual, project-
based REDD+ schemes (Sunderlin et al., 2014). This came into force in 2013 
and could offer financing potential for the future. In 2013 there was a sharp 
increase in transacted REDD+ project carbon over the previous year, largely 
as the result of an agreement between the German government and state of 
Acre to purchase eight million tonnes of carbon credits. Notwithstanding these 
possibilities, REDD+ is likely to depend on aid-based public sector funding for 
the foreseeable future. 
REDD+ in Latin America
On the global stage, Latin America has been a pioneer in developing REDD+ 
schemes, although individual country records have been greatly mixed. With 
probably about 100+ such projects on the ground, it remains small-scale in 
relative terms. It is also difficult to be precise since there is no central registry 
and many experiences might be difficult to officially categorise as ‘REDD+’ 
rather than simply ‘conservation and development’. Countries with emerging 
REDD+ strategies can be grouped into four categories (Hall, 2012): leaders, 
latecomers, stragglers and non-participants (see Figure 6.1). With the exception 
of Venezuela, Uruguay, Belize and French Guiana, all Latin American nations 
are now at various stages in the process of developing REDD+ strategies. 
Norway through the Amazon Fund and Germany have been major bilateral 
donors. With the exception of Brazil, all countries involved in developing 
national REDD+ strategies have received technical support and seed funding 
from the World Bank and/or the UN-REDD programme. The World Bank’s 
FCPF is the larger of the two programmes and requires countries to submit 
‘Readiness Preparation Proposals’ (known as R-PPs) to qualify for support 
from its Carbon Fund to finance emissions reduction projects. Participants 
include Argentina, Costa Rica, Guyana, Peru, Panama, Colombia, Suriname, 
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Guatemala and Mexico. The smaller UN-REDD is a collaborative programme 
involving the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), and funds preparatory activities and capacity building in 
Ecuador, Bolivia, Panama and Paraguay. 
Figure 6.1: REDD+ regimes in Latin America (source: Hall, 2012)
1. LEADERS
Costa Rica
Mexico
Brazil
2. LATECOMERS
Bolivia
Ecuador
Panama
Peru
Paraguay
Colombia
Guyana
3. STRAGGLERS
Argentina
Surinam
Guatemala
Nicaragua
Honduras
El Salvador
Chile
4. NON-PARTICIPANTS
Venezuela
Uruguay
French Guiana
Belize
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Farthest along the REDD+ road in Latin America are Costa Rica, Mexico and 
Brazil. Most activities today labelled REDD+ projects, in Mexico and Brazil, 
and other countries such as Ecuador and Bolivia, have in some way been able 
to build upon preexisting experiences in the forestry sector. These can be 
loosely classed as conservation and development, or integrated conservation 
and development projects (known as ICDPs); that is, combining avoided 
deforestation and sustainable forest management, but without the 
inbuilt incentive payments that now form a part of the REDD+ approach 
(Hall, 1997, 2012). 
Costa Rica was the first country in the world to introduce a national system 
of payments for eco-system services (PES), predating REDD by over two 
decades. It once had one of the world’s highest deforestation rates but its PES 
system (Pagos por Servicios Ambientales) has been credited with restoring the 
level of forest cover from 21 per cent in 1987 to over 50 per cent by 2010 
(Pagiola, 2008). Landowners are financially compensated for maintaining 
standing forest, reforestation and sustainable management. The cost of setting 
up Costa Rica’s REDD+ strategy under the FCPF is calculated at US$4 million 
while implementation would cost an estimated US$35 million a year. Funding 
would come from a variety of public sources administered through the national 
body Fondo de Financiamiento Forestal de Costa Rica (FONAFIFO) and via 
private individual contracts (Engel et al., 2009).
Mexico has a long history of forest sector involvement. Unlike in Costa 
Rica, 80 per cent of forests are held as common property in the hands of 
indigenous and community groups rather than privately, a practice dating 
back to the 1910 Revolution (Corbera, 2010). Despite periodic struggles 
between collective organisations and commercial logging interests, community 
forests are judged to have been effective in holding back deforestation due to 
traditions of collective mobilisation, decentralised management and delivery of 
local benefits. Bray concluded that, ‘there are regions of Mexico that already 
resemble the anticipated outcome of successful REDD+ projects’ (2010, p. 2). 
Influenced by strong grassroots pressure, Mexico introduced a unified system 
of environmental service payments in 2006 under its Pro-Árbol programme to 
compensate forest users for carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation and 
the introduction of agroforestry initiatives, funded by regular allocations from 
the national budget (Corbera, 2010). Well positioned to embrace a REDD+ 
strategy in view of its history and long experience in developing the forestry 
sector, with World Bank support via the FCPF, Mexico is seeking to establish 
a flexible, nested approach combining federal leadership with well-entrenched 
local initiatives (Hall, 2012).
Although national REDD+ preparations in Costa Rica and Mexico have 
emerged from long traditions of centralised forest conservation planning, Brazil’s 
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experience has rather different roots. This has been more recent, fragmented 
and decentralised. Regional state and local initiatives have played a leading role, 
rather than REDD+ programmes being federally orchestrated from the centre. 
The groundwork for REDD+ was laid in the 1980s and 1990s, post-UNCED, 
with the spread especially in the Amazon region of forest conservation and 
development projects, involving, for example, the rubber tappers in Acre and 
small farmer movements along the Trans-Amazon Highway. These ‘productive 
conservation’ initiatives were based on the premise that forest cover could be 
preserved while sustaining the livelihoods of forest users and bringing wider 
environmental benefits to society at large (Hall, 1997). Unsurprisingly, these 
early forest conservation and development initiatives now form the basis of a 
wave of pioneering REDD+ schemes supported by NGOs.
During the 1990s a number of other projects were developed locally adopting 
eco-system payments which included several voluntary carbon sequestration 
projects (Hall, 2008). Brazil’s first major PES forest scheme, Proambiente, was 
set up by civil society organisations but transferred to the federal government 
in 2004. Involving several hundred families in 12 Amazon locations, it was 
closed six years later following serious financial and logistical problems (Hall, 
2008, 2012). However, they too are now providing fertile ground for Brazil’s 
emerging REDD+ plans.
Over this period, while federal interest has faltered, Amazonia’s state 
governments have seized the initiative for developing REDD+ in Brazil. Acre, 
Amazonas and Mato Grosso have established their own REDD+ strategies and 
legislative frameworks for facilitating eco-system payments. In addition, state 
administrations have been politically active in lobbying the federal government 
to play a stronger role in supporting REDD+ during international climate 
change negotiations (Hall, 2012; Viana, 2009). Of Brazil’s state-wide REDD+ 
programmes, probably the best known is Bolsa Floresta in Amazonas, covering 
10 million hectares and 7,000 families distributed among several protected 
areas. This is funded through public sources such as the Amazon Fund as well 
as private commercial donations (Viana, 2010). More recently, the state of 
Acre has formalised its own jurisdiction-based PSA-CARBONO forest and 
emissions reduction plan. This includes incentive payments, financed by the 
Amazon Fund, Sky TV and the German development bank KfW (Hall, 2012).
In addition to these state programmes, other individual REDD+ projects are 
being implemented, especially in the Amazon region (ibid.). The Trans-Amazon 
Highway scheme in Pará targets small farmers in areas of high deforestation and 
rural violence. It incorporates 350 households in 15 communities, formerly 
embraced by the now defunct federal government Proambiente programme, 
mentioned above. Other planned pilot schemes are aimed at larger producers 
as well as small farmers and traditional forest communities. Larger commercial 
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cattle ranchers and soybean producers have been targeted on the grounds 
that they are the main drivers of deforestation and, therefore, maximum 
emissions reductions can be achieved more effectively rather than focusing 
entirely on small farmers. 
These larger-scale initiatives include major schemes in Pará (São Félix 
do Xingú) and Mato Grosso (Northwest Mato Grosso, and the Socio-
Environmental Carbon project) where a multi-stakeholder approach is 
being planned to benefit farms of all sizes (ibid.). Furthermore, a number of 
indigenous groups have developed PES schemes, most notably the Paiter Suruí 
of Roraima. These initiatives are being set up with technical and financial 
support from state and municipal governments, as well as a range of domestic 
and international NGOs such as the Nature Conservancy and academic bodies 
including the Woods Hole Research Institute. 
Beyond these three leading nations, the ‘latecomers’ occupy a more 
advanced position in their REDD+ preparations than the remainder of Latin 
America (Figure 6.1). Bolivia heads the list, having set up the pioneering, if 
controversial, Noel Kempff Climate Action project deforestation avoidance 
and carbon sequestration project in 1996. Bolivia was a founding member 
of the UN-REDD and in 2010 received a grant of US$5 million to prepare 
its strategy, although it remains firmly opposed to market mechanisms 
for generating revenues. Ecuador is building upon its Socio Bosque forest 
conservation plan to design a REDD+ strategy and has a number of other pilot 
schemes planned (ibid.). Panama, Peru, Paraguay, Colombia and Guyana are 
making efforts on the REDD+ road while the ‘straggler’ countries in which 
forests are considered less of a priority, such as Argentina and Chile, are in the 
very initial stages of planning for a REDD+ strategy.
Promises and challenges
In many ways, REDD+ comes as a breath of fresh air. In the past, the bulk 
of public incentives and subsidies in the Amazon have actively encouraged 
the spread of cattle ranching and commercial crop production as the basis of 
economic growth, incurring massive environmental and social costs, borne 
especially by the poor and the wider society (Mahar, 1979; Fearnside, 2008; 
Hall, 1997, 2011). In spite of its relatively modest scale so far, policymakers 
have high hopes that a scaled-up REDD+ strategy could have a positive impact 
in terms of encouraging a more socially and environmentally appropriate 
rural development model for the Amazon region and elsewhere to help reduce 
carbon emissions and avert global warming.
Yet the expectations raised by optimistic promises and expectations often 
belie the reality; REDD+ may well prove to be no exception. First, it makes 
some major assumptions about anticipated behavioural changes that can be 
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fashioned through providing financial and other incentives. Can people simply 
be paid to preserve? Second, REDD+ may underestimate the diversity and 
complexity of forest populations if it seeks to impose conservation strategies in a 
centralised, top-down, blueprint fashion without being flexible and sufficiently 
adapted to local reality.3 Third, there are several technical complications that 
may frustrate REDD+ projects and compromise their effectiveness once they 
move beyond the experimental, pilot phase. In addition, basic questions 
need to be asked about how REDD+ is operationalised and what systems of 
governance are most appropriate in order to engage all stakeholders.
1) Paying people to preserve?
The most basic assumption underlying REDD+ is that forest users can be 
persuaded to switch from environmentally destructive behaviour such as forest 
removal to more benign land-use patterns through the application of cash 
and/or in-kind incentives. Appropriate compensation, it is argued, can offset 
the opportunity costs of negative, short-term practices such as deforestation 
and slash-and-burn farming while developing a longer-term perspective that 
encourages the preservation of natural capital alongside providing support for 
user livelihoods. Thus, in addition to securing environmental gains such as 
carbon capture, REDD+ can also generate ‘co-benefits’ such as biodiversity 
preservation, climate regulation, watershed conservation and welfare advantages 
for the local population. 
Based on principles developed in the growing discipline of behavioural 
economics, ‘choice architects’ maintain that resource users can be ‘nudged’ 
in desirable directions, not just in economic and social terms but also in the 
realm of environmental policy (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). The notion that 
psychological considerations may have a strong influence on development 
decisions, and can be manipulated to produce desired outcomes, has gained 
increasing acceptance in policy circles (World Bank, 2015). According to 
REDD+ proponents in this context, forest users can be persuaded, given the 
right incentives, to switch to more environmentally sustainable behaviour 
patterns. Ideally, REDD+’s long-term objective should be to create a payments 
culture in which resource users can expect to be appropriately recompensed 
in cash for practising more ecologically friendly, conservationist activities 
(Angelsen, 2008; Wunder, 2009). 
On a continent in which public funds have in the past usually encouraged 
the removal of standing forest as an indicator of productive development, this 
change would represent quite a paradigm shift. However, this neoliberal REDD+ 
approach has come under severe criticism for encouraging an overreliance 
on cash payments as a major driver of behavioural change. In the context of 
3 Radcliffe provides an important insight in chapter 8 into how indigenous peoples view and 
understand environmental policies such as REDD+.
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traditional and indigenous forest communities, for example, Muradian et al. 
note that economic factors are only one influence on the choice of land-use 
patterns and willingness to supply environmental services (2010). Rationality, 
they argue, is context-specific and has to be seen in wider terms of the social 
embeddedness of economic relations. There is not necessarily an automatic 
link between cash and conservation. On the contrary, they argue, economic 
incentives may crowd out wider moral sentiments if applied inappropriately, 
and encourage selfish behaviour rather than working for the collective good 
(Ariely, 2008; Vatn, 2010). 
What is considered rational behaviour may vary considerably depending 
on social and cultural circumstances. Research in Asia, for example, indicates 
the need to incorporate locally developed rules and norms in community-
based forest conservation schemes in order to develop appropriate incentives, 
including the non-economic, which may be more effective than cash transfers 
(Clements et al., 2010). In Brazil and Mexico, research on REDD+ has 
found that communities often place a high value on investment into social 
infrastructure such as education and health facilities, as well as production 
support, rather than cash payments alone. This suggests that a multisector 
REDD+ strategy that addresses various complementary aspects of people’s 
livelihoods is far more likely to be effective than one based on simple cash 
payments (Corbera, 2010; Viana, 2010; Bartels et al., 2010). A recent study 
by the Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) of 23 early-stage 
REDD+ projects worldwide found that conditional livelihood enhancements 
were being considered in over half of these cases as potentially the most effective 
incentive for reducing deforestation (Sunderlin et al., 2014). 
2) Social complexity
A second related major challenge for REDD+ concerns the sheer social 
and cultural diversity of forest populations. Despite the assumptions of 
straightforward (not to say simplistic) economic rationality that often 
underlies REDD+ planning, reality is much more complicated. The values and 
motivations that underpin land-use practices are bound to vary considerably 
depending on the forest populations in question. The forces that drive 
large-scale commercial farmers seeking to maximise profits by supplying 
international markets are likely to be rather different than those influencing 
indigenous groups, smallholders, extractivists and riverine farmers dealing 
with local economies and subsistence needs (Hall, 2012, chapter 6). It may be 
convenient to assume uniformity of hopes, expectations and practices amongst 
these diverse groups, but the application of an uncritical ‘blueprint’ model 
across the board will be problematic. 
The Amazon region illustrates particularly well how such diversity might 
have strong implications for the application of REDD+ principles. Academic 
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research over many years in Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru reveals the 
heterogeneity of livelihood activities that combine a range of productive 
undertakings designed to maximise flexibility while reducing risks for 
livelihoods. These may include a combination of extraction of non-timber 
forest products, small-scale farming, fishing, livestock and non-agricultural 
pursuits such as informal gold mining (Harris, 2008; Brondizio, 2008). A 
number of considerations may affect household decisions regarding the level 
of forest cover to be retained in a given situation. It is not enough to assume 
that offering cash payments will produce the desired effect. Factors might 
include, for example: people’s position in the household life cycle; adaptation 
to specific frontier settlement conditions; accelerating rural-urban (and rural-
rural) migration; and the growing demand for forest products (Moran, 2001; 
Padoch et al., 2008; Browder, 2008). 
Another potential hurdle to be overcome in putting REDD+ into practice 
arises from variable and uncertain conditions of landownership, security of 
tenure and user rights. One of the basic concepts underpinning PES systems 
such as REDD+ is based on the Coasean assumption of clearly defined property 
rights supporting transactions (Coase, 1960; Muradian et al., 2010). However, in 
Latin America, this is very much the exception rather than the rule. Fortunately, 
in REDD+ pioneering countries such as Costa Rica and Mexico, despite some 
continuing problems, structures of individual and collective landownership are 
quite well established. However, in the Brazilian Amazon, for example, just four 
per cent of properties have officially validated legal titles, 21 per cent comprise 
unprotected public lands and over 40 per cent are officially protected areas 
(Brito and Barreto, 2009). Yet it must not be forgotten that land titles are often 
fraudulent or of dubious origin. The standing joke used to be that in many parts 
of the Amazon the fifth floor has already been sold.
In Latin America overall, governments control 43 per cent of forests and 32 
per cent are in private hands while traditional and indigenous communities 
administer 25 per cent, just seven per cent of which is recognised by statutory 
tenure law. A large proportion of forestland is managed by community and 
indigenous groups, reaching 70 per cent in the case of Mexico. In Amazonia 
the figures are: Ecuador and Colombia 65 per cent, Bolivia 26 per cent, Brazil 
22 per cent and Peru 17 per cent (RRI, 2009). Traditional and indigenous 
groups effectively manage a large proportion of forested lands, even if this is 
not always recognised in law. They are likely to become major players in the 
region’s emerging REDD+ strategies and it is critical that their ‘bundles of 
rights’ be recognised. These would include not just formal property rights but 
also customary entitlements relating to resource use. This will have a major 
impact on carbon rights and income-generating potential under REDD+ 
arrangements (Larson et al., 2010). Recognition of local diversity is especially 
relevant in this context.
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In fairness, it should be clarified that legalising indigenous lands and 
incorporating native peoples into the consultation process for REDD+ has 
been afforded a high priority in official preparations funded by the World Bank 
and UN-REDD. This is vital given the long history of conflict over natural 
resources that has resulted in indigenous groups being decimated in the past, 
and the understandable suspicion that currently typifies their negotiations with 
governments throughout the region. Independent observers have criticised 
these governments for failing to properly consult native populations under 
the International Labour Organization’s principles of Free Prior and Informed 
Consent, or FPIC (Griffiths, 2010; Colchester, 2010). In many cases, only 
grassroots pressure from indigenous groups and action by civil society has 
given them a stronger political voice in the REDD+ process. In Peru, Paraguay, 
Ecuador, Guyana and Guatemala, for example, indigenous rights have become 
a significant bone of contention in REDD+ preparations, reflecting historical 
struggles and conflicts. As has been pointed out ad infinitum the challenge of 
dealing with such social complexities, both with regard to traditional forest 
user groups as well as indigenous populations, will require sensitive REDD+ 
solutions (CIFOR, 2010; Hall, 2012).
3) Operational issues
Cutting across this matrix of social and cultural diversity are several basic 
challenges that threaten to undermine REDD+’s effectiveness as a credible 
and viable tool for avoiding deforestation, reducing emissions and enhancing 
carbon stocks. The most infamous of these is the problem of ‘leakage’, in which 
illegal deforestation is simply displaced from a controlled area to one that is 
unprotected or unmonitored (Wunder, 2008). By definition, leakage is almost 
impossible to measure or control, raising serious doubts about the effectiveness 
of REDD+ overall. Enforcing conditionality is a very real practical problem. 
One solution for overcoming the limitations of a results and project-based 
approach to REDD+ is to adopt a regional or area focus, as already noted. 
Such a jurisdictional model would take a macro-view of net deforestation 
achievements within regional or national boundaries, and reward participants 
accordingly, focusing on modifying landscapes rather than individual parcels of 
land. Underpinned by legislative frameworks, by a broader, more coordinated 
planning philosophy, and by appropriate financial incentives, the state 
governments of Acre, Mato Grosso and Amazonas, for example, have moved 
towards adopting a jurisdictional approach in Brazil.
Acre, located in the northwestern Amazon, is the clearest case of such an 
approach being put into practice. Its principles of florestania [forest citizenship] 
have their origins in the rubber tappers movement of the 1980s and 1990s, 
and have been developed by successive forest-friendly state government 
administrations. It is described as, ‘a long-term successful experiment in 
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transformation of the state from an outsider-driven development model 
based on conversion of forest to pasture and agriculture to an endogenous, 
participatory process of development focused on sustainable use and 
valorisation of environmental, economic, social and cultural assets of the local 
populations’ (Schmink et al., 2014, p. 31). Acre’s State System of Incentives 
for Environmental Services became law in 2010 and supports what is now 
considered to be Brazil’s leading subnational REDD+ initiative.
Closely tied to the leakage problem is that of additionality; how to 
establish a causal link between REDD+ schemes, deforestation and emissions 
reductions. How can one be sure that a project or programme has really been 
effective in achieving its stated goals of reducing CO2 emissions? A reliable 
system of monitoring, reporting and verification to assess changes in forest 
cover and carbon stocks would have to be in place, which is a major challenge. 
Changes over time could then be set against a historical baseline to measure 
progress against a ‘business-as-usual’ scenario, and any payments apportioned 
accordingly (Angelsen, 2008). In June 2014, for example, Brazil became the 
first country to submit its national baseline reference level to the UNFCCC 
for REDD+ purposes during the period 2006−10, using an annual average 
emissions figure (calculated for 1996−2005) of 1.1 billions tons of CO2e. 
Besides leakage and additionality, a third major challenge concerns the 
permanence or sustainability of emissions reductions obtained through 
REDD+, given the seemingly inexorable expansion of ecologically unfriendly 
frontier activities such as logging, mining and farming in Brazil and elsewhere. 
It is unlikely that payments to individual farmers will be sufficient to seriously 
discourage deforestation unless PES is incorporated into producers’ broader 
livelihood strategies. A landscape or jurisdictional model that takes a cross-sector, 
holistic approach to containing deforestation is more likely to be successful in 
the long run. This would link decisions about production and preservation 
not just to cash compensation but also to the whole range of economic and 
non-economic incentives and support mechanisms that condition resource 
users’ behaviour, be they small farmers, commercial producers, traditional 
extractivists or indigenous groups.
A major concern in designing and implementing REDD+ initiatives is the 
balance that should be struck between efficiency and equity gains. In order 
to maximise efficiency in emissions reductions the priority should, in theory, 
be to concentrate REDD+ efforts against the main drivers of deforestation 
– agribusiness, livestock and logging interests. However, if achieving equity 
is the main priority in terms of alleviating poverty and strengthening the 
stewardship role of local populations, benefits should be more equally 
distributed, with traditional and community groups obtaining their fair share 
of the pie. Yet it remains to be seen whether distributional justice will prevail 
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in the battle for REDD+ income. The politically powerful are likely to benefit 
disproportionately. As noted by Wunder, ‘Actors who represent credible threats 
to the environment will more likely receive PES than those already living in 
harmony with nature’ (2006, p. 48).
Be that as it may, a critical design and implementation issue in Latin 
America and elsewhere is how to effectively incorporate forest populations 
into the REDD+ process. This is essential to ensure that people’s interests are 
represented, that they are not simply manipulated by outsiders, and that there 
is an equitable system in place for sharing the co-benefits. It should not be 
forgotten that forest dwellers are its principal custodians and their presence and 
commitment on the ground are absolutely fundamental to the functioning of 
REDD+. Most such schemes in Latin America are heavily dependent on the 
successful participation of traditional and indigenous community populations. 
It is therefore essential to take into account REDD+’s social as well as purely 
technical aspects since the latter is heavily dependent upon the former. If project 
designers marginalise or sideline people on the ground it will be a recipe for 
disaster. Indigenous groups in particular, as noted, have used REDD+ debating 
fora to air their historic grievances in several Latin American countries to stand 
up for their rights and demand guarantees in the sharing of co-benefits. More 
generally, the mix of productive groups increasingly involved in emerging 
REDD+ programmes will require a nuanced management approach sensitive 
to their diverse perspectives, motivations and interests.
Incorporating social dimensions into REDD+ projects can take diverse 
forms involving varying degrees of popular participation. These can involve: 
i) basic social protection; ii) imposition of social safeguards; and iii) a more 
comprehensive social development approach (Hall, 2010, chapter 8). Social 
protection is similar to the conditional cash transfer (CCT), borrowed from 
social policy. With CCTs, regular cash payments are made to target households 
in exchange for compliance with conditionalities such as school attendance 
and participation in health and nutrition programmes. In the case of REDD+, 
the preconditions involve meeting conservation goals in exchange for cash 
and in-kind benefits. Brazil’s Bolsa Verde (Green Grant) programme, which 
is administered through the Ministry of Social Development and the Bolsa 
Familia, targets some 73,000 poor families across the country with regular cash 
payments in return for forest conservation (Campello and Neri, 2014).
Going beyond social protection, introducing social safeguards builds upon 
the experience of the World Bank and other multilateral institutions in their 
quest to offset the potentially harmful effects of large infrastructure projects 
such as hydropower and highway construction. The World Bank and UN-
REDD have adapted these ‘do-no-harm’ principles for inclusion in their 
national REDD+ strategy preparations to screen for potential risks. Another 
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independent initiative intended to uphold social and environmental standards 
for REDD+ has been developed by the Climate, Community and Biodiversity 
Alliance and CARE International, which works to tackle widespread poverty 
in the country, and is followed by Brazil’s third sector. These safeguards 
concern issues such as respect for territorial rights, equitable benefit sharing, 
strengthening local livelihoods, maintaining biodiversity, full stakeholder 
participation and compliance with national and international law. 
A more ambitious and comprehensive social development approach will 
involve understanding REDD+’s wider impacts on people’s livelihoods, 
subsequently integrating conservation activities more systematically. This focus 
on livelihoods is being developed by CIFOR, whose multicountry study has 
evaluated the impact of REDD+ over four years to produce results that will 
inform future REDD+ planning (Sunderlin et al., 2014).
Corruption in the distribution of potentially large financial rewards accruing 
to REDD+ beneficiaries is another possible challenge. So far this has been a 
concern in Africa and Asia rather than Latin America, but the writing is on 
the wall. Interpol has warned, for example, that ‘Organized crime syndicates 
are eyeing the nascent rainforest carbon market …[and] … REDD schemes 
are open to wide abuse’ (Vidal, 2009). These include fake carbon credits being 
issued and unwitting communities being tricked into joining schemes without 
proper consultation as a front for generating carbon revenues. As far as can be 
ascertained, the ‘carbon capitalism’ industry with its ‘carbon cowboys’ have not 
yet appeared in Latin America, but this could change rapidly if the REDD+ 
market expands and becomes formalised within the UNFCCC. 
Notwithstanding such concerns, mobilising greater financial support for the 
scaling-up of REDD+ is a major challenge, as described in the first section. 
Yet in spite of this funding deficit, perhaps a more serious issue is the pledge-
implementation gap; that is, the inability of recipient governments taking part 
in the FCPF and UN-REDD programmes to spend their existing resources 
due to a lack of implementation capacity. Major questions have been raised 
over the failure to put into place the institutional structures and technical 
capacity necessary to ensure timely execution of REDD+ (IDEAcarbon, 2011; 
Hall, 2012). Furthermore, many critics have reservations about countries’ 
overdependence on limited foreign funding to push forward the REDD+ 
agenda, raising questions about their genuine political commitment to 
reducing deforestation.
In order to scale-up and consolidate REDD+ policies, whether at the 
global or national level, it is necessary to have legislation in place that will 
regulate carbon markets and facilitate payments for eco-system services. Until 
this happens, it is argued, REDD+ provision will remain limited, piecemeal 
and dependent on voluntary markets and donor funding. Since the rainforest 
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nations’ coalition formally pressed for inclusion of avoided deforestation under 
the UNFCCC umbrella at the Bali COP in 2007, efforts have continued apace 
to bring this about. 
Provisional solutions to boost demand for REDD+ carbon offsets have 
been sought through the international Interim Forest Finance Project, which 
is appealing for enhanced bilateral donor support. Hope is also being placed 
in new regional compliance markets such as that spearheaded by California 
whose cap-and-trade system could stimulate demand for REDD+-based 
offsets for compliance purposes. Agreements have been reached with the states 
of Acre (Brazil) and Chiapas (Mexico) for establishing jurisdictional REDD+ 
schemes, as a consequence of participation in the GCF Task Force. Since 
2009 the GCF has fostered collaboration at the subnational level among 16 
states and provinces in five countries to lobby for REDD+ and raise funding 
(Hall, 2012). In their turn, regional administrations in Brazil, in collaboration 
with prominent NGOs, have formed a strong lobby, placing the federal 
government under pressure to adopt REDD+ as a national priority within 
UNFCCC negotiations (Viana, 2009).
In meeting the challenges posed by REDD+ in Latin America, it seems that 
a decentralised approach has become increasingly critical in order to get results 
on the ground. Individual, local projects have gradually become part of state-
level strategies in what is becoming a nested approach (Hall, 2012). Brazil is the 
clearest example of this process. As stated above, the states of Acre, Amazonas and 
Mato Grosso have all set up regulatory frameworks to facilitate environmental 
service payments. At the same time, as previously noted, the federal government 
was unable to sustain its own national PES scheme (Proambiente). In Brazil, a 
bill (PL792/2007) to establish a federal PES programme (ProPSA) and federal 
PES fund (FunPSA) has been debated in Congress for several years. Another bill 
(PL195/2011) proposes a national REDD+ strategy to regulate existing initiatives. 
Further proposed legislation (PL5586/2009) would create a national system of 
verified emissions reductions to enable financial compensation for those groups 
which actively conserve forests. These initiatives have encountered opposition 
from civil society representatives on the grounds that they do not respect the 
rights of traditional and indigenous groups nor guarantee equal benefit sharing. In 
contrast to Brazil’s slow progress, Costa Rica and Mexico have a long track record 
of introducing national legislation governing forest-based environmental services 
payments. 
Is Latin America ready for REDD+?
It is no coincidence that Latin America has played a leading, if still embryonic, 
role in developing REDD+. There has been a long tradition of forest 
conservation by indigenous and other traditional populations in the face of 
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growing pressures on natural resources. Much of the effort that has gone into 
establishing REDD+ on the continent has emerged from local and regional 
initiatives that are now being built upon. In this general sense it could be 
said to contain a significant element of bottom-up pressure. On the face of it, 
REDD+ seems like a win-win solution to the problem of forest destruction. 
By coupling traditions of conservation with monetary and other incentives, it 
promises to channel official funding to preserve natural resources rather than 
degrade them in the name of progress.
However, as suggested above, many challenges threaten to undermine this 
promise. Questions have been raised over one of the fundamental premises 
underpinning REDD+; namely, the potential of cash transfers to modify 
behaviour patterns in favour of conservation. In complex societies with 
traditional cultures and belief systems, it is often unclear whether monetary 
incentives are as effective as is often assumed by policymakers serving 
neoliberal agendas. The dangers inherent in stimulating carbon capitalism 
and associated corrupt practices will also be ever-present. In addition to the 
problem of engineering behavioural change, there are many basic problems for 
REDD+ in terms of carbon leakage, additionality and sustainability. Putting 
in place appropriate institutional structures to oversee REDD+ policies and 
building appropriate capacity are other formidable challenges. Alongside 
these issues are the possible dangers faced by forest-based communities whose 
existing statutory and/or customary entitlements may be threatened by new 
property rights to carbon unless proper safeguards are included in REDD+ 
arrangements (RRI, 2014; Hall, 2012). Undue delays in establishing global 
(that is, UNFCCC) and national legislative frameworks will only increase these 
risks and uncertainties, undermining REDD+’s longer-term credibility
National REDD+ strategy proposals drawn up with support from the World 
Bank’s FCPF and UN-REDD programme invariably come packaged with the 
observation that, while REDD+ constitutes a useful mitigation tool, national 
governments must also address the main deforestation drivers (Hall, 2012). 
Unless this challenge is tackled, it is argued, REDD+ will come to nothing 
if any climate benefits are cancelled out by the loss of forests due to logging, 
agribusiness, mining and resettlement. 
Yet although in most cases this precondition has tended to be dismissed as 
‘pie-in-the-sky’ wishful thinking, in the case of Brazilian Amazonia it could 
be argued it has become something of a reality. Official figures reveal that 
deforestation was reduced in the region by no less than 79 per cent between 
2004 and 2013, cutting carbon emissions by 650 million tons a year. This has 
given rise to optimistic projections that the historically high rate of tropical 
forest loss has at last been brought under control. 
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The government attributes this turnaround to its action plan for 
prevention and control of deforestation in the Amazon, which has brought 
international accolades. This plan included several sanctions, including 
enforcing environmental laws in municipalities where deforestation has been 
concentrated. This has been coupled with prosecutions against companies 
that buy products such as timber and soya derived from illegally deforested 
areas, and agreements with suppliers in the beef and soy supply chains 
to pursue sustainable practices that are certifiable (Nepstad et al., 2014; 
Boucher et al., 2013). 
More sceptical observers attribute the fall in deforestation to declining 
commodity prices from 2004 to 2008, as well as the subsequent global economic 
crisis and a drastic devaluation of the Brazilian real (Fearnside, 2014). In 
particular, the suspension of highly subsidised government agricultural credit 
to properties with pending fines to environmental authorities is reckoned to 
have had a major impact in this respect. A large reduction in availability of 
rural credit for cattle ranching from 2008−11, for example, is estimated to have 
saved 2,700 km2 of Amazon forest from destruction over that period, when 
deforestation was running at five to seven thousand square kilometres a year 
(Assunção et al., 2013). 
From 2012−13 the rate of Amazon forest loss has increased by 28 per 
cent due to land speculation and the advancing cattle/soy frontier, the 
effects of infrastructure projects built without environmental safeguards, the 
spread of agrarian reform projects, a reduction in the creation of protected 
areas and perceived weaknesses in Brazil’s revised Forest Code, approved in 
2012, that some argue significantly reduces protection (IPAM, 2014). There 
are thus doubts emerging over whether Brazil’s apparent success at reducing 
deforestation is sustainable in the long run. It therefore also remains to be seen 
whether in Brazil’s case this apparently more favourable context, if durable, 
will facilitate the scaling-up of REDD+ activities by reducing wider pressures 
on Amazonian forests. Furthermore, based on Amazonia’s experience in 
respect of the close relationship between the availability of subsidised financial 
resources and deforestation, payment systems for environmental services need 
to be carefully designed to help prevent inappropriate use. It would be ironic 
indeed if PES channelled through REDD+ aimed at conservation were to have 
the opposite effect.
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7. Nature, space, identity and resource 
extraction: paradoxes of discourses around 
indigeneity and environment in Bolivia1 
Katinka Weber
Contemporary discourses of indigenous environmentalism in Bolivia are explored in this chapter. How may such discourses operate to mask indigenous voices and realities, and undermine sovereignty claims? 
Familiar discourses that portray native peoples as ‘closer to nature’, or as its 
guardians have a long colonial history (Wade, 2004). A more recent version 
centres on the idea that ‘indigenous environmental knowledge and traditional 
resource management practices could be harnessed towards the achievement of 
conservation goals’ (Anthias and Radcliffe, 2013, p. 4). Such a view has become 
influential among environmental movements and international development 
institutions since the 1980s (ibid.; Conklin and Graham, 1995).2 Redford has 
labelled this image ‘the Ecologically Noble Savage’ (1991). In contemporary 
Bolivia such discourses operate on multiple scales and are perpetuated by non-
governmental actors as well as the government. This chapter considers their 
workings in the context of one local indigenous territorial governance project 
in the eastern Bolivian municipality of Concepción, where I conducted 11 
months of fieldwork in 2006−7, and during the Bolivian winter of 2012. 
At the time of my first research visit the Chiquitano organisation of 
Concepción was involved in developing guidelines on the use of natural 
resources for the Tierra Comunitaria de Origen (Communal Land of Origin, 
TCO) Monte Verde.3 It also carried out research into existing governance 
structures among communities to develop an outline for a future territorial 
governance system (Proyecto Gobernanza). Together with colleagues from a 
Bolivian non-governmental organisation (NGO), I assisted on the project. 
Most Chiquitano leaders and their NGO allies regarded these activities 
as crucial steps in their struggle to consolidate their TCO. Yet the process 
1 I am grateful to the Economic and Social Research Council and the Society for Latin 
American Studies for supporting the research this chapter is based on. I would also like to 
thank P. Anthias, S. Radcliffe and the editors for their helpful comments on earlier versions.
2 Also see Radcliffe, chapter 8.
3 Renamed Territorios Indígena Originario Campesinos (TIOC) in the 2009 Constitution.
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involved constant negotiations, pressures and conditions regarding how 
Chiquitano could live in and administer their territories and engage with 
their environment. These emanated from existing legal frameworks as well 
as discourses and the programmes of non-governmental allies which worked, 
unintentionally in some cases, to undermine indigenous peoples’ sovereignty 
over their life spaces. Discourses around indigenous peoples’ capacities to 
manage territories sustainably and concerning ‘ecologically noble’ tropes often 
play powerful roles in the struggles surrounding indigenous territories, and the 
articulation of political and cultural projects. They also draw attention to the 
ways in which indigenous peoples’ liveways are entangled with the environment. 
But while Chiquitano discourses on their territory and practices, in relation to 
land and resources, partly resonate with the ‘eco-native’ trope, their visions for 
development and their future also disrupt it. It fails to articulate more complex 
notions of environment, socio-natures,4 ignoring their knowledges and 
lived realities. 
The case of Monte Verde resonates with many others in Latin America 
and beyond, where governments have granted territorial rights to indigenous 
groups, but where the effective exercise of territorial sovereignty is closely 
intertwined with environmental governance technologies (compare Agrawal, 
2005), subject to constant negotiations with diverse (non)-governmental 
actors and regulatory frameworks (for example, Erazo, 2013; Hale, 2011). 
This normally takes place in societies where indigenous peoples are struggling 
against a typically neoliberal, prejudiced policy environment and for their 
rights to be amplified. Territorial rights or environmental management 
responsibilities are granted, often in line with state decentralisation agendas 
and multicultural policies. Bolivia, however, is experiencing what some have 
called a ‘post-neoliberal’ moment under Evo Morales (2006– ), and the 
Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement towards Socialism – MAS). Drawing 
on an extensive indigenous discourse and imagery, they follow a programme 
that purports to be anti-globalisation, anti-neoliberal and anti-privatisation. 
The government oversaw wide-ranging constitutional reform (ratified in 2009) 
which significantly extended indigenous peoples’ rights. With respect to global 
and domestic environmental issues, the Morales administration proposes that 
wisdom and leadership can be provided by indigenous cultures and movements.
Although this strategy appeared to set the tone for a possible paradigm 
shift in human−environment and indigenous−state relations, critics highlight 
the contradiction between the MAS project’s simultaneous reliance on 
developmentalist practice and neoextractivist development (Gudynas, 2009). 
In fact, the MAS project ‘reifies understandings of progress based on the 
colonial domination of nature’ in a way that ‘negates alternative understandings 
4 Compare Radcliffe, chapter 8.
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of territoriality, governance and development postulated by many indigenous 
peoples’ (Laing, 2015, p. 149). Like other territorial or environmental 
governance regimes, it thus has the potential to undermine regional and local 
indigenous peoples’ territorial projects and alternative lifeways. 
Governmental discourses around indigeneity 
and the environment
As has been well documented, President Morales frames his national political 
project – as well as his political discourse – around environmental issues by 
drawing on notions of indigeneity (Albro, 2005; Canessa, 2006, 2012). The 
Morales administration’s view of indigeneity and the environment are clearly 
emphasised in its rhetoric on climate justice. Bolivia emerged as a vocal 
champion of the climate justice movement during the international climate 
change conference in Copenhagen in 2009, and when staging the World 
People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth 
outside the city of Cochabamba in April the following year in response to the 
Copenhagen conference’s failure to achieve any binding agreements (Fabricant 
and Hicks, 2013, pp. 8−9; Laing, 2015). Morales criticises ‘so-called developed’ 
countries’ lack of commitment regarding reducing greenhouse gases, pushes for 
radical international climate change policies to be adopted, and demands that 
the rights of Mother Earth be respected (Fabricant and Hicks, 2013; Postero, 
2013). He has condemned capitalism as ‘the worst enemy of humanity’ and 
proposed ‘a sustainable model of development based on indigenous values’ 
as a viable counter-project (Postero, 2013). Indigenous peoples are portrayed 
as the ‘moral guardians of the nation state, best able to defend its natural 
resources’ (Canessa, 2012, p. 13). Demonstrating its domestic commitment 
to environmental issues, the administration passed the Law of the Rights of 
Mother Earth in 2010. Moreover, the new Bolivian Constitution contains the 
notion of vivir bien [to live well] – not the western consumerist notion of a 
‘better life’ that Morales associates with egoism, individualism and resource 
depletion, but ‘living well’ and not at the expense of others, or the environment 
(Canessa, 2012, p. 14).5 
Morales initially adopted an inclusive indigenous political rhetoric around 
2002. This was aimed at a popular base by aligning indigenous issues with 
an anti-globalisation agenda, attacking neoliberal and privatisation discourses. 
In international terms, this rhetoric allowed for alliances with global support 
networks and NGO allies. Domestically, Morales’ programme reflects the fact 
that his party rose to power in the early 2000s on a wave of disenchantment 
5 There is insufficient space here to explore this notion further. See Radcliffe, chapter 8, and 
Coletta and Raftopoulos, chapter 1, for details on the buen vivir concept and its inclusion in 
the Bolivian and Ecuadorian constitutions. 
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with the neoliberal reforms of the mid 1980s, as well as with the multicultural 
reforms of the 1990s that were meant to offset the negative impact of the previous 
phase (Albro, 2005, 2009; Canessa, 2006, 2012). The latter reforms sought to 
address demands for more inclusive citizenship and declared Bolivia to be a 
multicultural, pluriethnic nation, and enshrined the rights of indigenous people 
in Bolivian law. This was accompanied by decentralisation measures aimed at 
expanding citizen participation and municipal-level oversight (Gustafson, 2009; 
Postero, 2007). Crucially, for many lowland indigenous groups the reforms 
fulfilled some of their key political demands. The Bolivian government passed 
the Ley del Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria (National Service of Agrarian 
Reform Law) in 1996, which is generally referred to as Ley INRA or INRA 
Law. This legislated for indigenous groups to have the chance to gain titles to 
TCOs, guaranteeing their rights to the ‘sustainable use and exploitation of the 
renewable natural resources’.6 However, successive governments continued to 
adhere to the neoliberal paradigm, while opportunities for real participation 
and oversight remained elusive and many indigenous land claims remained 
unfulfilled for decades. Capitalising on widespread political disenchantment, 
expressed in successive social mobilisations from early 2000, Morales promised 
to rewrite the constitution, expand indigenous rights, and take natural resources 
out of private hands (Postero, 2007; 2013, pp. 85−7).
However, Bolivian and international voices have highlighted discrepancies 
in this national indigenous project and the government’s environmental 
discourse. For one, the Morales administration continues to depend on 
extractive industries; its main source of income is dependent on hydrocarbons 
(gas above all). Associated with this are environmentally damaging practices, 
underlined through the hundreds of operational mines across the country 
exploiting, among other things, silver, lead, tin and iron (Bebbington, 2009; 
Kohl and Farthing, 2012; Postero, 2013).7 A familiar Latin American story 
(generally more associated with governments following neoliberal economic 
agendas) involves the groups who oppose the damaging effects of these 
practices, or who oppose government plans, being accused of obstructing 
the nation’s development (Bebbington, 2009, p. 19; Postero, 2013, p. 86). 
This is epitomised by the ongoing controversies surrounding the Territorio 
Indígena Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure (Isiboro Secure National Park and 
Indigenous Territory − TIPNIS). The government’s developmentalist agenda, 
expressed in a road building project and seemingly linked interests involved in 
oil and gas exploration, clashes with that of lowland indigenous peoples. The 
6 Art 3.III of the Agrarian Reform Law 1751.
7 Other contradictions have also surfaced in the pluricultural state. For instance, the 
administration has been accused of a lack of political will in relation to implementing 
autonomies, has infiltrated social movements and sidelined political opponents. See 
Tockman and Cameron (2014).
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latter fear adverse environmental effects, the spread of extractive industries, 
disruption to liveways and the accelerated influx of highland coca farmers (who 
incidentally form part of the MAS political base) (Achtenberg, 2013; Canessa, 
2012; Gudynas, 2010; Laing, 2015; McNeish, 2013). For other lowland 
organisations, the TIPNIS case represents the threat that lowland indigenous 
peoples face everywhere due to ‘careless planning of other infrastructure projects, 
extractive and development projects nationally’ (McNeish, 2013, p. 226).
The MAS discourse of environmental indigenism is powerful in that it 
captures the imagination of diverse actors in global climate change debates, 
and allows for political visions around decolonisation to be articulated, the 
expansion of indigenous rights and an alternative development model (vivir 
bien).8 However, the reductive imagery clashes with the complex political and 
economic realities faced by the administration, as well as its diverse indigenous 
population. After all, as Nancy Postero remarks, the Morales administration 
faces ‘the same dilemma everyone else is: how to develop and live well, how to 
find a path to sustainable industrialisation and to share the benefits and burdens 
fair and justly’ (2013, p. 88).9 Many indigenous and non-indigenous Bolivian 
citizens are in fact on the receiving end of policies and social schemes funded 
through neoextractivism (Bebbington, 2009, pp. 15−16; Postero, 2013, p. 82).
The environmentalist indigenous discourse around the protection of 
Mother Earth also clashes with another aspect of MAS policy and rhetoric. 
Although anti-capitalist in nature and criticising the activities of latifundistas 
[large landowners], multinational corporations and enterprises of the 
traditionally white economic elite, the MAS programme is not anti-market. 
It is about equal access to markets and resources, that is, resources should be 
used for the ‘good of the people’ (Canessa, 2012, p. 30). Land needs to have 
some kind of (economic) functionality. This notion resonates with the legal 
framework of the 1953 Bolivian Agrarian Reform which was about formalising 
or legally recognising land ownership, as well as (theoretically) engaging with 
the breaking up of latifundios [landholdings]. The land’s ‘economic and social 
function’ became important, that is, it had to be ‘used’, or ‘worked’ (Anthias, 
2014; Assies, 2006), otherwise it would be deemed as ‘empty’ and ‘available’. 
This clashes, however, with the 1996 INRA, which aimed to overcome the 
reductive concept of ‘economic function’, partly to guarantee that large areas 
could be titled, by stipulating that TCOs ‘fulfil a social function when they 
are destined to achieve family wellbeing or the economic development of their 
owners’ (INRA Law, Art. 2.I). ‘Socio-cultural’ aspects are thus introduced 
8 See Radcliffe, chapter 8, for a comparison with Ecuador.
9 In order to reconcile these notions, Vice-President García Linera has formulated a ‘less 
radical’ notion of ‘vivir bien’, one that reconciles nature protection with development 
activities intended to secure the population’s basic social provisions. See Laing (2015,  
p. 157). 
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(Anthias, 2014).Worryingly for peoples who hold titles to TCOs, government 
spokespeople and the president himself nevertheless question their lands’ 
function on the grounds of a lack of productivity, referring to them as the 
new latifundios while proposing to review their borders. During a public 
meeting in 2011, Roberto Coraite, executive secretary of the Confederación 
Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesionos (Unified Syndical Confederation 
of Rural Workers of Bolivia − CSUTCB) proposed to replace the ‘obsolete’ 
and ‘discriminatory’ INRA Law, as it ‘favoured small (indigenous) groups who 
maintain immense expanses while the majority of campesinos [live on] tiny 
amounts of land’ (Bolpress, 2011). 
Spokespeople not only replicated the longstanding colonial discourse in 
which lands inhabited by indigenous peoples are deemed to be ‘unoccupied’, 
but also insinuate that (lowland) indigenous peoples do not know how to 
work it properly (Canessa, 2012, p. 26). As is exemplified not least by the 
TIPNIS conflict, the Morales’ national indigenous project which celebrates 
an ‘ecumenical indigeneity’ (drawing on Aymara rituals and symbols), has the 
capacity to undermine the autonomy of those whose ways of living do not fit 
with the governmental agenda (ibid., p. 30). This heightens the potential for 
conflict, especially where territories or communal lands happen to encompass 
areas of economic interest (Bebbington, 2009; McNeish, 2013). As will be 
discussed below, notions of the ecologically noble savage and a simultaneous 
focus on the ‘use’ of land and natural resources is shared by actors beyond 
the government, in ways that can work to undermine indigenous territorial 
sovereignty by placing conditions on how indigenous peoples can live in and 
administer their territories, as well as engage with their environments. 
The struggle for Monte Verde
Concepción, originally founded as a Jesuit mission, lies some 290 kilometres 
to the northeast of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, the Santa Cruz department’s 
capital. From the 1690s Jesuit priests worked to evangelise and integrate 
individuals from different native groups into the settlements, thereby sparking 
an ethnogenesis which led to the emergence of a shared ‘Chiquitano’ identity, 
cultural practices and language (Krekeler, 1993, p. 27; Schwarz, 1994, pp. 
33−4, 36).10 Since 1767, the year of the Jesuits’ expulsion from Latin America, 
Chiquitanos had gradually lost their land to Cruceño settlers who took over 
mission land, expanded their cattle ranching and agricultural activities, and 
exploited Chiquitano labour. Chiquitanos generally abandoned the ex-missions 
10 To establish clear linguistic and ethnic affiliations for the groups that later became known 
as Chiquitano is difficult. Authors refer to as many as 50 different groups. See also Krekeler 
(1993, p. 26) and Métreux (1948). In terms of linguistic affiliation most authors cite 
arawak, chiquitano and chapakura. See Lacroix (2004, p. 14).
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and established themselves in dispersed settlements, many of which became 
tied to agrarian and cattle ranching properties via an empatronamiento system 
[forced labour or debt-servitude]. The rubber boom that started in 1880, the 
Chaco war (1930s) and the building of the Corumbá Railway (mid 1940s 
to 1950s) accelerated both the Chiquitanos’ displacement from their lands 
and their exploitation as a labour force (Lema, 2009; Riester, 1976, p. 134; 
Vallvé, 2010). As in other lowland areas, through the 1953 Agrarian Reform 
landowners generally managed to consolidate and expand their property. 
This led to further Chiquitano loss of access to land, resources and hunting 
opportunities (Urioste and Kay, 2005).11 These processes accelerated further 
from the 1960s, as government-fostered development programmes, cattle 
ranching, logging operations, mining and oil exploration expanded (Radding, 
2005; Schwarz, 1994, pp. 43−4).
Today, approximately 65 per cent of the population aged over 15 years 
from the ca. 20,000 inhabitants of the Concepción municipality identify 
as ‘originario Chiquitano’ (Gobierno Municipal de Concepción, 2007; 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2001). The majority of Chiquitano live in 
approximately 50 rural ‘indigenous communities’ affiliated to the Central 
Indígena de Comunidades de Concepción (Indigenous Organisation of 
Communities of Concepción − CICC), but they also make up the majority 
of the inhabitants of Concepción town. Comunidades [communities] are 
located at varying distances from Concepción, from 20-minute walks to six-
hour pick-up drives. Most comunidades have a population of between 150 and 
300 inhabitants (the smallest around 50 and the largest 500), but many are 
steadily growing (Gobierno Municipal de Concepción, 2007, pp. 3−4, 49−51). 
Chiquitano people plant staples such as rice, yucca, maize, beans and plantain 
and, where possible, collect forest fruits and practise hunting and fishing. 
Comunarios [people who live in or are from a comunidad] largely produce 
food for their own consumption but may also generate cash by selling their 
produce to merchants or in the market to purchase items they do not produce 
themselves, such as sugar, salt and coffee. Money is also needed to improve the 
communal infrastructure, to send children to college in Concepción or to pay 
hospital bills. Some comunidades engage in communal productive projects, 
often in animal husbandry. Most of them are tightly enclosed by cattle ranches, 
agricultural estates or church-owned land. This means that expansion into 
adjacent areas, which may be necessary due to population growth, droughts or 
crop failures, is impossible.
11 However, when patrons occupied more favourable areas, new communities could emerge 
in remoter areas. See Schwarz (1994, p. 43). In some notable cases Chiquitano managed to 
form agrarian syndicates and started proceedings to gain land titles, or benevolent priests or 
patrons helped in the process. See Riester (1976) and Schwarz (1994).
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The area that Chiquitano call ‘Monte Verde’ stretches over a million hectares 
– mainly rainforest – situated in the Concepción and San Javier municipalities 
and Guarayos province (Tamburini, 1999, 2006). Chiquitano made a first 
attempt to create settlements in the area in the 1970s to alleviate food and 
resources shortages. After limited success, new attempts at settlement were 
made after the CICC had been founded in Concepción in the mid 1980s. By 
the 1990s, Chiquitano started claiming territorial titles. This was a response to 
the 1990 march of lowland indigenous movements (the March for Territory 
and Dignity) which resulted in the ratification of the 1991 ILO Convention 
169 and the inclusion of the term ‘indigenous territory’ in official documents 
(Jones, 1990, p. 5). Owing to sustained pressure from indigenous movements, 
in 1996 the Bolivian government passed the INRA Law, which defined TCOs 
as communal property covering lands:
that constitute the habitat of the indigenous and originary peoples and 
communities to which they have had access traditionally and where they 
maintain and develop their own forms of economic, social and cultural 
organisation in a way that secures their survival and development. They 
are inalienable, indivisible, irreversible, collective . . . indefeasible and 
imprescriptible;12
In light of these developments, the Chiquitano organisation of Concepción, 
San Javier and Lomerío presented a joint claim to the Bolivian presidency 
in 1995 for recognising the TCO Monte Verde as an indigenous territory 
(Tamburini, 1999; 2006). In the process, Chiquitano leaders consciously 
highlighted the organisation’s and local Chiquitano population’s indigeneity, 
their ancestral connections with the land, distinctive language, culture and 
communal organisational forms (Weber, 2013a). 
Due to the historical displacement of Chiquitano peoples, the case somewhat 
disrupts assumptions about indigenous peoples’ (historical) close connection to 
ancestral lands. This did not cause problems in the INRA process, however. The 
justifications for the Chiquitano land claim drew on ethno-historical accounts 
of the different groups living in the region pre-conquest, their settlement 
patterns and nomadic lifestyles, as well as the history of displacement. While 
‘traditional’ occupations were taken into consideration in conducting the 
Estudio de Necesidades Espaciales (Study of Spatial Necessities) as part of the 
INRA process to calculate the surface area to be titled in the claimants’ favour, 
emphasis was placed on meeting socio-economic subsistence needs. The size 
of an area to be titled was ascertained through a complicated calculation that 
translated activities such as hunting, fishing and animal husbandry into a 
monetary equivalent, combining this with projected population growth over 
12 Art. 41.I.5 of the Agrarian Reform Law 1751.
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the next 50 years. In the Chiquitano case, this resulted in a substantial initial 
claim of 1,082,334 hectares.13
Nevertheless, as was the case with other TCOs, the titling process entailed 
a decade-long juridical battle as the INRA procedure involved formalising 
ownership and recognising existing landholding patterns. Private settlements 
within TCOs or overlapping with them − that is, terceros [third parties] − were 
given priority if legal ownership could be proven. Properties also need to fulfil 
the ‘economic and social function’ (Bolivian Constitution, Art. 169 and the 
INRA Law, Art. 2) or, in this context, ‘agrarian use’. Hectares consequently 
‘missing’ from the land to be titled in favour of indigenous claimants would be 
compensated in unoccupied areas adjacent to the TCO (Anthias, 2014; Anthias 
and Radcliffe, 2013, p. 8; Balza Alarcón, 2001, pp. 51−3; Tamburini, 2006, p. 
251).14 In the case of the Monte Verde, private claims were raised by politically 
well-connected landowners, loggers and cattle ranchers from Concepción and 
beyond. Like other TCO titling processes, this was accompanied by corruption, 
violent confrontations with counter-claimants and threats against Chiquitano 
leaders and NGO allies.15 Moreover, terceros scaled up land takeovers and 
logging activities to stake out property claims. Despite such obstacles, in 2006 
the organisations consolidated 88 per cent of their original land claim (CGTI-
MV et al., 2006, pp. 6−8), and in July 2007 Morales granted them their legal 
title for the TCO. 
Chiquitano notions of Monte Verde, 
land and resource use
Chiquitano themselves have attached partially overlapping visions to the space 
of Monte Verde. Historical memory of land loss, enslavement and labour drafts, 
combined with the land claim’s more recent and conflictive nature, were reflected 
in 2006−7 when many comunarios from Monte Verde claimant communities 
displayed a sense of struggle and standing up for themselves; territory was 
often mentioned in the same sentence as lucha [fight]. Simultaneously, many 
regarded the area as safe. In this context some noted that their ancestors moved 
through the space on the old rubber path to the gomales [rubber areas] in the 
Beni. Although many died on the way, others managed to flee to the forest, 
using it as a space of refuge. The Chiquitano to whom I spoke stressed that by 
13 For an analysis of the contradictions in these aspects of the studies see Anthias (2014) and 
Balza Alarcón (2001). 
14 Problematically, some of the resulting territories were discontinuous and fragmented, and 
spaces that groups relied on for hunting often remained outside the titled area. Compensation 
areas were often hard to access or unsuitable. See Anthias and Radcliffe (2013); Balza Alarcón 
(2001, pp. 53−4).
15 Compare Anthias (2014) and Anthias and Radcliffe (2013, p. 8). 
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having the territorial title one could ‘live happily’ and ‘tranquilo’ [peacefully] 
hunt, fish, collect forest fruits, plant the chacos [fields] and sustain one’s family. 
Several actually called it a ‘reserve for future generations’, some called it ‘nuestra 
madre’ [our mother] or ‘nuestra casa grande’ [our big house]. 
By having access to the land, Chiquitano could also escape exploitative 
labour relations. As noted previously, some comunarios regularly engage in 
agricultural work or seek employment in Concepción if they need cash, but 
shortage of land and natural resources may actually force Chiquitano to engage 
in such work. For many of them the prospect of working on the surrounding 
agrarian properties was a ‘sore point’ as they or their parents might have been 
tied into empatronamiento relations on these properties; the more exploitative 
version of the system continued well into the 1980s. As a Chiquitano leader 
explained the situation: 
between the CICC, the CIDOB [La Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas 
de Bolivia] and the CPESC [Coordinadora de Pueblos Étnicos de Santa 
Cruz] then, they thought about claiming a territory, why? Because 
they have seen the need of the comunidades. Because there are some 
comunidades that are around Concepción and they have no land any 
more. And the families multiply, multiply themselves . . . afterwards we 
will not have land anywhere. The businessmen will take over the lands, and 
we will be left with this very small space. [Then] we are going to depend 
[on them] again, even though we have a comunidad.16 
Somewhat nostalgically, others noted that by gaining access to the territory 
one could live like los de antes [the ancestors], or los padres [parents] and allow 
future generations to do the same. Given the history of forced labour in 
the region, this is more likely to demonstrate that Chiquitano associate the 
territory with socio-cultural reproduction, a relational space where Chiquitano 
comunario social and cultural beings could continue to exist. This is also 
evident in the explanation a Chiquitano leader gave for claiming the territory: 
‘we want to have our own territory to develop our own culture and … life of 
the Chiquitano people’.17 
Notably, what Chiquitano leaders and comunarios generally associated with 
their cultural distinctiveness, apart from having their own language, beliefs, 
customs, dress and so on, was ‘working to survive’, ‘working the land’ and 
‘working with people’ in a way that differs from non-Chiquitano, such as 
local whites, mestizos or immigrants. In the words of Chiquitano leader 
Carlos Leigue: 
[The highland immigrants] are not similar to one, the Chiquitano, right? 
The Chiquitano works to maintain his family, but he is not a trader. The 
Chiquitano does not work an amount to be able to sell. ... In contrast 
16 Interview, Concepción, 26 Oct. 2006.
17 Interview, Concepción, 26 Oct. 2006.
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the one who has come from the interior [here: the highland or valley 
region] ... they work their fields in great quantity but it is for business, it is 
different.18
Chiquitano land and resource use is restricted by certain norms which stipulate 
the amount of hectares or location where a comunario or family could plant 
or fell. Decisions in relation to commercial activities need to be agreed upon 
in a communal assembly. To illustrate how transgressions may be handled, a 
brief transcript is given here of a socio-drama, organised as part of the Proyecto 
Gobernanza in the small comunidad Las Abras in San Javier municipality. 
According to the plot, a comunario and his foreign wife (played by myself ) had 
been extracting wood from the communal land and were selling substantial 
quantities to Bolivian and international enterprises. One comunario opined 
with regards to the punishment: 
… well, the comunarios have already said that one cannot clear more 
than five hectares, we just have to make [them] comply to the rules, and 
if he does not want to, well that he goes to another place, and we will not 
permit that he breaks the laws of the comunidad, well, and if he wants 
to help, that he puts the money for the sanitary post, and that he works 
like we all work … because the one who is Chiquitano has to think like a 
Chiquitano and act like a Chiquitano.19
Another comunario added that his neighbour was ‘appearing in the 
comunidad as if he were a tercero’. As one Chiquitano leader explained to me, 
treating land and forest ‘like the terceros’, caused resource depletion; where 
they operated ‘there is nowhere [left], all is plantations, thus, the land is not 
looked after.’20 When large estates farm for commercial purposes or graze cattle, 
the land is cleared for all but a few for shade trees and consequently tends to be 
dry. Sanctions can be applied to those who pollute water sources or transgress 
hunting norms. Depending on the comunidad, sanctions ranged from verbal 
warnings, compensation fines, communal work to physical punishment and or 
expulsion from the comunidad. 
From 2004, Monte Verde’s claimant organisations worked on developing 
a normative framework for the use of natural resources while drawing on 
existing practices. The results were shared with communities via their leaders 
or workshops and, in 2006, in booklet form. For some comunidades this 
led to a formalisation of land-use regulation and sanctions, while others had 
already specified a set of rules. Such forms of formal or informal regulation, 
especially in comunidades outside the TCO, are clearly linked to resource and 
land scarcity and aimed at undermining practices that potentially prejudice 
18 Interview, Concepción, 26 Oct. 2006.
19 Socio-drama, Las Abras, 17 April 2007.
20 Interview, San Javier, 8 June 2006.
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the community. But Chiquitano attitudes to land, nature and resources are 
also linked to their cosmovision and beliefs, expressed in myths and cuentos 
[tales] where such figures as jichis and duendes [dwarves] hold moral sway 
(Radding, 2005, p. 238). The jichi lives mostly in water holes and possesses 
the power to control the force of nature and is therefore often referred to as 
the ‘owner of the forest’, or the ‘owner of the animals’. He often appears to 
Chiquitano comunarios in the form of a snake, but also as a frog or a human. 
Jichis appearances are often associated with human activity in the environment, 
which may have potentially damaging effects on the beings living there (that is, 
it appears to those who overhunt or overfish, fell trees, pollute water holes or 
hunt gestating animals) and its retaliations may even be fatal.21 While the topic 
of how Chiquitano perceive their environment, land and resources deserves 
a more in-depth exploration, this short discussion highlights that claimants 
associate the land with visions for the continuity of Chiquitano ways of living 
which may fit into the eco-native image, but as will be discussed below, other 
Chiquitano visons disrupt notions held by (non) governmental actors. 
Territorial management, indigeneity 
and the environment
The interest in indigenous territories from international and national NGOs and 
their funders, stems from contemporary discourses around environmentalism 
and nature, as well as popular portrayals of Amazonian and other tropical 
forest areas as ‘the lungs of the earth’ and crucial ‘last reserves’. They are a 
‘hot topic’ in the light of campaigns that focus on climate change mitigation 
and biodiversity protection. Anthias and Radcliffe note that the TCO-titling 
process in Bolivia can be seen as an example of an ‘ethno-environmental fix’, 
which sought to ‘synergise protection of vulnerable populations and highly-
valued natures from the destructive effects of markets’ against the background 
of the 1990s’ otherwise-neoliberal governance approaches (2013, p. 1). This 
was partly a response to the academic and policy critiques of the 1980s and 
1990s that were picked up by institutions like the UN and World Bank, which 
highlighted the links between the protection of biodiversity and indigenous 
peoples (ibid., p. 4). As such, environmental protection and indigenous 
development were seen as compatible, and ‘land rights were justified as a 
prerequisite for realising indigenous peoples’ potential as natural resource 
managers’ (ibid., p. 5). Anthias and Radcliffe further argue that this has resulted 
in the creation of ‘hybrid, “not-quite-neoliberal” and double-edged spaces … 
in which traditional livelihoods activities coexist with various forms of market 
21 For more information on Chiquitano belief systems, see Riester (1976, p. 142), Freyer 
(1997, p. 96) and Balza Alarcón (2001), pp. 256−82. 
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engagement’ (ibid., p.11). What is clear is that land rights are not given simply 
because these lands can serve (and be protected as) ‘relational spaces’ where 
socio-cultural relations can be reproduced (García Hierro and Surrallés, 2005, 
pp. 10−11). Instead, functionality is attached to the space; territorial rights are 
granted because these lands need to be protected or managed in some way and 
native peoples are deemed to be ‘natural conservationists’. As discussed below, 
economic functionality is key, even when accompanying environmentalist 
ideas of ‘sustainability’ whereby lowland peoples can serve as ‘guardians of the 
forest’. This rhetoric may undermine indigenous peoples’ sovereignty over the 
spaces in which they live, and ignore their knowledges and lived realities. 
One example demonstrating how this might work is the meeting that 
was held Concepción in late February 2007 between the leader of the city’s 
Chiquitano Organisation and employees from a large, globally-active NGO 
focusing mainly on wildlife conservation. The NGO planned to implement 
a sustainable communal forestry project funded by the European Union in 
the TCO. According to the NGO spokesperson, the Chiquitano were chosen 
for the project as they knew how to live in harmony with the forest and could 
protect it. However, he added that they still needed to be taught one or two 
things about logging, as their own techniques damaged the forest and lowered 
the quality of the wood. Sensing some resistance to the project’s premises, he 
asserted: ‘TCOs are large areas, how can you justify them? [Through] forestry 
management, selling oxygen, conservation of the biodiversity and even tourism, 
thereby one can develop many projects to preserve this territory’.22 The colonial 
logic that areas inhabited by lowland indigenous peoples are ‘empty spaces’ 
whose occupation must be ‘justified’ is clearly one shared by a wider set of 
non-governmental actors. Merely living on the land is clearly not enough, so 
NGOs step in ‘to provide opportunities’ for (or threaten people into adopting) 
market-based conservation initiatives, which will ‘help’ indigenous groups in 
asserting that they have a right to reside on the land, or deserve formal titles 
to it. Indigenous knowledges have to be improved upon, as they are deficient. 
This exemplifies how the environmental discourse can function to undermine 
indigenous territorial sovereignty by placing conditions on what kinds of 
development indigenous peoples can engage in. The outcome of the meeting 
was inconclusive. However, in a move that clearly undermined the authority of 
the Chiquitano organisation, NGO workers had already approached separate 
comunidades about the project, making it likely that they would deal with 
them if the organisation refused.
The discourses of NGOs and governmental actors about indigenous 
peoples’ ecological credentials and their visions for indigenous territories 
are also evident in debates around territorial management procedures. From 
22 Field notes, Concepción, 27 Feb. 2007.
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around 2000, the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, known as 
CIDOB, its NGO allies and foreign donors increasingly focused on gestión 
territorial [territorial management], leading to its implementation in TCOs 
across Bolivia.23 Indigenous organisations and NGOs had begun to debate 
the administration of the claimed territories in the late 1990s. This was seen 
as crucial to exercising self-determination and autogobierno [self-governance] 
(see CPESC, 2003). It was portrayed as a participatory process through which 
Chiquitano would define how they wanted to live in and govern the territory, 
as well as generating production, while simultaneously conserving natural 
resources and strengthening Chiquitano identity (Flores, 2006, pp. 7−8). As 
one NGO stated, Chiquitano could ‘enjoy the freedom to pursue their own 
development’, but NGO assistance was needed as Chiquitano ‘lacked the 
practical skills necessary to assume the challenge of autonomous territorial 
management’ (Tapia and del Pilar Valencia, 2007, p. 2). 
From 2005, and in line with gestión territorial, the Chiquitano organisation 
engaged in an NGO-financed project involving the ordenamiento, that 
is, ‘ordering’ the territory through settlement planning, establishing the 
exact amount of land each community could use and establishing zones for 
conservation and sustainable forestry (CGTI-MV et al., 2006, p. 11). Apart 
from carrying out studies focusing on establishing the territory’s economic 
potential, further NGO projects in 2006−7 concentrated on strengthening 
the organisational structures responsible for the TCO. Many leaders regarded 
territorial management as necessary in order to consolidate and strengthen 
the territorial claim to ownership of such a vast stretch of land. It was also 
feared that without a solid justification the INRA would ask: ‘for what do these 
Paicos [from Paikoneka, used in a derogatory fashion by some local whites and 
mestizos], the Indios need that much land?’24 There were specific anxieties about 
land and its ‘function’. Recent government rhetoric that likens indigenous 
groups with TCO titles to latifundistas gives such fears more substance. Despite 
legislation being passed that allowed indigenous groups like Chiquitano to gain 
territorial titles – hard-won by the country’s indigenous movements – these 
gains are now threatened by the government and, paradoxically, as addressed 
below, by the autonomy legislation which the movements hoped would deepen 
their rights (Weber, 2013b).
Critical Chiquitano voices have underlined the more problematic aspects 
of the process behind territorial management. Chiquitano leader José Bailaba 
noted that it seemed paradoxical to reeducate Chiquitano comunidades on 
how to manage their land. Should Chiquitano control territories with the 
23 In 2001, CIDOB signed a contract with the Danish embassy for a pilot project in territorial 
management in the Bolivian lowlands. 
24 Field notes, Concepción, 27 Feb. 2007.
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aim of living there according to their ‘own forms of economic, social and 
cultural organisation’ (CPESC, 2003, p. 33), how could they do so lacking 
the necessary practical skills? This highlights what Radcliffe (chapter 8) 
identifies with regard to environmental policy in Ecuador; namely, while such 
policies link indigeneity to conservation, they dismiss indigenous knowledge 
and practice (which at the very least needs to be improved), undermining the 
actual possibilities native groups might have to exercise self-determination 
and autonomy in their territories. Bailaba has highlighted the problems this 
could create. Experience has shown that productive activities, such as forestry 
management and agricultural activities can cause conflict among Chiquitano 
(CPESC, 2003, p. 33). Chiquitano Anacleto Peña voiced similar objections:
We are talking of territorial management of the TCO, according to the 
dictionary this is synonymous with administration. We talk of indigenous 
territorial management, which we perceive to be different and it has 
another conceptual meaning. For us the concept of territory, in the vision 
of the indigenous people, is to say where one is born, one grows, one 
reproduces, one lives … And territorial management as we the indigenous 
peoples see it, we have realised the administration of our territories since 
time memorable, of the natural riches, the fauna, the flora, we have lived 
from fishing, hunting, and gathering. In Lomerío, they have implemented 
projects of forestry extraction … but the experience gained in all this 
process, created discontent among the comunidades … and they forced the 
closure of the sawmill (my translation, quoted in CPESC, 2003, p. 33).
Thus, both highlight problematic aspects concerning productive and 
development activities. The issue here is not that no income should be generated, 
but is one of scale. Although projects such as cattle ranching or sustainable 
forestry management may provide an extra income in times of need, as José 
Bailaba and Anacleto Peña highlight, productive projects on a grander scale 
have often failed or created conflicts (see McDaniel, 2003).25
Further challenges
During the height of the Constituent Assembly in 2007, some Chiquitano 
leaders were considering what it would mean if their TCO gained recognition 
as an autonomous entity – one of the key political demands from lowland 
indigenous movements at the time. Chiquitano leaders felt this was a way of 
consolidating their territory, protecting it against the grip of the departmental 
elites and opponents of the territorial claim in Concepción. Several leaders 
expressed the opinion that autonomy was about ensuring the continuity of 
Chiquitano lifeways, achieving socio-cultural survival and securing livelihoods. 
As one leader highlighted, this also entailed finally obtaining the legal rights 
to make use of their renewable and non-renewable resources in what was after 
25 The circumstances surrounding the failure of such projects merit further investigation. 
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all their land.26 While the 2009 Constitution legislated for the possibility that 
indigenous groups accede to Indigenous First Peoples Peasant Autonomies, 
the government has been slow to implement them, if not actively been 
discouraging (Tockman and Cameron, 2014). Multiple restrictions mean that 
in order to accede to autonomous status, indigenous peoples need to adapt 
their ‘supposedly “autonomous” community-based modes of decision-making 
to the Bolivian state’s managerial logic’ (Cameron, in Tockman and Cameron, 
2014, p. 58). Rather than leading to a consolidation of self-determination 
this, combined with the fact that the Bolivian government has not actually 
relinquished control of natural resources to autonomous entities, is ‘seriously 
limiting the jurisdiction of indigenous self-governance and indigenous 
conceptions of territory’ (Tockman and Cameron, 2014, p. 54).
When I returned to Concepción in 2012, CICC leaders had yet to file for 
recognition of autonomous status for their TCO, and were worried about its 
future. As one of the leaders explained, not many Chiquitano had chosen to 
settle in the TCO because it lacked schools, health facilities and other amenities 
available in communities located closer to the municipal capital. This put an 
obstacle in the way, as the law indicated that a population of 1,000 was a 
prerequisite for gaining autonomous status (ibid., p. 51). Furthermore, a lack 
of Chiquitano settlers made it harder to prevent illegal logging or settlements. 
The Chiquitano communities’ right to the land might be questioned if other 
people put the TCO land to use, thereby potentially laying claim to it. But 
creating amenities and infrastructure in the territory requires resources. In 
2006−7, Chiquitano organisation had relied on funding from the Catholic 
church, a range of NGOs, and various government administrative institutions 
for productive and infrastructure projects. But in 2012, NGO funding had 
largely dried up; the Chiquitano organisation and its projects were maintained 
by municipal funding and through some of the functioning territorial 
management plans with which claimant communities now generated 
resources, partly to keep the CICC going.27 The municipality had been run 
by a MAS Chiquitano mayor since 2010, but such funds may vanish if the 
municipal power distribution changes (in 2012 CICC leaders and the mayor 
assured me that cooperation was good), hence increased economic activities 
by communities may be required to fulfil the Chiquitano leaders’ dream of 
an autonomous territory. While more research needs to be conducted into 
this topic, it seems that despite promises of autonomy, the situation of many 
Bolivians resembles that of territories elsewhere (but generally under neoliberal 
governance regimes). Although these have seen a delegation of responsibility, 
26 Interview, Concepción, 17 July 2007. The Chiquitano notions of autonomy will be explored 
in depth elsewhere. 
27 Interview, Concepción, 1 June 2007. More research needs to be carried out in relation to 
funding issues and the working of the management plans. 
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they lack the finances to match it, an example of ‘autonomy without resources’ 
(Stahler-Sholk, quoted in Erazo, 2013, p. xix). 
The shortcomings of such territorial governance regimes are thus exposed, 
and those of idealistic images of ecologically noble savages who rely on 
assumptions about indigenous supposedly ‘traditional’ and non-extractivist 
stances, as opposed to a governmental or entrepreneurial modern or market 
logic (compare McNeish, 2013). At the same time as indigenous peoples 
may aspire to futures where they can live ‘how past generations have lived’ 
as far as relationships with other peoples and within their own groups, and 
vis-à-vis more-than-human entities are concerned, they may also desire 
development in the form of improved access to housing, health, education 
and sustainable economic projects. Their leaders see such aspects as crucial 
to exercising territorial autonomy (compare McNeish, 2013, p. 236; Laing, 
2015). If capital for such plans is not forthcoming from other sources, they 
may negotiate payments with NGOs or donors for biodiversity protection 
or apply to carbon credit schemes. However, this would signify potentially 
relinquishing control over their lands (compare Erazo, 2013). Alternatively, 
they may actually have to (or want to) engage in certain economic activities 
in their territories, including exploiting subsoil resources. Or they might even 
grant concessions to third parties to do so, although this may put them at 
loggerheads with the government. It could also open up indigenous groups to 
criticism from those (NGOs, government officials, academics and more) who 
harbour ideals of the ‘environmentally noble savage’, or who invoke this image 
tactically to influence patterns of resource governance. Being based on the 
‘generic assumption that Native Americans’ relations to nature are equivalent 
to Western environmentalist principles’, this necessarily misrepresents native 
Amazonian communities’ lived realities and their main concerns (Conklin 
and Graham, 1995, p. 697). It fails to articulate indigenous peoples’ complex 
visions of how they wish to live in the future. This may involve different 
forms of development in the face of the reality that development and resource 
distribution, especially if state-led, has been uneven and generally not extended 
to indigenous lands and communities. 
Conclusion
This chapter has focused on the way that indigenous environmentalism 
discourses function in MAS rhetoric and NGO-indigenous projects, and 
examines their effects and limits. The Bolivian government is drawing on this 
discourse to intervene in international debates on climate change as well as 
using it to frame its vision for the Plurinational State. The administration has 
gone so far as to ratify the rights of Mother Earth, declaring her a ‘collective 
subject of public interest’ (Art. 5, Ley de Derechos de la Madre Tierra). While 
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the reforms and rhetoric promised a paradigm shift in human-environment 
and state-indigenous relations, there are some fundamental contradictions 
in MAS’s indigenous political project. As demonstrated here, it clashes with 
the administration’s developmentalist practice and dependence on extractive 
industries. In tackling the challenge of ‘how to develop and live well’, the 
administration has been unable to break a century-old dependence on 
extractivism and the established wisdom that the path forward lies in economic 
development and industrialisation (compare Postero, 2013, p. 88). Certainly, 
although the government’s rhetoric may capture the imagination of westerners 
involved in global climate change debates, it also clashes with the realities of 
what Evo Morales seeks to portray as an indigenous national political project, 
opening up the governmental project to further criticism. Moreover, MAS’s all-
inclusive national indigenous project has the potential to undermine regional 
and local indigenous political struggles and alternative lifeways, especially 
where the lands of these peoples encompass areas of economic interest. 
Worryingly for indigenous groups with TCO titles, MAS governmental 
spokespeople replicate the longstanding colonial discourse which deems lands 
inhabited by indigenous peoples to be ‘empty’ and ‘under-used’. This leads 
commentators to conclude that ‘official plurinationalism has come to look 
more like liberal multiculturalism, which reasserts the primacy of the central 
state over indigenous peoples and territories and minimizes the spaces for 
nonliberal forms of citizenship’ (Tockman and Cameron, 2014, p. 50).
While discursive strategies based on the ecologically noble savage may 
be beneficial to native groups in helping to articulate political projects and 
alliance building, and possibly leading to the granting of certain rights, 
it may also work to undermine their very struggle, and silence their voices. 
For groups like the Chiquitano, current Bolivian state legislation concerning 
indigenous territories and dominant environmental discourses have created a 
situation where they must live up to certain state-recognised or NGO-defined 
forms of organisation, administration and identification (that is, indigenous, 
peasant or originario) (Weber, 2013a). The territory has to be ‘used’, involving 
processes of sustainable ‘marketisation’, rather than being recognised as a 
space where human vis-à-vis human, and human vis-à-vis more-than-human 
relationships predominate. While Chiquitano want to live peacefully and 
‘like past generations have lived’, they are forced to demonstrate that they are 
capable of administering the space in ways that (non)governmental actors see 
fit, while their own practices and knowledges are dismissed, or at least are in 
need of improvement. Chiquitano self-determination goals and the way they 
envisage their livelihoods are neither expressed in the image of the eco-native, 
nor are easily compatible with the logic of sustainable production. If self-
determination and autonomy is to become a lived reality for native peoples, 
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the lived realities and socio-natures of Chiquitano must be included in what 
researchers, policymakers and environmental organisations take into account.
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8. The difference indigeneity makes: 
socio-natures, knowledges and 
contested policy in Ecuador
Sarah A. Radcliffe
Today Latin America is the site for vibrant debates concerning environment, socio-cultural difference, and the policy implications of diverse knowledges, as previous chapters have testified. Latin American 
places are central to the urgent environmental questions of our time such as 
Amazonian deforestation’s contribution to global climate change, the socio-
environmental consequences of biofuel plantations, and the challenges of 
urban sustainability. Socio-natures – that is, the overlapping and mutually 
constitutive relations and material assemblages that blur a conceptual divide 
between nature and culture, humans and non-humans – now lie at the heart 
of multidisciplinary debates about development. Within those discussions that 
recast the understandings of nature in Latin America, the notion of indigeneity 
often appears, with respect to the articulations of characteristics and political 
positionality associated with being indigenous (whether by self-identified 
individuals and groups, or diverse non-indigenous actors constructing a 
discourse about indigenous peoples).1 
Indigeneity epitomises new debates around socio-nature as it is often 
associated with marginal lands and pristine biospheres, although its meanings 
are always shifting and being rearticulated, relationally positioned with respect 
to other social categories and specific forms of socio-nature. Policymakers 
involved in biodiversity conservation and eco-system services often draw on 
long-standing associations between indigenous peoples and nature. Although 
these peoples are often seen as closer to nature than the ‘universal’ subject 
(Anderson, 2007), western understandings of indigenous knowledge regarding 
environments are often ambivalent; on the one hand, indigenous technical 
knowledge is celebrated, yet often perceived as largely empirical and only 
locally relevant. On the other hand, western representations of these peoples 
stress an affective, spiritual relation with land, arising from ancestral cultures 
untouched by history and politics. It is arguable that the Anthropocene’s 
1 See chapter 7 for Weber’s discussion of governmental discourses around indigeneity and the 
environment in Bolivia.
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generalised anxiety about the speed and consequences of global climate change 
entails a recalibration of these associations between a nurturing population and 
Nature writ large, which demand critical analysis. 
In Latin America, indigenous politics are often linked with environment 
policies and processes that threaten biospheres and climate change, with ethnic 
rights movements highlighting the centrality of hierarchies of postcolonial 
social difference to the way in which the environment is approached in the 
region (Fabricant, 2014; Postero, 2013; Offen, 2014). Indigenous peoples 
often understand environmental policies as the usual development round yet 
again, as summarised by a 2013 declaration: ‘The current ... development 
model promotes megaprojects, infrastructure … REDD+, carbon credits … 
which do not respect the individual and collective human rights of indigenous 
peoples’ (Foro Indígena, 2013). This chapter examines how environmental 
policy debates in post-neoliberal Ecuador position indigeneity, and the 
decolonial politics devised by these peoples to resignify indigeneity and recast 
the protection of environments. In this context, indigeneity does important 
work informing and positioning socio-natures in relation to all-too-human 
subjects and the political, administrative and development contexts in which 
they operate. Exploring these issues in ‘post-neoliberal’ Ecuador permits a 
grounded account of how indigeneity plays a role in moulding the ways socio-
natures are imagined, how conservation knowledge and policy are formulated, 
and how political contests emerge. The chapter suggests that, notwithstanding 
a degree of policy openness to indigenous knowledges, indigeneity is configured 
in ways that tend to reproduce relations of coloniality (Andolina et al., 2009).
The chapter ends by arguing for decolonising the discussions around 
environment and indigeneity.2 A growing debate about the colonial contexts 
within which knowledge is produced and circulates informs this account 
(Anderson, 2008; Jazeel and McFarlane, 2010; de la Cadena, 2010; Blaser, 
2010; Jazeel, 2014). Environmental policy necessarily entails processes of 
professional knowledge production and epistemological positioning (Briones, 
2011), which arguably necessitates analytical attention to the politicised way 
boundaries are drawn around human/more-than-human difference, especially 
in light of subaltern struggles over dispossession. 
According to geographer Kay Anderson (2007; also Bhabha, 1994, p. 
146), indigenous people become an important ‘hinge’ or means by which 
policymakers and scholars think through global environmental challenges, as 
western knowledge categorises these peoples as closer to nature. Yet dominant 
and metropolitan knowledges about environments and climate change rarely 
reflect critically on how indigeneity and its knowledges are constructed, or how 
2 Decolonisation seeks to rethink modernity in its co-constitution with coloniality, prompting 
the resignification of modernity’s key categories and knowledge production (Mignolo, 2000).
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indigenous struggles are positioned in emergent environmental policy.3 To do 
so first requires identifying the enunciation loci of diverse actors (policymakers, 
academics and indigenous peoples) brought together by ‘environmental 
protection’ (Sundberg, 2014), and secondly reexamining policies from 
indigenous perspectives reveals how environmental policy becomes mired in 
colonial exclusions and dispossession.4 In order to examine these dynamics, 
the chapter analyses two key policy shifts introduced since 2007, the year 
Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa was elected and inaugurated a profound 
shift in how environmental policy was formulated and debated. These include 
a payment project for forest biodiversity protection, a proposal to leave oil 
reserves unexploited (the Yasuní-ITT initiative), and indigenous decolonial 
politics of socio-natures. Each project seeks to protect nature while positioning 
indigeneity in distinctive ways and with diverse consequences for achieving 
indigenous rights regarding socio-natures (compare Ari, 2014, on Bolivia). 
Before sketching out the political and policy context, a couple of qualifiers 
are in order. The chapter does not present a systematic review of Ecuadorian 
indigenous peoples and environment politics, or a comprehensive overview 
of environmental policies in that country. Instead, it draws on collaborative, 
decolonial research with Kichwa and Tsáchila indigenous women regarding 
their experiences of, and responses to, development in order to reflect on 
environmental questions under post-neoliberalism (Radcliffe, 2015). Hearing 
their discussions at meetings, on buses and sitting around the fire at home informs 
the interpretation of Ecuador’s environmental debates and policies offered here. 
Emblematic (although not representative) of Kichwa female contributions to 
knowledge production and political debates is the figure of a Kunak Warmi, a 
‘knowledgeable woman’ in the Andean kichwa language. As well as addressing 
local problems, the Kunak Warmi reflects wider insights into the relationships 
between living forms, indigeneity (and the racism that accompanies it), and 
decision-making in post-neoliberal Ecuador (compare Gibson-Graham, 2011). 
To these women’s critical, often decolonial, perspectives on development, the 
chapter also adds material drawn from diversely positioned women belonging 
to Ecuador’s 12 other indigenous nationalities.5 Diverse indigenous women’s 
perspectives on environmental debates and policies are forged in relation to a 
differentiated and postcolonial field of knowledge production. In this chapter, 
these heterogeneous women provide an entry point into exploring contested 
socio-natures. 
3 Coletta and Raftopoulos, chapter 1, analyse the emergence of plural knowledge centres, which 
have transformed environmental agendas and conflicts in the region.
4 See Hall’s discussion on REDD+ in chapter 6.
5 Nationalities – nacionalidades − in the Ecuadorian context refer to major indigenous ethno-
cultural groupings.
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Figure 8.1: Kunak Warmi/knowledgeable woman, Quimiag parish, central Andes, 
Ecuador, International Women’s Day 2010 (author’s photo)
Buen Vivir and rights for nature: Ecuador in context 
Ecuador is world-renowned for its broad range of biodiverse habitats. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the country faces some of Latin America’s major 
environmental challenges, the 2008 Constitution and the planning process 
known as Buen Vivir – which seeks peaceful cohabitation between citizens 
and harmonious relations with nature – have strengthened the institutional 
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and legal basis for environmental protection.6 Recognising the rights of nature 
in the constitution became the first step in a resurgence of environmentalist, 
indigenous and civil society mobilisation around deforestation, petroleum 
dependency, mining and sustainable lifeways.7 
Debated throughout the 2007 constituent assembly and then ratified 
within the 2008 Constitution, the Buen Vivir approach emerged from a 
contentious politics involving diverse social movements including women, 
indigenous peoples, deep ecologists, sectors of the left and mainstream political 
actors. Buen Vivir in this sense represents a ‘radical questioning’ of modernist 
development’s high human and environmental costs, a questioning made 
‘possible within several indigenous traditions in South America’ (Gudynas, 
2011, p. 442). It also reflects how ‘Ontologies bring themselves into being 
and sustain themselves even as they interact, interfere and mingle with each 
other’ (Blaser, 2014, p. 7). Ecuador’s national Buen Vivir development plan 
is committed to 12 goals including endogenous development, an economy 
built on ‘solidarity’, recognition of unpaid (including reproductive) labour, 
cultural diversity, nature and environmental sustainability as constitutive 
of and as intrinsically valuable as social life. Buen Vivir seeks to centre 
sustainable and just forms of living for humans, and nature or Pachamama 
(earth more-than-human, in kichwa), in an ‘unprecedented biocentric turn’ 
(Escobar, 2010, p. 21). Moreover, Ecuadorian policy is embedded within 
a complex infrastructure of rights, most linked to western legal traditions, 
although the stress is on how rights are to be fulfilled in ‘harmonious 
existence with nature’ (Gudynas, 2011, p. 443). Buen Vivir selectively 
draws upon indigenous border thinking, making it the first nation-state 
endorsement of non-western epistemologies (de la Cadena, 2010; Cortez, 
2011). At its broadest, Buen Vivir can refer to diverse conceptions of more-
than-human assemblages and agency, including from the Shuar in Ecuador, 
Guaraní in Bolivia and Mapuche in Chile, socio-natural relations that do not 
claim universality. In Ecuador, the constitution outlines the rights of nature/
Pachamama in ways that hint at the profound impact of indigenous and deep 
ecology epistemologies that centre the liveliness of more-than-human nature 
and seek to recalibrate the balance between human and natural flourishing.8 
Constitutional article 71 states:
6 Through a strongly rights-based and social movement-influenced constituent process, the 2008 
Constitution incorporated a range of anti-neoliberal and pro-rights agendas, repositioning 
Ecuador in the global economy and restructuring the relationship between state, citizens and 
resources (Becker, 2010; Escobar, 2010; Radcliffe, 2012).
7 Also see Coletta and Raftopoulos, chapter 1, for details on the buen vivir concept.
8 I do not argue that policy recourse to an ethnic discourse of Pachamama indicates a reactionary 
utopia or a head-on confrontation with capital (compare Sanchez Parga, 2011). 
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Nature or Pachamama, where life is reproduced and exists, has the 
right to exist, persist, maintain and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, 
functions and its processes in evolution. Every person, people, 
community or nationality will be able to demand the recognition of 
rights for nature from public institutions.
Nevertheless, the constitution presumes that nature is exterior to the 
human condition and establishes human obligations towards nature 
(Sanchez Parga, 2011, p. 43). Buen Vivir represents a geographically and 
historically specific articulation of meanings, hopes and epistemologies from 
indigenous organisations, environmentalism, feminism, degrowth advocates, 
small farmers and many others, an ‘invented tradition’ unique to Ecuador 
(Bretón, 2013). Diverse women from multiple indigenous nationalities had 
expectations, as did others, of the rights of nature and Buen Vivir, as illustrated 
by early comments from Monica Chují, female vice-president of the Amazon 
indigenous confederation Confeniae and Constituent Assembly member. For 
her Buen Vivir represents ‘one of the most important and profound proposals 
in the context of globalisation, as a new model of development and economic 
growth.’ Around the time of the 2008 Constitution and the first Buen Vivir 
development plan (2009–13), Ecuador embarked on some specific measures 
to address environmental concerns which are summarised below.
Environment and indigeneity I: payments 
to protect forests 
Established in 2008, the Socio Bosque (Forest Partners) Program reflects 
the post-neoliberal government’s aim of compensating forest-dwelling 
communities in protecting biodiversity for its intrinsic values. Presenting 
itself as the vanguard of emissions-reducing measures, Ecuador devised 
Socio Bosque with technical assistance from Conservation International. 
The programme aims to protect over four million hectares of forest, reduce 
emissions and improve the wellbeing of around a million people in the 
poorest areas. To take one community example, the Amazonian Rukullakta 
community government receives $39,500 yearly under a 20-year contract 
with the government, representing a nominal payment to participants 
(Erazo, 2013; also de Koning et al., 2011; Krause and Zambonino, 2013). At 
the latest count, 12.8 per cent of target forests had been protected, and 5.6 
per cent of potential beneficiaries incorporated into the programme (Bertzky 
et al., 2010).
Although Socio Bosque began as a REDD+ project (Reducing Emissions 
through Deforestation and Forest Degradation),9 it is now institutionally 
9 See Hall, chapter 6.
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separate in Ecuador’s administration of environmental programmes.10 
However, similarities remain in that incentives (cash payments) are made to 
managers and users of vulnerable environments for forest conservation and 
protection. REDD programmes in Latin America often frame indigenous 
difference as powerful in particular ways. In this case, Socio Bosque directly 
unites indigeneity with environmental concerns as a third of targeted 
eco-systems are inside indigenous territories while 11 of the country’s 13 
indigenous nationalities have enrolled at least some land and territories into 
Socio Bosque (Bravo and Moreano, 2015). To deliver poverty alleviation, 
forest protection and global climate change mitigation, the programme calls 
upon indigenous subalterns to practice eco-system services in return for 
payment (Erazo, 2013), in the context of government attempts to launch 
the country as a primary provider of eco-system services for emerging carbon 
markets (Fitz-Henry, 2012, p. 272). By equating carbon reduction practices 
and monetary value, eco-systems service approaches have been critiqued 
for treating nature as another commodity within a market (Scales, 2014; 
Fitz-Henry, 2012), whereas in Ecuador’s post-neoliberal model, eco-systems 
services were deliberately framed in the 2008 Constitution as the remit of the 
nation-state, not the market (Acosta, 2010, p. 10). The Socio Bosque programme 
straddles these issues by pursuing environmental goals under constitutional 
commitments to nature’s rights, by paying for conservation behaviours. 
The programme raises questions about the relationship between 
indigeneity, the spaces for biodiversity conservation and postcolonial power 
relations. As in other conservation projects, the Socio Bosque overlaps 
environmental protection zones and indigenous territories and frames them 
as in need of particular modified forms of market relations. As Karl Polanyi 
has argued, policymakers at times attempt to legislate to designate certain 
subjects and objects as ‘not ready’ for the market and distance them from 
capitalism’s most destructive effects (Li, 2010). Latin American countries 
apply this model in areas inhabited by indigenous groups, most recently by 
bundling biodiversity and cultural diversity conservation goals into a new 
form of governance. Reserve areas seek to suspend both indigenous subjects 
and nature outside the most damaging effects of capitalism by means of this 
‘ethno-environmental fix’ (Anthias and Radcliffe, 2015). Such frames have a 
number of consequences for indigeneity’s position in conservation debates. 
First, indigeneity is framed as in positive synergy with a discrete nature 
category. On this basis, indigenous groups and nature are framed as equally 
incorporable into nationally-realised and globally-envisioned environmental 
governance. In other words, ‘indigenous and other forest-dwelling peoples 
10 The institutional separation was established around 2010 (Melissa Moreano, personal 
communication). 
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are now re-imagined in the context of global relations of biopolitical security 
linked to climate change’ (Latta, 2013, p. 573). 
Figure 8.2: Map of established Socio Bosque areas
Key:
Red – priority areas for Socio Bosque
Grey – indigenous territories
Purple – biomass carbon areas currently in Socio Bosque
Yellow – biomass carbon areas which are a priority for Socio Bosque
Source: M. Bertzky et al. (2010, p. 15). Reproduced with permission
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A second aspect is illustrated in the above figure, which shows how Socio 
Bosque imagines indigenous peoples are present – and policy-relevant – in 
remote, rural and environmentally-rich areas, a cartography that silences as 
much as it reveals. Beyond the realities of motley and heterogeneous urban 
and rural spaces where diverse forms of indigeneity are lived, this mapping 
of conservation-friendly indigenous subjects in Socio Bosque areas reflects a 
postcolonial politics in which indigenous actors lack full political voice and 
legitimacy in many spaces. Indigenous groups must fulfil the project terms to 
receive payment, but generally exert limited leverage when it comes to clarifying 
land title and enforcing rights; likewise, international REDD+ frameworks have 
yet to systematically incorporate global indigenous rights regimes (Lemaitre, 
2011). Under the terms of post-neoliberal payment for eco-system services, 
indigenous subjects are expected to conform to state governmentality – what 
anthropologist Agrawal terms ‘environmentality’ (2005) – in a depoliticised 
role as an indigenous subject synergistic with and subordinate to prevailing 
governmentality, consistent with REDD+ globally-directed goals (Hale, 2002). 
In this way, projects tend to reify indigeneity as local and subordinate, making 
diverse indigenous voices into a narrower version of indigeneity that leverages 
particular visibility in decision-making (for example, Hiraldo and Tanner, 
2011; Shankland and Hasenclever, 2011). 
Such experiences inform certain indigenous responses to Socio Bosque. 
The Amazon indigenous federation Confeniae rails passionately against 
what it perceives as the programme’s undermining of  indigenous economic, 
political and social rights. The federation scorns ‘local use’ of indigenous ‘local’ 
knowledge, effectively pointing to how Socio Bosque replicates coloniality-
modernity’s tendency, by which ‘indigenous systems of knowledge are reified 
by the very modern structures that marginalize them’ (Briones, 2011, p. 318). 
The programme fails to secure indigenous nationalities’ informed prior 
consent (despite its status as a constitutional right) on major infrastructure and 
extractive projects that continue unabated in, around and overlapping with 
indigenous-inhabited areas in the Amazon (Confeniae, 2009). In its critiques, 
the federation links REDD+ mechanisms with other international markets 
and neoliberal measures, each of which over recent decades deepened subaltern 
impoverishment and entrenched political marginalisation. For these reasons, 
the indigenous movement rejects Socio Bosque, as it represents ‘a continuation 
of the type of policies that have impeded their quest for sovereignty and self-
determination’ (Reed, 2011, p. 525). Despite Socio Bosque’s admirable goal of 
protecting cultural and biodiverse enclaves, the issues of knowledge, difference 
and authority remain outside the terms of this policy field. 
Between the 1948 UN Charter on Human Rights and the 2007 UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, decades of dispossession 
PROVINCIALISING NATURE170
unfurled through place-specific combinations of racialised denial of a common 
humanity, skewed legal systems, and discourses of progress/ development/ 
modernity in ways that suspended human rights’ applicability to indigenous 
groups. Moments of particularly acute and rapid forms of dispossession 
were associated with neoliberalism and post 9/11 securitisation, after which 
rapidly expanding extractive frontiers have continued to displace indigenous 
populations while undermining their effective recourse to policy, law and power 
to protect rights and interests. Indigenous groups, such as those in Ecuador, 
live in postcolonial nation-states that claim sovereignty over the entire national 
territory and subterranean realms. As under previous Ecuadorian republican 
governments, the post-neoliberal state continues to claim state sovereignty over 
subsoil resources such as oil reserves, thereby establishing the legal-political 
framework for interventions in indigenous territories in the name of national 
interest. The political ground over which environmental policy is implemented 
does not, then, represent a ‘symmetrical antagonism’ between a nation-state and 
indigenous groups (Parry, 2004, p. 14), but a playing-field tilted by coloniality-
modernity’s construction of space and difference. Postcolonial power relations 
set the conditions under which indigeneity is linked to conservation in the 
first place, whereas longstanding indigenous demands for autonomy and self-
determination are delegitimised. Environmental policy could hence be argued 
to be perpetuating the notion of ‘empty lands’, a policy imagination that 
undercuts existing inhabitants’ visibility and presence, while dismissing their 
knowledge and practices as excess to universal policy procedures and priorities. 
In response to such postcolonial knowledge production, indigenous subjects 
mobilise alternative forms of knowledge including understandings of more-
than-human agency and difference (de la Cadena, 2010).11 Informed about 
geographies and histories of resource dispossession, diverse Ecuadorian 
indigenous women articulate specific critiques concerning the Socio Bosque 
programme, as became clear during a nationwide consultative project with 
indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian women (Radcliffe et al., 2014). According 
to Gloria, a Sápara woman from the Amazon region, Socio Bosque did not 
represent a means of protecting her livelihood and indigenous autonomy, but 
rather an unwelcome intervention that would further her dispossession. As she 
recounted, 
I met with [staff from] Socio Bosque and asked them ‘What is happening? 
They are buying up our territory.’ They asked me how I knew. And then 
payments – no one gives away money for conservation, the conservation of 
Sápara territory! (Interview, August 2012) 
11 Subalterns may strategically essentialise heterogeneous (more-than-) human identity, interests 
and difference to make sustained arguments ‘from below’, e.g. Fabricant (2014) on Bolivia. 
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This Amazonian woman amplifies long-standing critiques of the successive 
waves of global development expressed by diverse indigenous women in 
Ecuador’s Amazon, Andean and coastal regions (Radcliffe, 2015). She testifies 
how energies of the earth – what de la Cadena calls ‘earth beings’ (2010) – 
have political interests that could be harmed through Socio Bosque. Her 
words also provide insights into contemporary linkages between indigeneity 
and environment. Whereas Gloria makes her claims to indigenous forms 
of socio-nature management with reference to historical connections to a 
specific territory, she also reveals her politicised awareness of the postcolonial 
constraints placed upon such a configuration. In her narrative, indigenous 
places are contingent and precariously defended in comparison with ‘national’ 
socio-territories. To challenge the status quo, she argues that the state’s interest 
in Amazonian biodiversity silences indigenous peoples’ rights to give free prior 
informed consent as established in legal instruments such as International 
Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 169, the United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the 2008 Constitution. 
Additionally, global rights and environmental protection are constituted 
on the ground as ontological and epistemological struggles. Gloria views 
Socio Bosque through indigenous epistemologies that blur the Eurocentric 
distinctions between society and nature, humans from non-human forms of 
life. In encounters with Socio Bosque employees, she discovered the project 
understands ‘environment’ in ways that accord with dominant postcolonial 
‘universal’ knowledges and not her socio-natural knowledges. The Socio 
Bosque team member told her, ‘“No, here above is your indigenous land, and 
below is the state’s.” That’s what he told me!’ Gloria’s response highlights the 
distinctive ontological positions in this encounter, ‘I said, “What did you say? 
We have a spirit that lives within the earth. The alive spirits live there. For this 
they say uku runa live in the mountain. [The earth is] alive. Where are they [the 
uku runa] going to live [with the Socio Bosque]?” This exploitation is going 
to throw everything out.’ Gloria thereby decentres western epistemologies of 
individual human rights. For her, Socio Bosque risks unleashing potentially 
damaging consequences for a life form that exists beyond that envisioned in 
the project’s design, but which is key to her socio-natural world. Her words 
highlight how ‘the distinct ontological positioning of indigenous peoples has 
been shut out of REDD debates’, as elsewhere in Latin America (Latta, 2013, 
p. 574). 
Situated within socio-natures of human and non-human animate, political 
and significant actors, the Sápara contest the ontological basis of global 
environmental policy and debates as they interact with socio-natures outside 
dominant ‘environment’ policy categories. Gloria’s critical knowledges about 
Socio Bosque generate two significant implications for our understanding 
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of the difference indigeneity makes in debates and policies. Firstly, Gloria’s 
scepticism about policymakers’ sudden interest in her territory highlights the 
always-already political field against which indigeneity and environment are 
linked in current interventions. Secondly, as discussed at greater length below, 
Ecuadorian indigenous subjects and movements strategically bring a distinctive 
epistemology-ontology to push environmental debates further in directions 
that bring into focus the exclusions associated with coloniality-modernity. 
Environment and indigeneity II: Yasuní-ITT
First proposed in 2007, the environmental protection policy known as the 
Yasuní-ITT initiative was devised to raise pledges to a United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP)-administered fund in return for which 
Ecuador would not exploit the petrol reserves found under the Yasuní National 
Park, one of the world’s most biodiverse habitats as well as the ancestral and 
present territories of several indigenous populations, including Waorani and 
diverse uncontacted groups (Rival, 2010). Some 200,000 hectares of the park 
had already been designated a protected area, within existing environmental 
policy.12 Despite reservations about the Yasuní-ITT scheme’s long-term 
viability, international pledges to the fund began to flow in. The post-neoliberal 
government rethought its objectives, and by July 2013 a state commission 
concluded that the plan’s economic results were insufficient. Correa terminated 
the plan in August 2013, citing the failure to generate more than $13.3 million. 
At the time of writing, the UNDP is reimbursing funds and encouraging 
donors to reinvest in alternative sustainability options. Rather than identify 
why the initiative ended,13 my focus is on how the Yasuní proposal enrolled 
indigeneity issues.
What difference does indigeneity make to this proposal? As in the case 
of Socio Bosque, the Yasuní-ITT was to be rolled out directly in territories 
with resident indigenous populations, yet it also raised key issues about the 
differential valuing of western and indigenous epistemologies in environmental 
policymaking. Diverse indigenous women engaged in debating Yasuní-ITT and 
the politics that led to its closure, critiques that draw extensively on decolonial 
politics as well as ontologies involving political earth-beings. In October 2013, 
Alicia Cawiya, vice-president of the Waorani Nation of Ecuador (NAWE) from 
Amazonia, spoke at the national Assembly (parliament) against conservation 
12 The park was also subject to familiar pressures: from the 1990s successive governments drilled 
for oil, built the Maxus road, and granted exploitation rights in bordering areas. Indeed, during 
the initiative, some government departments held negotiations over oil prospecting in other 
areas.
13 Yasuní-ITT plan’s demise has been attributed to international conservatism, lack of sound 
economic planning, over-ambitious goals and unrealistic expectations. 
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areas such as Yasuní-ITT that ignored indigenous self-determination and rights: 
‘We demand our territory. Before it was immense, [but] the government always 
wants to divide it up [with] an intangible zone, [or] the Yasuní Park ... Where 
are the Waorani administering? They’re throwing us out of everything, other 
people from cities, working and administering from elsewhere.’ Reminding 
parliamentarians of Waorani rights to free informed prior consent, Cawiya 
continued: 
The resource that comes out [of the ground] is petrol. The assembly 
approved the award of 5 per cent [of oil revenues] to be managed by 
autonomous parish councils. But they are not the Waorani! They are 
denying us the Amazon, so we don’t agree … How have we benefited? 
There should be a consultation for the Yasuní. All the ancestors disagree 
[with the plan]. I ask it as a Waorani woman. ... You can say that the whole 
world is in favour of exploiting the Yasuní, but we aren’t. For that reason 
we were born in the Yasuní, like a woman. (Cited in Colectivo Miradas 
Críticas, 2014, pp. 77–80)
Elaborating in later press interviews, Cawiya clarified that exploitation was as 
much about her peoples’ rights to oil revenues as it was overturning romantic 
notions of indigeneity’s natural conservationist attitudes. Other indigenous 
women drove home the issues of sovereignty and self-determination, arguing 
that the government was trespassing on indigenous territories (Manuela Ima, 
former NAWE chairwoman, cited in Arsel and Ávila, 2012, p. 218). 
Environment and indigeneity III: decolonising 
indigeneity and nature 
The above sections highlight the urgency of indigenous struggles over 
Ecuadorian environmental policies and debates and how they are informed by 
direct experience of environmental projects as well as by distinctive ontological 
perspectives regarding ‘nature’. As documented through ethnographic work, 
diverse Ecuadorian indigenous groups often view the world in terms of 
living chains that engage active and powerful more-than-human agents, as 
well as diverse human subjects (Blaser, 2010; Cepek, 2011; Descola, 2012; 
Kohn, 2013). Informed by these ontologies, critical engagement with 
western policy-related ontologies on environments occurs in highly diverse 
political contexts, underlining the importance of situated understandings of 
indigeneity, socio-natures and policy. Hence, although the 2008 Constitution, 
the Buen Vivir development plans and indigenous rights organisations such 
as La Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (Coniae) and 
Codenpe14 all use the term ‘Pachamama’ what they mean by it in relation to 
14 Ecuador’s indigenous development council, Consejo de Desarrollo de las Nacionalidades y 
Pueblos del Ecuador (Codenpe) represented indigenous peoples’ primary institutional location 
in the Ecuadorian state from the late 1990s to 2014.
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policy is quite distinct, especially in the context of increasing tension between 
the Correa government and indigenous and other social movements.15 
In the complex coalitions with degrowth advocates, environmentalists, deep 
ecologists and others, indigenous Pachamama conceptions became associated 
with a perspective whereby ‘all living beings have equal ontological value’ 
(Acosta, 2010, p. 7). Furthermore, indigenous intellectuals argue living beings 
include diverse mineral, water and ‘earth beings’ that westerners understand to 
be inanimate landscapes (streams, rocks, mountains and so on).16 Harmonious 
relations between humans and these other beings are captured by the kichwa 
term ‘sumak kawsay’, defined thus by an Andean indigenous woman:
Sumak kawsay is the life that we see on waking in the morning; it’s a life 
in plenitude, this life in harmony; it’s life in conversation with all the Apus 
[mountains viewed as more-than-human agents]; it’s me and everyone living 
with nature, eating from the land, rituals, our festivals. Eating what Mother 
Earth gives us; this is life in equilibrium. This life in harmony is sumak kawsay 
that we’ve lived for over 10,000 years. (Laura, an educationalist in the third 
sector, speaking at a public policy meeting in 2010)
According to Luis Macas, an indigenous intellectual, who is director of 
independent thinktank Scientific Institute of Indigenous Cultures and Coniae’s 
ex-president, its ‘meaning comes from kichwa and contains two concepts. 
Sumak signifies plenitude, magnitude, justice, complement, the superior. 
Kawsay is life in constant realisation, dynamic and changing; it’s the interaction 
of the totality of existence in movement’ (2011). Sumak kawsay has hence 
been translated as buen vivir or living well and, after its meanings had been 
reconfigurated, it was incorporated into the constitution and development 
planning, as previously discussed. 
Drawing again on indigenous women’s insights, this section explores how 
concepts of Pachamama and ontologies of more-than-human earth beings 
provide insights into Ecuador’s environmental debates and policy struggles.17 
Specifically, heterogeneous indigenous women focus on decolonisation, and 
what it means for knowledge production, decision-making and statecraft in 
15 The gap between government and civil society understandings of nature/Pachamama 
is beyond this chapter’s remit. Contributory factors include Alberto Acosta’s exit from 
government, the breakdown of relations between Correa and former indigenous allies, the 
shift of political power to the SENPLADES planning secretariat, and a developmentalist 
modernising macroeconomic policy.
16 Wylie, chapter 2, discusses how indigenous and European views on the relationship between 
humans and non-humans in the South American tropics has been revisited through 
foundational narratives since the early modern period. 
17 Sumak kawsay has been articulated, worked and reimagined by diversely-positioned actors; 
here it refers to Andean rural, low-income Kichwa women’s uses and meanings. 
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relation to human and more-than-human thriving.18 Sumak kawsay arises out 
of and speaks back to what indigenous intellectual Luis Macas calls ‘historic 
experiences of life [which are] converted into struggles and proposals’, forged 
through coloniality-modernity’s exclusions (2011, p. 52). These conceptions 
build up from a distinctive ontology, challenging modern development, 
economies, the nation-state and natures, and as such they are entangled with 
measures to decolonise Ecuador (Escobar, 2010; Walsh, 2010).
Through discussions and meetings, Andean Kichwa women and their 
representatives clarify what Pachamama is, how it links to heterogeneous 
politics of decolonisation, anti-consumerism, rural orientations and more-than-
human politics of sumak kawsay, and how it differs from state environmental 
policies. For these indigenous subjects to articulate sumak kawsay constitutes 
a political act which materialises the world in a specific direction, as it enrols a 
series of practices that constitute forms of being and seeks more than the daily 
experiences of bare life and second-class citizenship. By placing a more-than-
human agency in equal position with all (heterogeneous) humans, Pachamama 
dissolves the society-nature dualism, expands the polis boundaries (the public 
sphere and the interests represented in it), and hence citizenship (Gudynas, 
2011, p. 445). Pachamama signals a relationship not of human domination 
over nature, but one of understanding the mutual relations of care and 
nurturing, as well as the intrinsic power of more-than-human agents to act on 
the human world.
As human relations with Pachamama represent a bundle of practices and 
knowledges about human relations with the more-than-human, Kichwa rural 
women feel uniquely privileged to comment upon socio-economic priorities 
and templates for action that arise in relation to sumak kawsay. If neoliberal 
multiculturalism offered conditional recognition of difference, Kichwa women 
are aware that, for the first time in their lives, government policy and public 
debate are being discussed in terms they consider to be their own (Radcliffe, 
2015). Yet diverse village Kichwa women noted how the new constitution talks 
of buen vivir yet does not, for them, equal sumak kawsay which, they argue, 
is a dynamic of mutual care for a more-than-human earth being linked to the 
decolonisation of territory, state and knowledge-making. 
For us now there is no sumak kawsay; the little gifts the government 
gives us aren’t sumak kawsay. Sarah, you’ve seen that we don’t have water 
for irrigating our crops. We don’t have buen vivir, we lack healthcare – 
we don’t have medicines in the community. And the government says 
that health has improved for everyone. But that’s not true – we don’t 
have anything. (Interview, Delia, COMICH women’s representative, 
Chimborazo, 2010)
18 As above, this requires situating indigenous women’s epistemologies and ontologies within 
contested political spheres and incommensurate forms of knowledge production and 
decision-making.
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The real sense of buen vivir has been lost, of the coexistence of nature and 
people, as women, as men. (Anonymous women’s representative for coastal 
nationalities, speaking at public policy meeting, 2010)
Sumak kawsay is thus mutually embedded in the personal-political practices 
that underpin Andean notions of reciprocity, relationality, correspondence 
and complementarity with other humans and more-than-humans including 
Pachamama (Acosta and Martinez, 2011). Politicising their daily lives, women 
from Kichwa and other nationalities posit that Pachamama and sumak kawsay 
do not correspond to existing Ecuadorian analytical and planning boundaries 
which separate political economy and culture, national project and everyday 
livelihood. Instead, they articulate a set of priorities for life by recalibrating and 
in large part deliberately blurring the boundaries between politics and nature, 
between humans and climate security, and dignity. 
Well before buen vivir principles were incorporated into the constitution 
and national plans, multiple indigenous women defined and defended these 
care relations, especially in agriculture, by encouraging seed and crop diversity, 
local production-exchange circuits and biospheres: 
For indigenous people, [a life force] is present in the animals, food, the 
fields, in the sown ground, in the land. We first have to say thanks to the 
Pachamama, ask her authorisation to start harvesting. So it’s to do with all 
seres [all beings, human and more-than-human]. So sumak kawsay is not 
just about eating well; it’s about living all this presence with the seres which 
give life to all existence. (Middle-aged Kichwa woman working as midwife, 
speaking at focus group, Chimborazo, 2009) 
In turn, these practices feed into national and international activism with calls 
for communities, waters, air, forests and oceans to be declared food sovereignty 
areas, free of extraction, deforestation and industrial food production. 
According to some Kichwa, women have a gender-specific connection to 
socio-natures. Yet village women and elected representatives do not privilege or 
dehistoricise female connections to the more-than-human.19 Women’s accounts 
of sumak kawsay highlight the need to understand indigeneity as inherently 
intersectional, heterogeneous and dynamic: ‘It’s the women who defend the 
territory the most in demonstrations and uprisings. They bring the idea that the 
land is not marketable, that it cannot be reduced to a commodity – that’s their 
idea’ (Maria, Andean Kichwa development professional, Quito 2009). This 
view is echoed by rural Kichwa women who discuss the environment/more-
than-human as relations of mutual care and nurturing in which Pachamama’s 
19 Femininity is privileged in other indigenous statements about environment, e.g. an 
international indigenous women’s meeting stated ‘As we women are part of nature and the 
universe, we are called to care and defend nature because our millennial history and culture 
follows from nature’ (Mandato 1 Cumbre, 2009; compare female indigenous leader Nina 
Pacari, 2009, pp. 33–4).
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power and authority rely upon women’s actions, just as earth-beings animate 
women’s concerns and priorities. 
In conversations around more-than-human agency, rural Andean Kichwa 
women without leadership roles expressed sumak kawsay’s epistemological 
and ontological consequences, based upon practices that guarantee relations of 
mutual constitution and care between human and more-than-human actors. 
Their female leaders in turn invest Pachamama with meanings that exceed 
its appearance in the constitution, reflecting a long history of indigenous 
intellectual activity in conjunction with a series of organisational efforts to 
articulate critical knowledges:
We women were thinking about [sumak kawsay] before Conaie and 
before Ecuarunari and the NGOs … Women have been thinking about 
sumak kawsay for a very long time. We’ve talked about the protection of 
Pachamama, care of the environment, and how we produce organic food. 
Also for sumak kawsay we have been working a lot on identity, valuing our 
own kinds of food, the community ways of life, organisation. (Focus group 
of rural and urban Kichwa women, Chimborazo, 2009)
Numerous indigenous women leaders – and grassroots constituencies – 
express non-mainstream epistemologies to intervene in current debates 
on environment and development. In Ecuador, these non-essentialised 
perspectives owe their depth to years of activism, informal education and lively 
epistemologies, not ‘dead tradition’ (Chakrabarty, in Sundberg, 2014, p. 38). 
Indigenous women mobilise their connections to more-than-human agents to 
make specific interventions in environmental policy debates (de la Cadena, 
2010), in demands for food sovereignty, organic agriculture, access to drinking 
and irrigation water, and protection of heath lands.
Indigenous formulations of sumak kawsay disrupt ‘the separation between 
“nature” and “humanity” on which [western/global] political theory was 
historically founded’ (de La Cadena, 2010, p. 342). As in Bolivia, the Ecuadorian 
indigenous movement has recruited the Pachamama into contemporary anti-
colonial struggles and linked environmental debates and policies to a politics 
of decolonisation (Ari, 2014). Pachamama and sumak kawsay become integral 
to agendas of the plurinational intercultural nation-state in which diverse 
nationalities could pursue their own ‘living in harmony’ agendas. Expressed in 
terms of overturning colonial codes (racism, inequality, nature exploitation), 
Andean decolonisation profoundly rethinks the categories, relations and values 
that inform decision-making, participation and public policy (Codenpe, 2011; 
Aparicio and Blaser, 2008). In this political ontology, indigenous intellectuals 
envision new socio-spatial relations reflecting Ecuador’s multiverse of humans 
and more-than-humans (Blaser, 2014). These dynamics are illustrated in the 
indigenous women’s activism on climate change that took place in Lima in 
July 2014. Here female representatives from diverse ethno-cultural groups, 
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organisations, religions and generations called for effective participation in 
climate change decision-making in national and international policy; women’s 
collective rights to land and forests; and the integration of women’s vision 
and natural resource management into policy (Indigenous Women Combat 
Climate Change, 2014). 
Women do not simply echo ethnic male leadership’s decolonisation agendas 
(Colectivo Miradas Críticas, 2014, pp. 51–3; Radcliffe, 2015), but rather 
argue for deessentialised understandings of Pachamama and sumak kawsay 
in order to build on women’s creative and unfixed roles in human wellbeing 
and environmental sustainability. Hence they struggle to ensure diversity is 
recognised within diversity and that indigeneity is not reduced to a masculinist 
interpretation. Ana Maria, professional agronomist and recently-elected local 
councillor, expresses this: 
We think of sumak kawsay in terms of food, the environment, in water, 
in the protection of lands and slopes. So it’s something integrated. We’re 
talking about how we all must live well, well-fed, well-educated, with 
our own rights, right to life, good environment, right to a good state 
education. And that we’re all accepted – men, women, boys and girls 
without discrimination on the basis of colour, ethnicity, clothing, and 
language – nothing! (Interview, Chimborazo, 2009)
Hence female leaders intervene in public policy debates knowing that 
references to Pachamama and decolonial politics will be understood, at least as 
buen vivir, even if interlocutors are not fully conversant with sumak kawsay’s 
non-western ontologies. At the II Continental Summit of Indigenous Women 
of Abya Yala, held in Cauca, Colombia in November 2013, more than 4,000 
delegates gathered from Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Guatemala, Mexico, Venezuela, 
Panama, Colombia and Chile to debate priorities. They discussed development 
and resistance strategies to protect human and indigenous women’s collective 
and gender rights, and challenge racism and inequalities, and concluded that 
resource extraction, water and forest exploitation, and megaprojects continue 
to produce impoverishment, displacement, and the loss of knowledges and 
sovereignty. In turn they called for ethnic movements and nation-states to ensure 
women’s consistent, dignified, full and authorised participation in decision-
making, political office and design of public policies (Declaration Piendamó, 
2013). These agendas position sumak kawsay as a politics embedded in neither 
anti-globalisation agendas nor localist cultures, but a hybrid standpoint politics 
occupying multiple spaces and scales. 
Conclusion 
The shifting meanings of indigeneity present today in Ecuador – and Latin 
America – do specific and impactful ‘work’ in debates around environments 
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and socio-natures. Deliberately confronting mainstream interpretations of 
indigeneity and environment, this chapter draws on indigenous women’s 
words and postcolonial feminist theorisations to recast and reimagine the 
links between indigeneity and environment. Indigenous women’s emphasis on 
diversity within diversity, on indigeneity’s constantly shifting meanings and 
practices, provide invaluable insights into the loaded term of ‘indigenous’, 
especially in the context of debates over environments and policy. Hence, 
the chapter reroutes indigeneity not through modernist expectations about 
conservation-friendly practices, or the synergy of indigenous knowledge with 
environmental protection goals. Instead, it argues that indigeneity – as it is 
entangled with politicised epistemologies-ontologies of the more-than-human 
– makes a difference to environmental debates and policies in Ecuador. This 
critical indigeneity challenges widespread assumptions about the shared interests 
of socio-natures and indigenous subjects by highlighting the latter’s marked 
postcolonial status, and querying how policymakers decide about nature as if 
it were incapable of demands and politics. By systematically producing Other 
ways of thinking about socio-natures, and by reconfiguring the ways in which 
indigeneity is linked to environment in dominant thinking, indigenous politics 
– in complex interactions with other civil and political actors – decentres 
human agency. It also queries policy’s tendency to privilege disembodied 
and merely human knowledges. Environments and places, according to this 
approach, are produced through dynamic multiscalar networks which enrol 
more-than-human actors (de la Cadena, 2010; Latta, 2013, p. 570; Gibson-
Graham and Roelvink, 2009; Head and Gibson, 2012). 
Where does this take us? First, more attention needs to be paid to how 
knowledge production on ‘the environment’ tends to either ignore or essentialise 
indigenous peoples (compare Mignolo, 2000; Blaser, 2014). As others have 
pointed out, professional and academic knowledge production claims authority 
and awareness in part through excluding indigenous people as active and 
informed knowledge producers (Briones, 2011; Blaser, 2010; Jackson, 2014). 
Viewing such production and deployment in environmental policy debates 
as an inherently political process in which there are no innocent, universal or 
a-historical positions should animate contemporary debates around the politics 
of global climate change. Andean indigenous knowledge production represents 
an empirical and theoretical challenge to climate change’s depoliticisation which 
has been demonstrated by Swyngedouw (2011), Wainwright and Mann’s bleak 
climate change-driven scenarios (2013), and Chakrabarty’s point about western 
modernists’ difficulty in thinking about ‘humans ... acting like a geophysical 
force’ (2012). Andean indigenous women’s perspectives suggest that instead of 
‘liken[ing] humans to some nonhuman nonliving agency’ (Chakrabarty, 2012, 
p. 11), as if it were a static and passive substrate (Jackson, 2014, p. 77), Andean 
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earth-being agents contribute to diversely-positioned situated knowledge about 
the mutual imbrications of humans with geologically-scaled processes. The 
issues highlighted in the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
report require multiscalar and multifaceted as well as urgent action, on which 
indigenous epistemologies could perhaps offer unique perspectives.
Second, the Ecuadorian case suggests post-humanist approaches 
themselves can usefully engage with decolonisation perspectives and 
decolonising methodologies, especially where these draw on indigenous 
epistemologies (Walsh et al., 2002; Smith, 2012; Sundberg, 2014, p. 38). 
The more-than-human or post-humanist approach questions dominant 
western ontologies by reexamining humanity’s engagement with the agency, 
politics and assemblages of nature/non-human forces and actors. Examining 
indigeneity shines a light on how to retheorise the society-nature divide, and 
this chapter suggests that differently situated subjects and their knowledges 
have to be granted full ontological recognition within post-humanism 
(Blaser, 2014; Sundberg, 2014). As already established in relation to the 
Andes, ‘the expansion of the political spectrum [to include more-than-
human agents] may destabilize governmental categories, those population-
making tools that regulate life and death in a non-state’ (de la Cadena, 2006, 
p. 345). In contemporary Ecuadorian environmental policies and debates, 
Andean indigenous border thinking brings insights into the political realm, 
putting more-than-human agency to lever change in struggles over the 
regulation and protection of ‘nature’. Indigenous women and ethnic rights 
organisations’ inclusion of Pachamama’s more-than-human agency arises in 
the context of a decolonising political agenda that has powerful contributions 
to make to environmental debates and policies. 
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